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EXCLUSIONIST RIGHT PARTIES IN
WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS

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Abstract.

This dissertation is mainly concerned with political parties that usually cluster inside the area of right-wing radicalism. Major changes concerning Western European party systems represent the background of analysis. The study is underpinned on the recognition that, after the emergence of ecology and left-libertarian parties, the rise of right-wing parties is the most relevant and debated transformation in the configuration of party systems. Fourteen EU-member states are included in the set of inquiry and life-span analysis ranges from 1990 to 2009. Firstly, the examination focuses on the identification of parties at stakes with the purpose of elaborating a suitable label. By exploring the right deviancy on value and cultural topics through expert survey datasets, the final label for those actors is Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs). Secondly, the research takes into account factors that potentially affected the electoral performances of ERPs. The related framework is two-fold, composed of demand and supply sides. On the one hand, for the demand side, individual-level data are inspected; on the other hand, for the supply side, expert judgments have been employed to plot party positions along a couple of domains, i.e. economy and immigration. In conclusion, the aim of the final chapter is to shed light on the different ERPs' electoral fortunes by pinpointing patterns of multiple combinations of conditions and constructing a weighted additive index.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGALEV	To Start Living Differently (Anders Gaan Leven) — current name: The Greens (Groen!)
AN	National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale)
BE	Left Block (Bloco de Esquerda)
BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego)
BNP	British National Party
BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich)
CC	Common Course (Fælles Kurs) [<i>Denmark</i>]
CC	Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria) [<i>Spain</i>]
CCD	Christian Democratic Centre (Centro Cristiano Democratico)
CD	Centre Democrats (Centrum-Demokraterne) [<i>Denmark</i>]
CD	Centre Democrats (Centrumdemocraten) [<i>Netherlands</i>]
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl)
CDS	Social and Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático y Social)
CDS/PP	Democratic and Social Centre/People's Party (Centro Democrático e Social/Partido Popular)
CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) [<i>Germany</i>]
CDU	Christian Democratic Union (Cristiani Democratici Uniti) [<i>Italy</i>]
CDU	Democratic Unity Coalition (Coligação Democrática Unitária) [<i>Portugal</i>]
CDU/KD	Christian Democratic Unity (Kristen Demokratisk Samling) — current name: Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna)
CHA	Aragonese Council (Chunta Aragonesista)
CIU	Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió)
COM/V	Communists (Kommunisterna) — current name: Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)
CONS	Conservative Party
CP	Popular Coalition (Coalición Popular)
C	Centre Party (Centerpartiet)
CPN	Communist Party of the Netherlands (Communistische Partij Nederland)
CPNT	Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition Party (Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Traditions)
CSU	Christian-Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern)
CVP/CD&V	Christian People's Party (Christelijke Volkspartij) — current name: Christian Democratic and Flemish (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams)
D	The Right (La Droite)
D66	Democrats 66 (Politieke Partij Democraten 66)
DA	Democratic Alternative (Demokraattinen Vaihtoehto)
DC	Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana)
DEM/DL	Democrats/Democracy is Freedom (Democratici/Democrazia È Libertà)
DF	Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)
DI	Democratic Intervention (Intervenção Democrática)
DIKKI	Democratic Social Movement (Dimokratiki Kinoniku Kinima)
DKP	Communist Party of Denmark (Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti) [<i>Denmark</i>]
DKP	German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei) [<i>Germany</i>]
DL	Liberal Democracy (Démocratie Libérale)
DP	Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletaria)
DSP	Democratic Socialist Party
DVU	German People's Union (Deutsche Volksunion)
EA	Basque Solidarity (Eusko Alkartasuna)

EAJ-PNV	Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea — Partido Nacionalista Vasco)
ECOLO	Ecologists (Écologistes)
EKA	Pensioners for the People (Eläkeläiset Kansan Asialla)
EL	Unity List – The Red-Greens (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne)
EM	Greek Front (Eliniko Metopon)
ERC	Republican Left of Catalonia (Equerra Republicana de Catalunya)
FDF/RW	Democratic Front of the Francophones (Front Démocratique des Francophones) — current name: Rassemblement Wallon (Walloon Rally)
FDP	Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)
FDPL	Finnish People’s Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto)
FE-JONS	Spanish Phalanx of the Assemblies of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (Falange Española de la JONS)
FF	Fianna Fáil – The Republican Party (Fianna Fáil – An Páirtí Poblachtánach)
FG	Family of the Irish — United Ireland Party (Fine Gael)
FI	Forward Italy (Forza Italia)
FN	National Front (Front National) [<i>Belgium</i>]
FN	National Front (Front National) [<i>France</i>]
FOLKB	People’s Movement (Folkebevægelsen)
FP	Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet)
FPL	Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet liberalerna)
FPÖ	Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs)
G	The Greens (De Grønne) [<i>Denmark</i>]
G	Ecologist Party “The Greens” (Partido Ecologista "Os Verdes") [<i>Portugal</i>]
GL	GreenLeft (GroenLinks)
GP	Green Party (Comhaontas Glas)
GPV/CU	Reformed Political League (Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond) — current name: ChristianUnion (ChristenUnie)
GREENS	Green Party
GRÜNEN	The Greens (Die Grünen) [<i>Germany</i>]
GRÜNEN	The Green Alternative (Die Grüne Alternative) [<i>Austria</i>]
HB	Unity of the People (Herri Batasuna)
IC	Initiative for Catalonia (Iniciativa per Catalunya)
ID21	Integral Democracy for the 21st century (Integraal Democratie onder 21 Eeuw)
IDV	Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori)
IKL	Patriotic National Alliance (Isänmaallinen Kansallis-Liitto)
IU	United Left (Izquierda Unida)
JL	June List (Junilistan)
JUNIB	June Movement (JuniBevægelsen)
KESK	Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta)
KF	Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti)
KIPU	Ecologist Party (Kirjava "Puolue"- Elonkehän Puolesta)
KKE	Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas)
KKEES	Communist Party of Greece, Interior (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, Esoterikoú)
KOK	National Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus)
KPÖ	Communist Party of Austria (Kommunistische Partei Österreichs)
KRF	Christian Democrats (Kristendemokraterne)
LAB	Labour Party (Páirtí an Lucht Oibre) [<i>Ireland</i>]
LAB	Labour Party [<i>United Kingdom</i>]
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós)
LIBDEMS	Liberal Democrats
LIF	Liberal Forum (Liberales Forum)
LN	Northern League (Lega Nord)
LO-LCR	Workers’ Struggle/Revolutionary Communist League (Lutte Ouvrière/Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire)
LPF	List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn)
LPP	Liberal People’s Party (Liberaalinen Kansanpuolue)

M	Moderate Party (Moderaterna)
MCC	Citizens' Movement for Change (Mouvement des Citoyens pour le Changement)
MDP	Portuguese Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Português)
MEI	Independent Ecologist Movement (Mouvement Écologiste Indépendant)
MN	National Movement (Mouvement National)
MP	Environmental Party the Greens (Miljoepartiet de Groena)
MPF	Movement for France (Mouvement pour la France)
MRE	European Republicans Movement (Movimento Repubblicani Europei)
MSFT	Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore)
MSI	Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano)
MUC	Communist Unity (Unidad Comunista)
ND	New Democracy (Néa Dimokratía)
NDP	National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
NPI	National Party of Ireland (Páirtí Parlaiminteach na hÉireann)
NPSI	New Italian Socialist Party (Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano)
NyD	New Democracy (Ny Demokrati)
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei)
P	Pensioners' Party (Suomen Eläkeläisten)
PAR	Aragonese Party (Partido Aragonés)
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima)
PC	Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales)
PCF	French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français)
PCI	Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano)
PCP	Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português)
PD	Progressive Democrats (An Páirtí Daonlathach)
PDC	Christian Democratic Party (Partido Cristão Democrático)
PDCI	Party of Italian Communists (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani)
PDS/DL	Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) — current name: The Left Party (Die Linkspartei)
PDS/DS	Democratic Party of the Left/Left Democrats (Partito Democratico della Sinistra/Democratici di Sinistra)
PdUP	Proletarian Unity Party (Partito di Unità Proletaria)
PLI	Italian Liberal Party (Partito Liberale Italiano)
POLA	Political Spring (Politiki Anixi)
PP	Pensioners' Party (Partito dei Pensionati)
PP	Popular Party (Partido Popular)
PPI	Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano)
PPR	Political Party of Radicals (Politieke Partij Radikalen)
PR	Radica Party (Partito Radicale)
PRD	Democratic Renovator Party (Partido Renovador Democrático) [<i>Portugal</i>]
PRD	Democratic Reform Party (Partido Reformador Democrático) [<i>Spain</i>]
PRG	Radical Party of the Left (Parti Radical de Gauche)
PRI	Italian Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano)
PRL/MR	Liberal Reform Party (Parti Réformateur Liberal) — current name: Reform Movement (Mouvement Réformateur)
PS	Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) [<i>Belgium</i>]
PS	Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) [<i>France</i>]
PS	Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) [<i>Portugal</i>]
PSC	Socialists' Party of Catalonia (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya)
PSC/CDH	Christian Social Party (Parti Social-Chrétien) — current name: Humanist Democratic Centre (Centre Démocrate Humaniste)
PSD	Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata)
PsDA	Sardinian Action Party (Partito Sardo d'Azione)
PSDI	Italian Social Democratic Party (Partito Social Democratico Italiano)
PSI	Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano)
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español)
PSP	Pacifist Socialist Party (Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij)

PSR	Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionário)
PvdA	Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid)
PVV	Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid)
PVV/VLD	Party for Freedom and Progress (Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang) — current name: Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten)
PXXI	Politics XXI (Politica XXI)
RC	Communist Refoundation Party (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista)
REM	Reform Group (Remonttirymä)
REP	The Republicans (Die Republikaner)
RI	Italian Renewal (Rinnovamento Italiano)
RPF	Rally for France (Rassemblement pour la France) [<i>France</i>]
RPF	Reformatory Political Federation (Reformatorische Politieke Federatie) [<i>Netherlands</i>]
RPR	Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République)
RV	Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)
SCHIL	Schill Party, Law and Order Offensive Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive, Schill-Partei)
SD	Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne) [<i>Denmark</i>]
SD	Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) [<i>Sweden</i>]
SAP	Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti)
SDI	Italian Democratic Socialists (Socialisti Democratici Italiani)
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Finland (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue)
SEGNI	Segni Pact (Patto Segni)
SF	Sinn Féin
SFP	Swedish People's Party (Svenska folkpartiet i Finland)
SGP	Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij)
SKL/KD	Christian League of Finland (Suomen Kristillinen Liitto) — current name: Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit)
SMP/PS	Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue) — True Finns (Perussuomalaiset)
SNP	Scottish National Party (Pàrtaidh Nàiseanta na h-Alba)
SP	Socialist Party (Páirtí Sóisialach) [<i>Ireland</i>]
SP	Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij) [<i>Netherlands</i>]
SP.A.	Socialist Party Different (Socialistische Partij Anders)
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs)
SVP	South Tyrolean People's Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei — Partito Popolare Sudtirolese)
SYN	Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology (Synaspismós tis Aristerás tōn Kinimátōn kai tis Oikologías)
UD	Democratic Union (Unione Democratica)
UDC	Unione of the Centre (Unione di Centro)
UDEUR	Populars of the South (Popolari per il Sud)
UDF	Union for the French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française)
UDP	Popular Democratic Union (Uniao Democrática Popular)
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UMP	Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire)
UV	Valencian Union (Unió Valenciana)
V	Left, Liberal Party of Denmark (Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti)
VAS	Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto)
VB	Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok) — current name: Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang)
VERDE	Green Party (Partido Verde)
VERDI	Federation of the Greens (Federazione dei Verdi)
VERTS	The Greens (Les Verts)
VIHR	Green League (Vihreä Liitto)
VS	Left Socialists (Venstresocialisterne)
VSL	Alliance for a Free Finland (Vapaan Suomen Liitto)

VU/N-VA	People's Union (Volksunie) — current name: New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie)
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)
WP	Workers' Party (Páirtí na nOibrithe)

AN INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH DESIGN

Political parties of contemporary West European democracies lay at the heart of the present research. An important preliminary question is: why political parties? The simplest answer would be: because they matter, and their role is still a crucial one in politics. On the one hand, contemporary politics is characterised by features overshooting political parties: the increasing importance of charismatic leaders able to strongly personalise the political arena; the mounting spread of globalisation and the long-debated loss of relevance of both the State and domestic politics; the revolution in technology and information which is fostering autonomy and involvement of mass publics; the weakening of ideologies and values which is often connected to the diminishing percentage of turnout at the polls, and also to the supposed enlarging rift between voters and elected officials. Moreover after the end of the Cold War, with the breakdown of the USSR and Eastern European communist regimes, and the alleged definite triumph of liberal democracies (Fukuyama 1992) several changes in politics may have undermined the legitimacy and strength of both the state and political parties. On the other hand, parties are still able to exercise fundamental functions in society: they shape values and public opinion, channel preferences and requests, and give institutional representation to organised groups and citizens. Besides, configuration and dynamic of party system in a country is fundamental in determining the performance of political regime at stake, especially in parliamentary ones where parties form coalitions and support governments. Sartori highlighted how parties belong «first and foremost, to the means of representation» since they are «an instrument or an agency, for *representing* the people by *expressing* their demands» (Sartori 1976, 27). Besides, they «have found their essential *raison d'être* and their nonreplaceable role in implementing representative and responsive government» and this democratic responsiveness is provided since parties «supplied the channels for articulating, communicating, and implementing the demands of the governed» (Sartori 1976, 27). Along with that instrumental function, one cannot neglect that political parties

bring with them a set of cultural and ideological principles affecting society in many respects, so that they are active actors in the political realm.

Although party systems are extensively examined, with special regards to dimensions of party competitions, a specific area within them plays the central role in this inquiry. Indeed, analysis revolves around those political parties that are usually located along the right wing side of the political spectrum. This already provides some hints on the scientific relevance of the topic. After the rise of ecology and left-libertarian parties, the upsurge of the variously called “new right” represents the most important change in party systems of the last three decades. Indeed, in terms of party system analysis, the (re-)emergence of the “right” and its power of affecting West European politics is the uppermost change in the last two decades. This is further proven since the forerunner Kitschelt’s study (1995) has been followed by a large proliferation of researches about the radical right. Although exponents of the right-wing radicalism were actually active also in early periods of time, the phenomenon acquired a major status by the end of the 1980s spreading all over Europe. In fact, nowadays very few countries do not present parties belonging to the radical right or on the border between that and the mainstream centre-right.

The framework of analysis is firmly settled on comparative politics, so that the main purpose is to identify, describe and (whenever possible) explain similarities and difference among cases (Caramani 2009). The “backbone” of the research is constituted by a rigorous comparison among cases and properties. In particular, the framework is based on the comparison of scores held by the units of analysis on different selected properties (Marradi 1981). To that purpose, the best technique is the *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA), a method based on Boolean algebra that was initially put forth by the influential works of Charles Ragin (1987). The main intention was to make quantitative and qualitative techniques interact by framing a middle range approach able to take profit of strong points from both sides. Furthermore, the number of cases (*see* note 1) is too small to make statistical analysis viable and the current research does not aim at explaining how variations of independent variables carry out variation in the dependent variable. On the other side, QCA is deeply rooted in case oriented knowledge, though it combines also an

accurate match between cases through binary or fuzzy values. This last distinction is at the origins of two different QCA versions, respectively, the crisp-set QCA (csQCA) grounded on dichotomized scores and fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) based on calibrated scores ranging from 0 to 1 (Wagemann 2007). Given the composite nature of data here employed — descriptive statistics from mass surveys, expert survey scale data, and others — crisp-set QCA appeared as the most appropriate tool for cross-country comparison. Although the use of binary values may carry out loss of information, it brings also simplicity and clarity in data elaboration and avoids the complexity of fuzzy values that need at least two cut-off points to transform raw data into fine-grained scores.

With special attention to cases here included in the set of investigation, a so-called “Most Similar, Different Outcome” (MSDO) strategy has been employed. The basic tenet is that cases are selected because of their similarity on some properties, though they differ on results on a certain point. In other words, cases share a high degree of similarity, though are dissimilar on the outcome, so that investigation has to focus on their idiosyncrasies «in which the reasons for the different outcomes may lie» (Rihoux and Ragin 2008, 22). Thus, the fourteen countries here included¹ are currently members of the European Union and none of them was embedded into the USSR sphere of influence during the Cold War. Sure enough, every single country is featured by its own social and political peculiarities, though the large majority of them are fully democratic since the end of WWII. The only exception to this argument are Greece, Portugal, and Spain, which can be classified as “late comers” since they evolved in the mid-1970s towards a democratic regime. However, given their adherence to the Western camp and their rapid evolution into democracy, they are considered part of the set under investigation. Of course, the research design bears in mind Lijphart’s suggestion (1971) of limiting comparison to those cases that are actually similar and, thus, comparable. Although assumed as a main guideline, that principle is just slightly relaxed in order to include three more cases. This brings profits to the entire

¹ The number increases of one unit when Belgium is split into its two main regions. The complete list is as follows: Austria, Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

analysis because description is richer and more extended, and final results are more robust since based on a large set of cases². On the other hand, they do not share the same outcome, namely, their radical right parties performed in a very different way at the polls. Whether this work had been based on quantitative methods, the aim would have been the inspection of variance of a dependent variable. However, since the present context is definitely more qualitative, the term *outcome* is preferred than dependent *variable*. The core of scientific investigation is essentially based onto the verification of regular associations between factors and outputs. More precisely, several hypotheses stemming from theoretical assumptions are to be tested empirically «about the *association* of presence or absence of phenomena (a qualitative or categorical/discrete level of measurement)» (Caramani 2010, 36). In analogy of what has been said above, quantitative independent variables that are assumed as factors affecting the outcome are called *conditions* in this inquiry. In a nutshell, the purpose is testing whether some conditions are able, and eventually in what ways, to produce a given outcome.

Even though various topics are treated in the next chapters, the crucial point of the investigation is sure enough related to the outcome to be explained. Thus, (i) having identified a suitable label for those political parties located in the radical right area and (ii) singled out theoretical hypotheses on the outcome, then the main research question is: do exist common configurations of conditions able to shed light on the divergent electoral performances of Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs)³? In other words, the purpose is to single out combinations of causal factors that are associated to ERPs' electoral performances in all countries here included and, by consequence, to describe and reason about commonalities and differences.

By consequence, this work is conveniently divided into two essential branches. The first part is mainly consecrated to the object of analysis. Indeed, every scientific inquiry needs to clarify *a priori* the meaning of its concepts and labels, and associate theoretical-abstract constructs to existent-real objects (i.e., political

² As Caramani highlighted, «establishing what is similar and what is different is a matter of *choice*» (2009, 38) because it depends on the “distance” between researcher and object, that is the quantity and quality of properties that are taken into account when comparing cases.

³ The construction of that label and the identification of parties of that kind are provided by Chapter 2.

parties). Part 1 is split into two chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the meaning of the label “right” in politics and put forth a cultural framework to interpret the contemporary evolution of West European party systems. Chapter 2 has the main purpose of identifying those parties that are usually associated to right-wing radicalism and provides a new grouping label (i.e., Exclusionist Right Parties, ERPs). The second part encompasses a theoretical and empirical analysis. Its lifespan covers on the whole the 1990-2009 interval and the leading perspective relies on the assumption that party electoral scores are essentially affected in two main ways: the demand side regards those societal values able to influence voting behaviour; on the other hand, the supply side deals with the political context, i.e., the institutional settings and competition among parties themselves. Therefore, the main goal is exploring whether demand-side and/or supply-side factors affected ERPs electoral performances, and how they combine in each country. Hence, Part 2 is made up of three chapters. Chapter 3 investigates demand-side factors, i.e. societal conditions creating a fertile ground for ERPs to prosper in the first decade of the XXIst century. Chapter 4 explores supply-side factors, i.e. institutional arrangements and party system configurations that can favour/discourage the settlement of ERPs. Finally, Chapter 5 will try to put together those conclusions reached by the two previous chapters, in order to find out whether some common configurations of conditions can be associated to ERPs different electoral fortunes.

PART 1 – THE OBJECT OF ANALYSIS

I. PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE

1. THE OPENING DILEMMA

The focus of this investigation is primarily on political parties generally qualified as radical rightist⁴, hence my field of investigation does not concern established mainstream centre-right parties belonging to the Christian democratic or conservative *familles spirituelles* (Knutsen 1998) and generally affiliated to the European People's Party. The literature identifies non-moderate right-wing parties by a plethora of terms: extreme right, far right, radical right, right-wing populism, neo and post-fascism, just to give a hint of a terminological chaos that can be considered as a «consequence of a lack of clear definitions» (Mudde 2007, 12). Such a setback is particularly critical for a comparative study that should be underpinned on concepts able to travel across temporal and spatial contexts, indeed «the wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel» (Sartori 1970, 1034). Besides, what we grasp about external world is necessarily filtered through those concepts we resort to: we are able to know what we conceptualize and conceptualization itself affects our understanding of reality, in a sort of circular feedback. Therefore, a key issue is determining an appropriate label to qualify political parties at stakes, a task that is not straightforward at all, taking into account drawbacks of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). The main questions can be formulated this way: how can we catalogue those parties perceived as part of the radical right? Which label can be used and why? The crucial dilemma is well stressed by Cas Mudde when he faces the challenge of circularity: «we have to decide on the basis of which post facto criteria we should use to define the various parties, while we need a priori criteria to select the parties that we want to define» (Mudde 2007, 13). Furthermore, these parties generally do not proclaim to be radical or rightist in their official labels, whereas Green and Socialist parties generally do. Following the indication of the

⁴ I will use “radical right” as a general label in the first part of the paper, until a new one will be provided in the empirical section (see §4.3).

German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, it is possible to distinguish between “radical” and “extreme”: while the first type of party is tolerated since is not against democracy, the second one is banned from party competition as being extremist implies also the eventual resort to violence to achieve political goals.

2. THE RIGHT THROUGH AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

2.1. Left-right duality

The popular dyad stemmed from revolutionary France in 1789: as stated by Roger Eatwell, «a seating pattern emerged in the new National Assembly in which most of the nobility and clergy could be seen to take up positions on the right, whereas the Third Estate, which demanded a constitution and limitation of the King’s power, occupied the left» (Eatwell 1989a, 33). This configuration could also explain why in Christian culture the right is associated to God, authority, and tradition. Whether nowadays left and right are by now empty boxes is open to debate; however, a preliminary task is trying to distinguish between these two opposite poles used by researchers, politicians, and citizens to interpret politics. Several authors tried to supply a definite answer: e.g., the Canadian psychologist Jean A. Laponce (1981) argued that the distinction between right and left is parallel to sacred and profane respectively; Dino Cofrancesco (1984) claimed that the right can be associated to tradition, authority and order, while the left fights privileges and strives to emancipate human beings; Giovanni Sartori (Bosetti and Bobbio 1993) argued that the left let morality and justice enter politics, whereas Michele Salvati (1995) stressed that the left's perspective is more prone to see society as modifiable by human projects, while the right does not believe in that possibility. Besides, Marcello Veneziani (1995) spelled out five different concepts on which left and right diverge: liberty, difference, pluralism, democracy, and history, while Norberto Bobbio (1994) singled out equality as the key element to discriminate between left and right, since the former pursues equality and progress, and it is driven on by ideals, whereas the latter is mainly motivated by interests and has tendencies to inequality and conservatism. Although the quest is far from complete, the left-right dualism still plays a primary role: indeed, that scheme is «a taxonomic

system, an efficient way to understand, order and store political information» and this continuum keeps its importance as «a central dimension of political conflict in advanced industrial society» (Knutsen 1998, 63-64). Furthermore, Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver pinpointed that a universal way to portray «policy positions of political actors has been to describe these as being to the “left” or to the “right” of the political spectrum» (2006, 188). A reason for its widespread usage lays on its simplicity and ability to depict a comprehensive picture of what is going on in a given party system, avoiding the construction of more complex multidimensional spaces (2006). An interesting point is that a left-right mono-dimensional scale can be built up by considering a number of factors, «each part having a more precise substantive meaning than the more general underlying notions of left and right» (Benoit and Laver 2006, 189), hence it can be related to economic policy, social policy, European policy, and so on, in relation to its content.

Historically, the physical split between left and right became commonplace in France by assuming a threefold significance: in the political domain, the post-1789 royalist right was generally associated with the defence of the absolute monarchy, whereas the republican left claimed for a representative body elected by a universal suffrage; secondly, in economy, the right defended feudal relations and government monopolies, whereas the left was more oriented to stimulate the market and to accept the governmental intervention to protect the poor; thirdly, in the social domain, the right supported customs, traditional habits, and the role of the Catholic Church, whereas the left – especially its more extreme wing – was secular and even atheistic, emphasizing the primary importance of reason and self-expression.

In the late nineteenth century, several right-wing groups had emerged in France, clustered by René Rémond (1966) in three specific strands: the Legitimists defending the interests of the old aristocracy, and considering the Monarchy and the Church as inalienable points of reference in society; the Orléanists who stood for the new middle class, sympathetic with liberal freedoms and constitutional rules in a parliamentary democracy; thirdly, the Bonapartists supporting a charismatic appeal joining lower classes, the peasantry and the working class, along with a conception of humanity as motivated by “myths and visions”. Besides, the language of left and right had become common denominator in most continental Europe,

whilst it was less adopted in Britain and the United States where the dyad “liberals versus conservatives” is still nowadays widely referred to represent the two poles of the political arena. In Europe, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the rising industrial working class brought about the mounting of socialist ideologies, mainly linked to Marxism.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, many changes affected the left-right spectrum: economic laissez-faire assumed a more rightist-conservative bent in the interests of the growing business class, while the Marxist left became more fascinated with the idea of a strong state as an instrument to promote economic and social equality. After World War I, a major split occurred within the left between its moderate wing supporting the project of moving gradually towards socialism in the democratic arena and its radical branch arguing the necessity for a revolution to overthrow the bourgeois state. Communism is generally located at the extreme-left, whereas fascism became its chief opponent on the opposite side. Despite of this common usage, the placement of the latter poses considerable problems to the logic of the left-right space, especially regarding economy: even though fascism defended private property as the basis of society, such ownership «was always to be subjected to the ultimate needs of the nation rather than the individual» (Eatwell 1989a, 36). Therefore, this justified economic public intervention, whereas liberalism – always on the right side – stands for a minimal state to booster free markets. However, this implies a contradiction since the supposed extreme right prototype (i.e., fascism) is not extreme rightist in economy, namely, by conceiving the left-right axis as a continuum from a maximum economic intervention of the state (extreme left) to the strongest pro-market stances (extreme right). Besides, considering the contrast between collectivism and individualism, the position of fascism is still troublesome with its attempt «to find a middle way between capitalism and communism» (Eatwell 1989a, 37). The importance of emphasizing fascism’ stances is due to the possible association with right-wing extremism, thereby the former could be considered as a litmus paper for all political parties located on the right side. Eatwell as well (Eatwell 1989b, 49-61) tried to identify the essential philosophical core of the right by testing several concepts: change, capitalism and private property; authority and authoritarianism; freedom and

liberty; equality, egalitarianism and elitism; nationalism, racism and militarism; human nature. However, none of those concepts is always and unambiguously able to discriminate the right from the left. His conclusions states that it is easier to identify the left since it frequently presents its ideology more overtly and generally centred on change; besides, the radical left is concerned with the rejection of capitalism, the importance of equality and a belief in the perfectibility of human nature. Ex adverso, there is not any form of right-wing thought encompassing all these three features at the same time.

2.2. What is right?

A second step is trying to identify some of the typical rightist traits: for instance, William Pickels (1964) listed three aspects, i.e. the stress on established authority, the acceptance of just evolved institutions, and the emphasis on individual rights except when they interact with the state or Church. An important member of the British new right, Roger Scruton (1982, 408) has identified nine features to interpret the right: civil society is conceived from a conservative and authoritarian point of view, stressing the importance of customs, tradition and social bonds; political obligations are elaborated in terms of obedience, legitimacy and piety; reluctance versus a too sharp separation between law and morality; a conservative bent about culture; belief in hereditary principles and prescriptive rights; strong defence of private property; belief in individual rights and freedoms; belief in capitalist economy and free economic initiative; finally, a conviction in human imperfection and scepticism about the possibility to modify human nature and society by a rational and political plan of action. Moreover, the Italian political philosopher Dino Cofrancesco (1984) argued that, apart from the exact policy implementation, rightist political platforms generally are instruments to strengthen tradition that can be decoded in six different ways: the first meaning is linked to the word of God that is transmitted through generations and represents the primitive archetypal value order; the second one is represented by the nostalgia for a “golden era” of a given society, symbolizing an exemplum that still represents a source of inspiration; the third is directly linked to the nation, its components and its ultimate indivisibility; the fourth one is bind to a somewhat mythical vision of a far-off society that is revitalized because of its glory (like the Roman Empire for fascist

rhetoric); the fifth is connected to the community of destiny to whom the single member must abandon himself and consecrate an absolute loyalty, exalting ancestral binding relationships; the sixth has a legacy with conservatism since it preaches the dangers of reconstructing reality since the real beginning, so that any reform should be cautious and moderate without any dogmatic belief.

Furthermore, plentiful of adjectives have been used to clarify and distinguish several historical experiences. Eatwell (Eatwell 1989c) gave an important contribution, delineating five rightist styles of thought, i.e. reactionary, moderate, radical, extreme, and new right. The first two of that list can be considered as responses to the prominence attributed to individualism and freedom by liberalism in the eighteenth century; the third and fourth are replies to the outburst of Socialist movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with the emergence of a mass electorate. Finally, the fifth is the most recent strand and represents a counteraction to Socialist governments, and «especially their problems in solving questions of both economic growth and the distribution of wealth, problems which have helped undermine the authority of the state» (Eatwell 1989c, 63). We can analyze Eatwell's prospectus more in detail.

The reactionary right supports a strong nostalgia for the so-called *ancien régime*. Besides aristocrats and monarchists – tenacious opponents of both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution⁵ – major political theorists belong to this political strand, such as Louis de Bonald and Joseph De Maistre in the nineteenth century, and Charles Maurras in the twentieth century: a widespread claiming is the rejection of 1789 French revolution, considered guilty of having ruled out its traditional rulers (the Monarch and aristocracy). Maurras (1973) asserted that the nation is the only community that matters and the republican regime was alien to the nation since it was imported from abroad, and any type of non-monarchical regime was meant to become the regime of just one faction. Founded in 1899 by Henri Vaugois and Maurice Pujo, the *Action Française* review became in a few years a daily newspaper characterized by an integral nationalism and claiming the restoration of the monarchy to secure a stable and strong state.

⁵ For an important examination of the values stemming from the French Revolution, in terms of contemporary influence, see (Martinelli, Salvati, and Veca 2009).

In common with the reactionary right, the moderate right shared the conviction that the world cannot be better reshaped by human reason. Its major philosophical source can be traced to Edmund Burke, deemed as the father of the modern British conservatism. That right is not a priori adverse to change: the core principle stands in the balance between the respect for tradition and a sense of inevitable progress. One of the most important features is the “limited government” as a middle-ground solution between absolutist government, on the one hand, and mass activism, on the other. The moderate right also sought to limit the strong support of liberalism to rationalism and its utilitarian principles, as well as to balance individualism with a temperate collectivist perspective, stressing the key role played by intermediate units such as the nation, religion and family.

The term “radical” is more tricky: Eatwell claimed that there is no common agreement about its use, since it has been employed to identify very different phenomena like the McCarthyism in the United States or the Republikaner Party in Germany (Eatwell 1989c, 68) even though a sharp diversity exists among them. As previously stated, a radical right strand emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century to counter the rise of Socialist parties and movements. It differentiated from the moderate or reactionary right as it preached a vigorous activism and put forth an ideology that did not seek to justify the present or the past. Its chief manifestation emerged in Germany after World War I, in particular, «an aggressive and romantic vision of nationalism was vital to what is described here as the radical right» (Eatwell 1989c, 69). Major examples of its style of thought can be found in the writings of Oswald Spengler and Ernst Jünger. Key elements are given by: the idea of salvation for humanity through politics; a strong emphasis on activism to rediscover the true nature of man, and the downplaying of political programs because of the difficulties to find a third way between capitalism and socialism; the decadence of present, hence the refusal of conservatism; the yearning of a strong leader able to unify the nation as the true community; a tough anti-leftism, especially against its rationalism and prominence given to class struggle, as the latter would constitute a threat to the unity of the “true” community. It is worth noting that anti-Semitism was never a focus point in the political thought of the radical right: since the former had been essentially a feature in society in the inter-

war period, some anti-Semitic references were usual in many political movements of that epoch. Eatwell reinforced this point stressing that «the radical right had little tendency to engage in conspiracy theory» (Eatwell 1989c, 70).

The extreme right category presents as well some problems of ambiguity, since through this label many phenomena have been classified whenever they did not conform to the mainstream right. A weak aspect is the paucity of the intellectual tradition of the extreme right, since it produced propagandist materials despite the lack of an original theoretical elaboration of its ideology. Some of its key traits are in common with the radical right like its strong opposition to the leftist internationalism and class-based society, and also to communist ideas both in domestic and international context. Economy is not, however, a main issue in its program: economic policies have tended to follow a quite statist bent, even though there is not a rejection of neither private property or the market. One of the prominent attributes is the paranoid stress on conspiracy theory: this can be ultimately traced back to conflict between opposite forces — mirroring a Schmittian friend-foe scheme (Schmitt 1998) — and portrays the world as a struggle between in-groups and out-groups. A well-known example of conspiracy theory is the threatened Jew plot to dominate the planet and undermine society's bonds.

In the end, “new right” is a catchphrase encompassing different forms of thought, but its criticisms to high public spending programs of leftist governments represent a shared stance, as demonstrated by the American and British experience through Reagan and Thatcher. By the way, another important instance is given by the French Nouvelle Droite of Alain De Benoist, whose three core factors are (Eatwell 1989c): a rejection of the Judeo-Christian tradition concerning egalitarianism since nature would clearly show that men are not equal to each other, but rather differences must be preserved and not conceived in a hierarchic way; a sharp attack against social and political systems of both the United States and the former Soviet Union: that rejection aims, in the first case, to the obsessive pursuit of money and, in the second case, to an egalitarianism based on coercion; the third point is a quest for identity, i.e. a European community grounded on a common culture and, to this purpose, De Benoist sought to the Gramscian cultural hegemony

strategy (Gruppi 1972). Inside this context, some have heard echoes of fascism or extreme right, but the Nouvelle Droite's aim is more intellectual than mass mobilizing. In the wide set of the new right, some have suggested a twofold division between an individualist and laissez-faire strand, and an authoritarian-traditionalist one. Nevertheless, Eatwell put forth a more elaborate and meaningful fourfold division (Eatwell 1989d): a libertarian strand supporting a minimal state; a laissez-faire component preaching a strong pro-market environment; a more traditionalist wing aiming at counter the spread of individualism, highlighting the vital importance of religion and family; finally, a mythical wing linked to ideas such as nation, race, will of the people. Therefore, the last two groups are respectively close to the moderate right and radical or extreme right, as previously defined, confirming that ideological divisions are still somewhat blurred.

3. THE FORMATION OF PARTY SYSTEMS

3.1. Introduction

Hitherto, I highlighted prominent features and concepts generally associated with the broad centre-right area, though my field of inquiry is not represented by all parties that are simply not left wing. As I previously stated, I am not concerned with Christian Democratic parties, since the majority of them are mainstream conservative actors. On the contrary, my interest rests on the investigation of political parties that are, first of all, “new” parties, i.e. they were established more recently and whose instances can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s; secondly, they are perceived as marginal actors that have increasingly gained a central role, therefore it is important to identify the margin, that is to say, the dimension that we need to set them out; thirdly, these parties are not viable partners in the national governments in almost all cases, with only few exceptions (like in Austria and Italy). Briefly, we are seeking for “pariah” parties representing, after the emergence of the Ecologists, the most important change in Western European party systems since the end of World War II. This is even more striking whether we take into account that the radical right has been excluded from the set of acceptable political actors after the tragic experience of fascist and authoritarian regimes in the inter-

war period. Moreover, given its more consistent electoral success than the Greens and other post-materialist movements, the relevance of this change acquires a huge importance.

Frequently, these parties are labelled radical or extremist by mass media and their political competitors, thus stressing the higher intensity and also the differentiation of their political appeal. A conceptual premise is necessary: I will use radicalism instead of extremism, since I consider the latter one linked to the possible use of violence in politics and suitable for those parties or movements seeking to overthrow democracy, both from the inside (contesting elections to change the political regime) and the outside (extra-parliamentary groupuscules). Once clarified this aspect, a crucial point is choosing the best tool to give account of this radicalism, i.e. the spatial representation of politics through dimensions of party competition.

In their outstanding research, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified two uppermost historical events that occurred in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century: the National and Industrial Revolutions. The process of nation building and the establishment of modern nation-states constituted the former, while the latter changed the configuration of economic and commercial interests in society. Both revolutions gave rise to a couple of cleavages each, thereby affecting party system outcome. A related fundamental concept is that of cleavage: this is «considered to be a division of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise» (Lane and Ersson 1999). Hence, the National Revolution gave rise to two cleavages: the first is the State-Church conflict whose main issue was the management of mass education, historically belonging to the various churches, but at that time advocated as a new competence of the state in virtue of its claiming to shape loyalty of its citizens; the second one can be called Centre-Periphery because of the intention of the central state to establish an official language and a common culture, therefore suppressing local customs and traditions not conforming to the mounting new national paradigm. On the other hand, the Industrial Revolution induced two important cleavages: the first one is the well-known

Capital-Labour⁶ conflict, i.e. the opposition between entrepreneurs and manual workers; the second one is the Urban-Rural conflict based on frictions between bourgeois business and agricultural interests. Given that four-fold division, as the two scholars argued (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), the pre-eminent cleavage was the contention between capitalists and workers over the redistribution of resources, as a consequence of the increasing profits generated by the Industrial revolution all over Europe. The primacy of this competitive dimension is further confirmed since left and right are often conceived in terms of related economic policies: the left-wing pole usually strives to strengthen the active role of the state in economy, in order to collect resources through taxation and redistribute them to the poor, thereby reducing the gap in wealth among social classes; on the other hand, the right-wing pole considers free market as a priority to which people resort to freely buy and sell goods, so as to increase their well-being. That said, the left is prone to increase taxes to sustain social spending, while the right does not generally concede an increase in taxation, even though this would imply a reduction in public services. In few words, economic left-wing policies defend state interventionism, whereas right-wing policies enhance free market competition. Of course, this is not the only issue at stake, since the extent of privatisation and degree of decentralisation in the decision-making process are extremely important too. Actually, economic systems have been at the heart of the struggle between two opposite *Weltanschauung* during the Cold War — i.e., the capitalist versus the communist world— and this played a crucial role in shaping European political systems, divided between Socialist and Communist parties, on the one hand, and capitalist and conservative parties, on the other hand. A crucial observation regards the presence of the capital-work cleavage in every West European party systems, as pointed out also by Lijphart (2001) which highlighted that the socio-economical cleavage is always present in his set of 36 democracies, regardless of their majoritarian or consensual model as well as the degree of social pluralism.

⁶That dyad is also labelled as Capitalists-Workers or, more recently, Market-State.

3.2. Preliminary considerations on transformations of party systems

At the end of the 1980s, major historical events provoked an uppermost change in both domestic and international politics: with the breakdown of the USSR and the demise of the Soviet bloc, Western world had defeated its main rival, thereby democracy and its liberal-representative model was meant to become the standard for all countries aiming at reaching prosperity. One expected consequence in national party systems was the need for a renewal in the communist left, like the Italian Communist Party that dissolved so that the majority of its former members established the new Democratic Party of the Left. In general, old Communist parties lose their strategic importance, even though the erosion of their electoral constituencies had already started a couple of decades before. Insofar, the setback of planned economy brought about the decline of radical state-interventionist economic policies, so that Socialist and Social Democratic parties moved towards more centrist stances, trying to balance the defence of moderate state interventionism in economy with free markets. Therefore, along the state-market dimension parties can differentiate in a decreasing marginal way because of that centripetal tendency, reinforcing the tradition of Keynesian mixed economy in continental Europe.

In a complementary way, the pronounced acceleration given to the process of European integration, since the 1986 Single European Act, contributed to stabilize and harmonize economic policies of state-members, especially by Maastricht parameters and the introduction of the common currency under the supervision of the European Central Bank some years later. The European Union holds an exclusive competence on some important policies like the set-up of competition rules to regulate internal markets, the monetary policy for those countries in the Euro-zone, and the common commercial policy. Furthermore, national governments in the Euro-zone have lost the possibility to undervalue their currency to support the export of their goods, and also they cannot resort to customs duties to protect internal markets from the external concurrence. Hence, the possibility for mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties to distinguish on the economic axis is steadily narrower, producing a sort of non-discrimination in the political supply (Bartolini 1996), and this explains why economic platforms of the two main parties

tend to overlap. Although the capital-labour cleavage is far from being irrelevant, its electoral feedback in terms of ballots is decreasing, i.e. it has partially lost its strength to distribute votes among political competitors, therefore it seems very likely that new challengers will try to collect votes with special attention to other dimensions of political competition. Usually, scholars resort to a bi-dimensional spatial representation: even though there are several axis along which parties can be located concerning several issues — for instance, the relationships in regards of the European Union, foreign policy, and so on — a plot diagram of two dimensions has the advantage to be easily represented. The assumption here is that, since the end of the Golden Age period (i.e., *Les Trentes Glorieuses*) and especially by the end of 1970s, a silent revolution has taken place (Inglehart 1977) in the West European affluent post-industrial democracies.

3.3. De-freezing, post-materialism, and the new politics

The party system configuration described above was so deeply rooted in West European countries that, as Lipset and Rokkan pointed out (1967), still in 1960s party systems kept on mirroring the same cleavages of the 1920s, so that citizens had to choice among parties that had already been existing for about half a century. Furthermore, an electoral research (Rose and Urwin 1970) related to 19 countries between 1945 and 1969 revealed that, after the end of World War II, the electoral strength of parties had marginal changes between elections as well as within a generation of citizens, thus reinforcing the thesis of low volatility and steady electoral stability. This is the reason why many argued about the freezing of the structural cleavages of party systems: Bartolini and Mair (1990) found that, despite of a relative volatility within the right and the left, since the 1920s there is an incessant reduction of voters passing from the right to the left and vice versa. That freezing lasted also because political parties had the interest in reproducing those conflicts to consolidate their power and role in society. This implied also a positive consequence onto the stability of regimes as it favoured the containment of political expressions and protests within the channels of democratic frameworks, by limiting divisions and tensions with standardized rules and procedures providing greater benefits than those obtainable by other means. This stability is even more explicit

whether considering the tumultuous events occurred in Europe during World War II.

At the beginning of the 1980s some scholars carried out studies about party system evolution (Dalton, S Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Crewe and Denver 1985) and researches on this issue continued (Franklin, TT Mackie, and Valen 1992) at the turn of the decade along the end of the Cold War. The aim was to check whether a de-freezing process of party systems was actually taking place. Two trends were singled out: the first one concerns the increasing electoral volatility as a consequence of the declining loyalty of partisanship and membership of parties⁷. Considering electoral results from 1940 to 2000 in advanced industrialized democracies, Wren and McElwain (2007) unveiled that «electoral volatility has increased over time at a fairly steady rate» (2007, 558). Secondly, Christian Democratic and Socialist parties diminished their consensus at the polls: indeed, the total vote percentage of parties established before 1960 has increasingly declined since the 1960s «indicating the stronger electoral presence of relatively new parties» (Wren and McElwain 2007, 557). Also Ignazi (1992, 3) pointed out that «at the electoral level, intraparty volatility has progressively accelerated in the 1980s», and the traditional ties between voters and established parties are progressively weakening as showed by the lessening of party membership and identification (Ignazi 1992; Mair 1984).

As said above, the distributional conflict lose its pre-eminence in post-industrialized affluent economies of the Western World, in regards to their orientation towards the production of services as well as their connection in international networks, so that left and right cannot be understood (only) in their traditional meanings. Furthermore, an interesting analogy with Maslow's hierarchy of needs can be built up: this American psychologist posited (Maslow 1970) that human beings' needs can be hierarchically classified because every man or woman would satisfy first those at a lower stage before passing to the higher one. More specifically, at the very basic level there are physiological needs, i.e. food, water,

⁷ «Growing access to higher education, an overabundance of information, and the disintegration of traditional subcultures have contributed to a progressive dissolution of traditional party loyalties» (Betz, 1993b, p. 663).

breathing, and the like, hence all those factors required to survive. After this, the other steps are represented respectively by: safety, love and belonging, esteem, and finally self-actualization. The last one plays a crucial role as it implies that an individual will try to realize his full potential, i.e. self-fulfilment, only once all the other needs were previously satisfied. This schema helps us construct an analogy with societies conceived as a whole: if human beings hold a hierarchy of needs to fulfil, it seems reasonable to posit that they project them onto society as well. In this vein, post-industrialized countries have solved the problem of physiological needs for their population, except for the layer of poverty-stricken people that, in any case, hopefully represent a minority bracket in West European countries. A proof of this achievement is reflected by the passage to a service-oriented economic system, where large and heavy industry labour-force is increasingly shrinking. Since the end of World War II, the long period of peace and prosperity has secured a sense of safety for West European citizens, along with a higher degree in the level of mass education, thereby enhancing a sense of self-esteem and confidence of individuals. As a consequence, we can hypothesize that there exists a part of the electorate having fulfilled those needs placed at the lower steps in the Maslowian scale, hence their voting behaviour will be oriented towards those political forces that underscore the importance of self-expression, freedom in life styles, acceptance of multiculturalism, expanded personal liberties against moral dogmas, and so on.

Thus, the emergence of ecology and left-libertarian parties is backed by their ability to seize new issues linked to raising social demands in affluent post-industrialized democracies. Together with the weakening of traditional alignments, casting a ballot acquired a different meaning: this was not anymore an expression of belonging to a given party or ideology, but a choice expressing self-affirmation (Ignazi 1992). Moreover, as noted by Ignazi (1992), the freezing thesis claim about ballot switching among related parties (Bartolini and Mair 1990) does not hold true as radical right parties are to be considered members a different party family, despite of an internal and puzzling heterogeneity, and not just as simple variants in the conservative area. Indeed, they have «a peculiar distinctiveness and they cannot merely be assimilated to other neighbouring political families» (Ignazi 1992, 5). Agreeing with Inglehart's intuition (1977) that the spread of new values linked to

quality of life and self-affirmation has given rise to the so-called New Politics, a critical point is whether this affected only the leftist side of voters and parties or the rightist side as well. Drawing upon Ignazi, one can ask why «in an era of mounting post-materialism and economic growth, do we find an increasing number of rightwing voters?» (1992, 5). Furthermore, it does not seem that post-materialism created a bulk of issues exclusively related to the left-wing pole since, if that holds true, we should find a competition between post-materialist left-libertarian parties and materialist right-wing parties. One reason for this asymmetry is that post-materialist issues enhance the request for a change of the status quo, namely, represent the protest of citizens asking for improvements and “progress” in qualitative aspects of social life. This has a link with the left since the latter generally supports disadvantaged groups in society, even though the new left rejected a clear-cut class-based politics and stood for «participatory and decentralized forms of party membership» (Cole 2005, 206). The assumption here is that on the right-wing pole as well new kinds of parties entered the political system and do not define their core ideology in economic and materialist terms. Cole asked herself whether, after the challenge of the new left toward both the old right and left «would there be a second challenge from the right, creating a politics of the ‘new right’?» (Cole 2005, 206). Therefore, since the 1980s in Western Europe a sort of counterbalancing cultural and political sentiment has been growing to set against the green libertarian agenda, competing along the new value dimension, and related political forces put forth a set of «new priorities and issues, not treated by the established parties, a disillusionment towards parties in general, a growing lack of confidence in the political system and its institutions, and a general pessimism in the future», so that they promoted a sort of «‘a silent counter-revolution’» (Ignazi 1992, 6). Hence, the upcoming of a New Politics is linked to the raise of a new cleavage on which parties divide and compete, and this a product of two main historical processes: the advent of a post-industrial society (Bell 1973) since the 1970s and, more recently, the spread of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006). The ‘newness’ is justified since new political divisions are related to values, rather than social classes, so that «it does mean that post-materialist issues may occupy the political arena concurrently with materialist issues» (Cole 2005, 206). As

highlighted again by Cole (2005, 204) «these parties may represent a ‘new right’ that has developed to challenge the ‘new left’ on issues non-economic in nature, such as nationalism and law and order». Even though, this new competition is acknowledge by many scholars⁸, we can argue that the declining party identification of voters and «the perceived inability of established parties to address political issues have created openings in the arenas of party competition for entrepreneurial parties to exploit» (Cole 2005, 204). My argument is that the libertarian universalism preached by the New Left has naturally given rise to a counter-offensive reaction by the New Right enhancing an authoritarian and communitarian tide (Kriesi et al. 2006).

4. THE NEW CONFIGURATION OF PARTY SYSTEMS

4.1. *Authoritarians versus libertarians*

To give a substantial content to the authoritarian-libertarian divide, Flanagan and Lee (2003) tried to inspect societal components of that «A/L value cleavage» (2003, 250). They assume this cleavage to represent a directional change that «has been from a premodern theistic worldview in the Judeo-Christian tradition» (2003, 235) towards a modernist and, finally, a post-modernist *Weltanschauung*. Moreover, in their research, the two scholars have identified «a continuous linear movement from theism to modernism and to postmodernism», so that «those at the authoritarian end of the A/L continuum tend to have a theistic worldview and those at the libertarian end a postmodern worldview, with modernists falling somewhere in the middle of the A/L scale» (2003, 236). Transitions from one stage to the following one represent a demand for greater individual autonomy (Bell 1973; SC Flanagan and Lee 2003, 250), indeed authority had shifted from the outside (God) to the inside (single individual). The emergence of the authoritarian-libertarian axis is of particular importance as this greatly affected the political agenda in post-industrial democracies since the end of the 1960s. Therefore, the old materialist politics diminished its importance (R Flanagan and Inglehart 1987; SC Flanagan and Lee 2003) as well as harsh conflicts around distributive issues, taking into

⁸ For a critical argument see: (Harris 1994).

account also that welfare state services demanded increasingly higher funds to be sustained. Flanagan and Lee's intuition is that economic issues have shifted from position issues — either on the right, or on the left — toward salient issues — either highlighted by a party, or neglected — so that electoral consensus for mainstream parties comes and leaves at intervals linked to the economic cycle (2003).

A crucial event is the emergence of a post-modern sentiment in mass public that was less internally consistent since it did not imply one coherent schema to interpret and shape reality, but rather a «an open-minded entertainment of a plurality of worldviews» (2003, 251). This had a strong impact on political demands coming from society like «legalisation of drugs, for free sex, abortion, no-fault divorce, [...], women's liberation, minority rights, environmental protection», in a nutshell, freedom to adopt new lifestyles and new kinds of personal choices. It seems quite plausible to expect a counter-reaction by those holding authoritarian (theists) values, and as «a result of the mobilization and counter-mobilization around this new politics issues agenda, social issues began to replace economic issues as the most divisive position issues in the advanced industrial democracies» (2003, 251). Thus, Flanagan and Lee selected seven issues generally related to the competition between old left versus old right⁹: as demonstrated, correlations between those old issues and the A/L scale «are very low to insignificant. One's value position on the A/L scale will not predict a respondent's position on the old politics issues» (2003, 252), so that we can imagine to construct a bi-dimensional space where pro-state and pro-market issues are represented by an horizontal axis, and the authoritarian-libertarian divide along an orthogonal one.

4.2. Party systems at the dawn of the new millennium

For a concrete representation of the relationship between the libertarian-authoritarian and the state-market axis, one solution is resorting to expert surveys. These are very useful collection of data about political parties and have been conducted in different periods (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006). Scholars and political experts

⁹ See (SC Flanagan and Lee 2003, 252).

of party politics in their own country are asked to position parties at stakes along a series of dimensions that are assessed to be relevant in that context, often estimating also the saliency of each given issue for each party. This represents just one way of collecting data, as party surveys can be conducted as well at mass-public level, i.e. asking voters to place their preferred party along a series of dimensions, or elite-level, i.e. asking politicians to locate spatially their own party. As noted above, expert surveys are available along a 20-year time period, though unfortunately they are not always directly comparable since parties included in the surveys are not always the same, and furthermore the dimensions taken into account differ among surveys. This also reflects the changing relevance of the issues in the political debate: for instance, immigration was only recently included (Lubbers 2000).

Since my aim is to emphasize the relationship between the economic divide with the new cultural one, I shall resort to expert surveys conducted by Chapel Hill University of North Carolina (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). The choice is mainly motivated because this research group has always embodied a GAL/TAN dimension in all the three waves of data collection (namely, 1999, 2002, 2006), in addition to the economic pro-state/pro-market divide, and also a general left-right dimension on which parties are placed taking into account all the aspects of their ideology.

Positions are estimated on an 11-point scale where the extreme leftist position is 0, the central position is 5, and the extreme rightist position is 10. One major stumbling block in social science is the concrete measurement of a concept, hence it is fundamental to focus on the meaning of the GAL/TAN divide whose acronym stands for: Green Alternative Libertarian versus Traditionalist Authoritarian Nationalist. Political experts were asked¹⁰ to classify parties concerning their stances on freedoms, democracy, and rights, so that the more a party has a lower score, the more supports gay rights, euthanasia, wider democratic participation; on the other hand, the more a party has a greater score, the more it emphasizes the importance of law and order, and wants government to play an active role as moral

¹⁰ See Codebook in (Hooghe et al. 2010).

authority. With regards to the economic dimension, the more a party has a lower score, the more supports government spending and an active role of state in the economy; on the other hand, the more a party has a higher score, the more it emphasizes the importance of lower taxes, less regulation, free economic initiative, and reduced spending for welfare state services.

As a first step, I dealt with 1999 survey data where a total of 116 experts assessed positions of 143 political parties in the 14 largest EU member states¹¹. I considered then the economic and GAL/TAN dimensions and I estimated statistical correlation between them to test to what extent the European political space could be conceived as a bi-dimensional one. Of course, the more correlation is close to zero, the more the political space is two-dimensional since the more correlation is weak, the more we cannot predict the position of a party along a given dimension knowing the position on the other one. To make just a very simple example, if correlation is 0.3, this means that the position of party X along dimension A does not help us in predicting the positioning of the same party along the other dimension B (and vice versa). In 1999, the correlation is highly significant¹² and is equal to 0.616, hence positive and moderately high.

Indeed, observing Figure 1.A, where party positions are plotted on the bi-dimensional space¹³, they mostly occupy the first (market and authoritarian) and the third quadrant (state and libertarian), and this is line with Kitschelt's argument (1995) that new radical right parties combined market economy and authoritarian values, and vice versa for left-libertarians. Exceptions to that diagonal trend are predominantly on the fourth quadrant, i.e. Liberal parties merging market economy and libertarian values.

¹¹ A relevant drawback is that Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland are never taken into account. The following 14 countries compose my sample: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.

¹² At the level of 0.01.

¹³ The horizontal axis is the economic divide, while the vertical one is related to the cultural dimension. Note that, unless otherwise specified, figures and graphs are produced by SPSS Statistics 17.0 (17.0.0 version).

Scatter plot showing GAL/TAN (Y-axis, 0.00 to 10.00) versus STATE/MARKET (X-axis, 0.00 to 10.00). The plot includes a vertical dashed line at STATE/MARKET = 5.00 and a horizontal dashed line at GAL/TAN = 5.00. Data points are labeled with abbreviations representing various political parties or groups, such as AN, MS, GPV, RPF, etc.

Finally, I calculated the variance to estimate the dispersion of party positions along both the state-market and GAL/TAN dimensions. In the former case, the variance is equal to 4.893 (1999), 4.449 (2002), and 5.173 (2006), while in the latter case is 5.123 (1999), 4.970 (2002), and 6.442 (2006). Therefore, results show that the variance along the value dimension is increasingly higher than on the


¹⁵ At the level of 0.01.

economic divide, proving that party stances on values are becoming more and more differentiated, while the contrary holds true for the classic economic dimension.

Figure 1.B. West European bi-dimensional space in 2002.



Figure 1.C. West European bi-dimensional space in 2006.



II. CASE SELECTION

1. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CRITERIA TO SELECT PARTIES

Several attempts have been made to inspect and solve the problem of defining and identifying radical right parties, since the selection outcome greatly affects analysis, especially when focusing on the causes underpinning electoral performances. The selection issue is particularly critical when dealing with borderline cases, so that it becomes important to set labels and criteria. For instance, Seiler (1980) considered radical right parties as deviant cases from the bourgeois parties, while Lane and Ersson (1987) identified ultra-right parties by an ideological tie with fascism and discontent parties as qualified by a threefold factor: protest-attitude, populism and charismatic leadership. Moreover, Hans-Georg Betz (1993) pointed out radical right-wing populist parties featured by: a radical rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system; a strong support for individual achievement and drastic restrictions of the role of the state; a resolute refusal of individual and social equality, along with an instrumental and populist use of public sentiments of envy, anxiety and resentment. These few instances supply a proof about the difficulties in finding common criteria and a shared label to select parties.

An important framework was designed by Herbert Kitschelt (1995) who shaped a new axis for a better interpretation of modern party competition, i.e. new politics: changes in values in Western societies have increased the attractiveness of appeals, on the one hand, for economic rightist principles – free market and liberalism – together with, on the other hand, for authoritarian and paternalist exhortations in the decision-making process of the state, corporation and family. In line with what I said above about post-materialism, the affluent post-industrial societies of Western Europe are characterized by a foremost important cleavage dividing left-libertarians from right-authoritarians. Hence, the so-called New Radical Right supports free market economics and an authoritarian organizing pattern to govern social complexity, thereby limiting diversity and individual

autonomy in cultural expressions. Hence, Kitschelt identified his objects of analysis by a bi-dimensional typology: authoritarianism (made of social conservatism, “law and order” and a xenophobic attitude) and economic neo-liberalism, namely, a pro-market economic guideline. Three ideal-types are designed: the new radical-right parties (authoritarian plus xenophobic, and neo-liberal), the welfare-chauvinist parties (authoritarian plus xenophobic, but defending welfare state programs) and the populist anti-statist parties (weakly authoritarian-xenophobic, but strongly neo-liberal).

Another crucial contribution was provided by Ignazi (1992, 2000) who did start from parties to put forth an alternative method grounded on three distinct criteria: placement in the political spectrum (spatial criterion); declared party ideology combined with an ideal and symbolic legacy with fascism (ideological and historical criterion); attitude towards the political system (attitudinal and systemic criterion). The first measure regards the placement of the parties along the left-right continuum (Laver and Hunt 1992); a party belonging to the extreme right is the one occupying the rightist extreme position by itself or with others belonging to the same area. A critical aspect is that there is not a fixed point – a precise number on that scale – after which all parties would fall into the extreme right category. Hence, it is fundamental to introduce a twofold ideological criterion: whether a party holds a fascist heritage and/or shows an anti-systemic attitude; when one of the two conditions is true, then a party has an extreme right ideology. By the first one, it become possible to split old far-right parties from new far-right parties, by their tie with the fascist imprint in their ideology, value system or aesthetics (Ignazi 1992). By the second one, Ignazi (2000) focused on those parties’ values and preferences aiming at weakening the legitimacy of democracy. Moreover, as Sartori put forth, with respect to a loose definition «a party can be defined as being anti-system whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes»; while, by a strict definition, the anti-system parties represent «an extraneous ideology thereby indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological distance» (Sartori 1976, 133), so that their aim is to pursue a delegitimizing impact opposing “alien” values in comparison with those of the regime. Furthermore, Kirchheimer (1966) identifies two types of opposition: the first is an opposition of principle whose aims mismatch

with rules and values drawn from the Constitution, and a second one that is a loyal opposition where goals are different but not incompatible.

Lately, Elizabeth Carter (2005) tried to set apart extreme right parties by three criteria: a blend of nationalist-xenophobic attitudes, a conformist-racist cultural profile, a rejection of democracy or a request for an institutional change. Furthermore, politics is conceived as constituted by a boundary line dividing friends and foes, i.e. separating inside from outside on culture homogeneity, welfare benefits, job opportunities, criminality and so on; moreover, these parties stress as well the necessity of rules in society and the primacy of national homogeneity within national boundaries. Using a one-dimensional space, Norris (2005) refers to a ten-point left-right scale and an anti-immigration policy scale: those parties with an expert score at 8.0 or higher are considered as radical right parties, but the inconvenient is that the right-left axis obviously can be also interpreted in economic terms so that a party, maybe racist and authoritarian, but with a redistributive leftist economic agenda, could be excluded.

2. INVESTIGATING CORE IDEOLOGY

Recently, Mudde (2007) inspected in greater details the ideology of right-wing parties and put forth the new brand populist radical right parties, building a rigorous conceptual framework as pre-requisite of his study. First of all, he assessed different techniques: the Wittgensteinian concept of “family resemblance” (Collier and Mahon Jr. 1993) by which «none of the parties are exactly the same, but each family member will have some feature in common with all other members» (Mudde 2007, 13); a second approach refers to the classical Weberian ideal-type, which is the pivot of a given party family: all members belonging to that family look like the ideal-type, though none of them overlap exactly with it; a third solution is to assume an existing party as “prototype” able to exemplify the overall family: the evident drawback is how to select that party serving as a model. The fourth and fifth approaches are centred first and foremost on ideology of political parties, trying to single out which is, respectively, the lowest common denominator and the greatest common denominator: the former is the most difficult research as it implies to identify those features shared by all parties leading to a minimum

definition, i.e. «similarities among a selection of party family members from backgrounds as dissimilar as possible» (Mudde, 2007, p. 14); the latter works in the opposite direction since it seeks a maximum definition, i.e. «the greatest possible number of similarities within (part of) the family», namely, «similarities among a selection of party family members from backgrounds as similar as possible» (Mudde 2007, 14-15). In his work, the scholar developed both a minimal and a maximum denominator, though these cannot be employed interchangeably since they can affect case selection.

When talking about a minimum definition, it is unavoidable referring to core concepts: following the insight of Micheal Freeden (1996) and Terence Ball (1999) a core concept is one that is central and constitutive of a given ideology like, for instance, “class” in Marxism and “freedom” in liberalism. Hence, as a first step, Mudde identified in nationalism the core ideological feature of right-wing parties: this is treated as a political doctrine that «strives for the congruence of the cultural and political unit, i.e. the nation and the state, respectively» (Mudde 2007, 16), by internal homogenisation and external exclusiveness. Nevertheless, this definition of nationalism is too broad and not useful to discriminate between moderate and radical nationalists, hence he resorted to nativism, interpreted as a combination of both xenophobia and nationalism: «an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state» (Mudde 2007, 17). This definition makes possible to keep out liberal form of nationalism, in addition to stressing the importance of xenophobia and opposition to mass immigration by nativist parties.

When the aim is to investigate on the causes of the electoral success of political parties, then it is worthwhile to seek for a maximum definition, i.e. starting from a most similar system design and attempting to identify the greatest common denominator about the ideology of parties under consideration. In an earlier work, Mudde (2000) considered five parties of Western Europe and pinpointed four core ideological features in common: nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and law and order. In an attempt to refine this study, the author recognizes the necessity to set an internal hierarchy among ideological feature and he states that «the

maximum definition should be revised into a combination of three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism» (Mudde 2007, 22). The first one is the most important, in accordance with the minimum definition, and nativism is considered as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. The second feature is defined in different ways in several fields of study: a crucial reference stands in the study of Theodor Adorno and his collaborators involved in the setting of the operationalization of that concept (Adorno et al. 1969) while Bob Altemeyer has singled out three characteristics of right-wing authoritarianism in his notorious F-scale: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemeyer 1981). Two more definitions are necessary: authoritarianism such as a «belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely» (Mudde 2007, 23); secondly, populism such as an ideological feature (and not a mere political style) by which society is ultimately divided «into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the “pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people» (Mudde 2007, 23). Once the three terms have been defined, the author seeks the best term fitting the maximum definition, and to do this he resorts to the Sartorian ladder of abstraction: the basis of the conceptual framework is nativism (minimum definition) and, by adding supplementary key features, he reaches the extreme right as «a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and anti-democracy» (Mudde 2007, 23). The final case selection of the scholar falls on the populist subset of radical right parties, composed of both nativist, authoritarian, and populist parties, though not anti-democratic.

3. GAL/TAN RIGHT-DEVIANCY

The previous section has supplied a brief outlook of the efforts that have been carried out to cluster those parties flowing within the wide area of right-wing radicalism. All attempts made by scholars have to cop with scarcity of data and with difficulties too in measuring concepts like authoritarianism, leadership, nativism, and the like. Furthermore, there is lack of longitudinal data measuring party features by shared standards and able to provide comparable information through time. Aware of these limitations, the present section resorted again to

Chapel Hill's expert surveys where the GAL/TAN dimension is assessed for three points in time along seven years, though unfortunately parties included are not always the same (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010). In line with early analysis, parties that are generally classified by the literature with the generic label of right-wing radicalism are expected to be located at the extreme right side of the GAL/TAN axis, in opposition to green and left-libertarian parties on the other extremity.

As already specified earlier, the GAL/TAN dimension measures party's stances on freedoms, rights, and values, although not explicitly concerned with immigration. However, the 2006 survey gathered a bulk of further information — unfortunately in the two previous collections of data — and some of them are directly related to value issues. These 2006 new items are: civil liberties regarding party position on civil liberties versus law and order; lifestyle about pros and cons on liberal policy like gay rights; religion about the opposition or support to religious principle in politics; immigration, namely, opposition or support towards tough policies; multiculturalism, regarding the integration of foreigners and asylum seekers by favouring multiculturalism or assimilation; cosmopolitanism where parties are located regarding whether they are in favour of cosmopolitanism or advocate nationalism; finally, minorities about opposition or support to the expansion of their rights. The direction of each scale is coherent with the overall survey design, i.e. the more scores are close to 10, the more the related party is on the right-wing side of the political spectrum, and vice versa. All those seven items are taken into account and five of them are merged by their affinity in measuring related concepts: lifestyle and religion are coalesced into traditionalism; immigration, multiculturalism, and minorities blended into xenophobia; civil liberties are per se a proxy of authoritarianism and cosmopolitanism approximates nationalism. To determine party scores on traditionalism and xenophobia an arithmetic mean of related item raw scores has been calculated. The crucial step is the assessment of correlation between these four new issues with GAL/TAN scores: the more correlation is strong and significant, the more the GAL/TAN dimension can be assumed to be a good proxy of these four issues, with a particular interest in xenophobia since this is not directly mentioned in the survey GAL/TAN question.

Table 2.1. Correlation coefficients between GAL/TAN and other 4 dimensions.

	GAL/TAN	TRADITION	AUTHORIT	NATION	XENOPH
GAL/TAN	1	0.938**	0.896**	0.791**	0.874**
TRADITION	0.938**	1	0.818**	0.704**	0.770**
AUTHORIT	0.896**	0.818**	1	0.725**	0.918**
NATION	0.791**	0.704**	0.725**	1	0.824**
XENOPH	0.874**	0.770**	0.918**	0.824**	1

** $p < 0.01$. Data source: (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010).

As showed in the table above, in 2006 all correlations are both positive and significant. In particular, the correlation between scores on GAL/TAN and xenophobia is enough robust to argue that right-wing parties on the former dimension hold a xenophobic attitude too. By unfolding the xenophobic issue into its three original components, correlations with GAL/TAN are still positive and significant.

Table 2.2. Correlation coefficients between GAL/TAN and 3 items.

	GAL/TAN	IMMIGRATION	MULTI/ASSIM	ETHNIC MIN
GAL/TAN	1	0.830**	0.871**	0.855**
IMMIGRATION	0.830**	1	0.922**	0.908**
MULTI/ASSIM	0.871**	0.922**	1	0.898**
ETHNIC MIN	0.855**	0.908**	0.898**	1

** $p < 0.01$. Data source: (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010).

On the other hand, a measure of exclusionism can be easily determined by computing the mean score of traditionalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, and nationalism for each political party. It is plain to verify that the correlation between GAL/TAN and exclusionist scores is almost close to a perfect positive correlation¹⁶. Thus, political parties that are strongly deviant on the rightist side of the GAL/TAN dimension will be labelled as Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs), i.e. parties that traditionalist on religious values, xenophobic on immigration, authoritarian on social order, and nationalist on societal homogeneity.

In the aftermath, the GAL/TAN dimension is examined through a diachronic and country-by-country perspective; to make a fruitful comparison, z-scores standard values has been computed within each party system, taking into account

¹⁶ Namely: Pearson's correlation coefficient is equal to 0.953 ($p < 0.01$). Since data on single value issues were collected only for the 2006 survey, these findings are assumed to hold true also for 1999 and 2002.

all three Chapel Hill's surveys¹⁷. The aim is to identify the most deviant party (-ies) inside each fourteen West European party systems. Furthermore, a threshold of 1 standard deviation has been fixed to identify the most deviant actor(s) on both extremities of the GAL/TAN dimension. Thus, if a party has a score less than or at least equal to -1, then it is an instance of the GAL cluster; on the other side, if a party has a score more than or at least equal to 1, then it is a instance of the TAN cluster, namely, that party turned out to be strongly traditionalist, authoritarian, nationalist, and xenophobic as proved earlier. In a nutshell, when a party satisfied the positive 1-standard deviation threshold is identified as an ERP. The concept of exclusionism has been forged since these parties support a conception of society as internally homogenous and based on traditional values and customs, and reject multiculturalism along with alternative life-styles, i.e. they are exclusionist in regards of what they perceive as being “diverse” and conceive “the Other” as the enemy. Their ideology is framed though a friend/foe scheme and their final aim is to protect the “inside”, defined as legitimate and pure, from the “outside”, perceived as a threat. Statistics are presented in the following table.

Table 2.3. GAL/TAN party deviancy in fourteen countries.

YEAR	COUNTRY	PARTY	Z-GAL	PARTY	Z-TAN
1999	Austria	LIF	-1.01	FPO	1.14
2002	Austria	Grünen	-1.00	FPO	1.18
2006	Austria	Grünen	-1.16	FPO	1.28
2006	Austria	LIF	-1.01	BZO	1.05
1999	Belgium	Ecolo	-1.57	VB	1.76
1999	Belgium	Agalev	-1.57	FN	1.76
2002	Belgium	Agalev	-1.28	VB	1.85
2002	Belgium	Ecolo	-1.26	-	-
2006	Belgium	Groen	-1.31	VB	1.57
2006	Belgium	Ecolo	-	N-VA	1.27
1999	Denmark	EL	-1.29	DF	1.62
1999	Denmark	SF	-1.15	FP	1.41
2002	Denmark	SF	-1.08	DF	1.48
2006	Denmark	EL	-1.27	DF	1.59
2006	Denmark	RV	-1.10	KF	1.17
2006	Denmark	SF	-1.03	-	-
1999	Finland	VIHR	-1.22	PS	1.16
1999	Finland	KIPU	-1.13	EKA	1.13
1999	Finland	VAS	-1.10	SKL	1.04
1999	Finland	-	-	KESK	1.04
2002	Finland	VIHR	-1.34	SKL	1.44
2002	Finland	-	-	KESK	1.07

¹⁷ The standardisation of values implies that the mean of all party z-scores is equal to 0 and standard deviation (σ) is equal to 1.

2006	Finland	VIHR	-1.42	KD	1.41
2006	Finland	-	-	PS	1.07
1999	France	Verts	-1.86	MN	1.46
1999	France	MEI	-1.43	D	1.15
1999	France	PS	-1.14	FN	1.02
2002	France	Verts	-1.45	FN	1.79
2006	France	Verts	-1.28	FN	1.41
2006	France	-	-	MPF	1.27
1999	Germany	Grünen	-1.35	DVU	1.30
1999	Germany	-	-	REP	1.20
2002	Germany	Grünen	-1.37	CSU	1.38
2006	Germany	Grünen	-1.26	CSU	1.43
1999	Greece	SYN	-1.16	ND	1.26
2002	Greece	SYN	-1.24	-	-
2006	Greece	Syriza	-1.42	Laos	1.43
1999	Ireland	GP	-1.08	FF	1.49
2002	Ireland	GP	-1.46	FF	1.20
2006	Ireland	GP	-1.24	FF	1.28
2006	Ireland	-	-	FG	1.09
1999	Italy	LB	-1.99	MS	1.85
1999	Italy	Verdi	-1.68	AN	1.45
1999	Italy	PDS	-1.04	CDU	1.03
2002	Italy	DS	-1.69	AN	1.31
2002	Italy	RC	-1.66	LN	1.07
2006	Italy	Rad	-1.45	AN	1.34
2006	Italy	Verdi	-1.29	LN	1.29
2006	Italy	RC	-1.25	PP	1.06
2006	Italy	PdCI	-1.21	-	-
2006	Italy	SDI	-1.05	-	-
1999	Netherlands	GL	-1.43	SGP	1.16
1999	Netherlands	D66	-1.31	CD	1.12
2002	Netherlands	D66	-1.23	SGP	1.48
2002	Netherlands	GL	-1.23	CU	1.27
2006	Netherlands	GL	-1.26	CU	1.56
2006	Netherlands	D66	-1.21	-	-
1999	Portugal	-	-	CDS/PP	1.37
2002	Portugal	-	-	CDS/PP	1.17
2006	Portugal	BE	-1.13	CDS/PP	1.31
1999	Spain	Verde	-1.70	PP	1.47
1999	Spain	IU	-1.26	PNV	1.19
2002	Spain	IU	-1.54	PP	1.59
2006	Spain	IU	-1.19	PP	1.69
1999	Sweden	V	-1.25	KD	1.43
1999	Sweden	MP	-1.13	-	-
2002	Sweden	MP	-1.12	KD	1.59
2006	Sweden	V	-1.14	KD	1.73
2006	Sweden	MP	-1.14	-	-
1999	UK	Greens	-1.23	UKIP	1.46
1999	UK	-	-	Cons	1.23
2002	UK	LibDems	-1.13	Cons	1.61
2006	UK	Greens	-1.06	UKIP	1.79

Data source: (Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Hooghe et al. 2010).

In Austria, all three surveys reveal that the most right-deviant party is, as expected, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Furthermore, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) appeared in 2006 as the second most right-deviant actor: after harsh quarrels against Strache over FPÖ leadership, Haider quit the FPÖ and founded the BZÖ in 2005. This party became a political actor mainly rooted in Carinthia, a Land where Haider was elected as Governor in two occasions. On the other side, the two most left-deviant parties are the Greens (Grünen) and the Liberals (LIF): the latter is a party composed of those who abandoned the FPÖ in the early 1990s when the Haider right-wing and national influence over the party had become too marked. Briefly, the analysis of right-deviancy is in line with the literature.

In Belgium¹⁸ the party configuration is as expected since in all three surveys the most right-deviant actor is the overtly xenophobic and separatist Flemish Interest (VB). In 1999, the greatest right-deviant position is shared with the francophone National Front (FN), unfortunately discarded in the two subsequent inquiries. Yet, its membership in the ERP set can be assumed with certainty since this party established in Wallonia such as the Belgian “twin” of the French National Front. In 2006, a second Flemish actor appeared on the rightist side, namely, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), a party striving for the independence of Flanders, but with a less radical agenda on social and cultural issues than the VB. Their position in 2006 is not that unexpected, even if they are usually considered such as part of the right-wing radicalism since the N-VA does not appear strongly concerned with xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments. This is further substantiated by the usually electoral cartel between N-VA and the Flemish Christian Democrats into the CD&V alliance¹⁹. On the libertarian side, the two most deviant actors are the Ecology parties belonging respectively to the French- and Dutch-speaking part of the country.

¹⁸ Excluding the bi-lingual Region of Brussels, in Belgium there are actually two separate party systems in accordance with the two big linguistic communities in the country: e.g. the Flemish Interest (VB) contest elections only in Flanders, whereas the National Front (FN) only in Wallonia. The same holds true for the parties of the three traditional major political families — socialists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals — and more recently for the Ecologists too.

¹⁹ The electoral agreement between the two parties was then dissolved before the 2010 federal elections when the N-VA contested election with its own political symbol.

In Denmark, the Danish People's Party (DF) is always the most right-deviant party, prevailing over both the Progress Party (FP) — that strongly suffered competition from the Pia Kjaersgaard's party²⁰ — and the Conservative People's Party (KF) that assumed in 2006 a rather radical stance, still more moderate than the DF. The FP is generally branded as right-wing radical party and actually stands at the second position in 1999; hence, its collocation in the exclusionist right group appears motivated. In the 2006 survey, the KF holds the second placing, but the party leaded by Lars Barfoed is a full member of the European People's Party (EPP) since 1993. On the other hand, the libertarian side is contented between the anti-capitalist red-green United List (EL) and the Socialist People's Party (SF).

In Finland, the configuration is more complex since the True Finns (PS) contends with the Finnish Christian League (SKL), which changed its name into Christian Democrats (KD) in 2001, for the position of most right-deviant party²¹. The latter has never been considered a part of the right-wing radicalism as it holds the usual tenets of Christian democracy and is actually an observer member in the EPP. Yet, its stance along the GAL/TAN axis appears more coherent when considering that the KD and PS formed an electoral cartel in the 2009 European Parliament elections. The PS was founded in 1995 after the dissolution of the Finnish Rural Party (SMP), clearly originated from the Urban-Rural cleavage; because of its claims against immigration from non-European countries and its Euro-sceptic stance on the EU threat against national welfare state, the PS is at least a borderline case between conservatism and right-wing radicalism. On the opposite side, the Left Alliance (VAS) and the Ecologists (VIHR) are the most left-deviant parties.

France is a crucial country since the National Front (FN) has often been considered almost a prototype of the post-industrial radical right. Data corroborate its reputation since the FN is the most right-deviant party both in 2002 and 2006. In 1999, the FN occupied the third place in the ranking, while the most right-deviant

²⁰ In 2001, the Progress Party gathered only 0.6 per cent of the vote and did not contest legislative elections neither in 2005 nor in 2007. Its major inroads were made in the 1970s (e.g., in 1973 landslide election it collected 15.9% of the vote), whereas in the second half of the 1990s its electoral performances dropped dramatically.

²¹ The PS was not part of the 2002 survey.

one is the Republican National Movement (MNR), a splinter party from the FN leaded by Bruno Mégret, and the second one is The Right (La Droite, D), a very small party founded in 1998 by Charles Millon after his expulsion from the Union for French Democracy (UDF). Both Mégret and Millon's parties are strictly minor actors compared to the FN that holds a real blackmail power (Sartori 1976) at least in the electoral competition. In fact, Le Pen's party has exerted an unchallengeable supremacy over the right-wing radicalism. On the leftist side, the most libertarian stance is always expressed by the Greens (Verts).

In Germany, a significant lack of data limits the analysis: indeed, in 1999 the two more right-deviant parties are respectively the German People's Union (DVU) and the Republicans (REP). Nevertheless, they are not anymore included into the two later surveys, so that the Christian Social Union (CSU) holds the most rightist stance, though the Bavarian partner of the CDU has never been considered as a member of the radical right group. Furthermore, the National-democratic Party of Germany (NPD) has never been included, thus identification of ERPs in Germany is rather problematic.

In Greece, the absence of right-wing radical parties was filled by the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) founded in 2000 and included only in the 2006 survey where it stand at the most right-deviant position. In the 1999 survey, the most right-deviant party was the New Democracy (ND) that is by all means a traditional mainstream conservative party, whilst in 2002 no party was over the threshold of right-deviancy. Other minor radical right-wing parties in the 1990s, like the National Party (EK) or National Political Union (EPEN), have never been investigated by Chapel Hill's surveys probably because of their very minor consensus at the polls. Along the opposite side, the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN), then renamed into Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), is the most left-libertarian actor.

In Ireland, the same configuration is constantly reproduced in all three surveys: the Republican Party (Fianna Fáil²², FF) is always the most right-deviant party, while the Green Party (GP) is the most left-deviant one. Nevertheless, the FF is a

²² Literally: "Soldiers of Destiny".

liberal-conservative party and member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in the European Parliament, thus very far from the radical right-wing area. Furthermore, in the 2006 survey, the United Ireland Party (Fine Gael²³, FG) turned out as second right-deviant party: also in this case, the FG is a member of the EPP and is generally acknowledged such as truly representative of usual Christian democratic instances. Thus, the Irish party system appears as devoid of ERPs and the extreme right in general has never played any significant political role thus far.

Italy represents a case where party system configuration is somewhat complex, due also to a rather strong party fragmentation. Certainly, dealing with the right has to cope with the cumbersome fascist legacy. In 1999, the most right-deviant party is the Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (MS-FT), namely, one of the heirs of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) that has represented the cornerstone of the old-style Italian right (Ignazi 2000). Notwithstanding, the MS-FT is included just in the first survey, while in the 2002 and 2006 surveys the most right-deviant position is held by the National Alliance (AN), the moderate counterpart that originated too from the dissolution of the MSI and was established precisely to quit the Fascist imprinting and embrace fully democratic values. A further key actor in Italian politics is the Northern League (LN) that turned out to be right-deviant only in the 2002 survey. Certainly, federalism represents its core ideological tenet and, in fact, the LN was not forged on the usual right-wing ground, but to give political voice to the anti-statist resentment of the Northern part of the country. On the other hand, the LN has adopted a rather xenophobic and social-conservative agenda since the mid-1990s advocating the typical right-wing “law&order” appeal against mass-immigration. Finally, two parties, namely, the CDU (United Centre Democrats) in 1999 and the PP (Popular Party) in 2006 are right-deviant too, and this is quite unexpected in relation to the literature on right-wing radicalism that usually do not take into account those two Christian democratic political actors. Thus, the choice of parties entering the exclusionist right group is rather complicated. On the opposite wing, the extreme position along the libertarian side is expressed in two

²³ Literally: “Family of the Irish”.

surveys (1999 and 2006) by the Bonino List-Radical Party (Rad, LB) and in 2002 by the Left Democrats (DS).

In the Netherlands, parties occupying the most right-deviant position are both strictly protestant parties, i.e. the Reformed Political Party (SGP) in 1999 and 2002, then the Christian Union (CU) in 2006. It is important to note that in the first survey the SGP scored higher than the Centre Democrats (CD) that is usually considered as being a truly right-wing extremist party. A second major observation regards the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF): this is included in the 2002 survey but it did not result²⁴ as right-deviant. The same holds true for its ideological successor²⁵, the Party for Freedom (PVV) leaded by Geert Wilders that, in 2006, scored only a right-deviancy equal to 0.70. It is useful to specify that the PVV's stances need further investigation, since the party was established only recently — i.e., in 2004 — and its evolutions has to be monitored strictly, even more since it entered the coalition (but not the executive) supporting the new Liberal and Christian Democratic government in 2010. It is plain to see that the selection of ERPs in the Netherlands in one of the most complicated. The SGP is the oldest political party since it was established in 1918 and its role is eminently to testimony Calvinist values in Parliament. Thus, the SGP is not a governing party, i.e. a party open to enter a governing coalition or cabinet. Indeed, it has been always in opposition and its ideology is mainly linked to Biblical values and principles. On the one hand, it is a firmly traditional, whereas on the other hand it is not a strong anti-immigrant party as showed by its ancient founding. Its membership in the exclusionist right group is open to debate. Secondly, the Christian Union sometimes allied with the SGP and the main difference between them is that the CU is open to participate in government as proved in 2006 when it entered the fourth Balkenende cabinet together with the CDA and PvdA. Moreover, compared to the SGP, the CU is a very recently established party as it issued from a merger in 2000 between the Reformed Political Alliance and the Reformatory Political Federation and contested elections for the first time in 2002. The CU is Christian social-conservative party and its ideology is mainly inspired by principle of the Bible; on the other hand, the

²⁴ Its score was just 0.13 above the mean in 2002 on the GAL/TAN dimension.

²⁵ This is argued in terms of its political struggle against Islamic values.

CU has a somewhat moderate left-wing attitude towards asylum seekers and persecuted for religious reasons. Despite of its moderate denomination, the Centrum Democrats is truly xenophobic and authoritarian party. This is confirmed in Carter's analysis (2005) where the CD is classified as a party attaching a central importance to contrasting immigration in Western societies (2005, 30) and also supporting new culturism (2005, 36), hence distinguishing from traditional white supremacy claims. Therefore, its membership in the exclusionist right group is well explained. Finally, on the other hand, the more libertarian parties are, as predictable, the Green Left (GL) and the Democrats 66 (D66).

In Portugal, the most right-deviant position is always expressed by the Social-Democratic Centre/Popular Party (CDS/PP), a firmly Christian and social-conservative party, member of the EPP, which across the literature is not generally included in the right-wing radicalism. Instead, the party is considered as ideologically close to the German CSU. On the other side, no party overcame the threshold on the left, save the Left Bloc (BE) in 2006. Thus, in 1999 and 2002 the Portuguese party system appear not to be particularly polarised.

In Spain, various Falangistas groupuscules are unable to play, so far, any influential role at the electoral level. In all three surveys, the most right-deviant party is the Popular Party (PP) with a marked right-deviant score. Probably, this might be due to its legacy with Alianza Popular (AP)²⁶, the party leaded by Manuel Fraga that, moving from the right to the centre of the political spectrum, merged with other small Christian Democratic and Liberal parties and re-found with the name of Partido Popular in 1989. On the other hand, in line with the same remarks made early, this party too is full member of the EPP and is not embedded into right-wing radicalism in the literature. The same conclusion holds true for the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) whose pattern is clearly into the Christian democratic tradition and in the European Parliament it has only one MP seating with the ALDE group. On the libertarian side, as predictable, the Ecology party (Verde) and the United Left (IU) are the most left-deviant parties.

²⁶ Between 1979 and 1982 general elections, the AP established its supremacy over the centre-right, taking profit of the drop of vote share (from 34.8 to 6.8 per cent) of Suarez's Social and Democratic Union.

In Sweden, once again, a party member of the EPP, namely, the Christian Democrats (KD), expresses the most right-deviant stance. Moreover, the New Democracy party (NyD) has frequently been embedded in the right-wing radicalism, even though its right-deviant score in the 1999 survey²⁷ was evidently under the threshold (i.e., 0.42). Furthermore, the exclusion of the Sweden Democrats and the National Democrats represents a strong limitation to the scope of the research. On the other extremity, the libertarian side is presided over by the Left Party (V) and the Environment Party-The Greens (MP).

Finally, in both 1999 and 2006 the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is the most right-deviant party and the same for the Tories (Cons) in 2002: the former is a borderline case in the literature since that party has been considered a single-issue party, i.e. preserving British sovereignty from European interferences and maintaining the UK out of the Euro-zone. That said, the party appears to have acquired also some ideological traits linked to social-conservatism and anti-immigrant reluctance. Thus, its collocation into the ERP group is problematic. On the other hand, the Conservative Party is without any doubt a historical mainstream party in British politics, never associated with the radical right, excepting the neo-liberal economic policies under the Thatcher's leadership. Unfortunately, the British National Party (BNP) is not considered in any of the surveys and the same could be argued for the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland (DUP). Conversely, the most the left-deviant parties are the Greens in 1999 and 2006, and the Liberal Democrats in 2002 when the Greens were not included.

4. A COUNTER-ANALYSIS WITH BENOIT AND LAVER'S DATA

In lots of instances, the previous analysis has carried out an output in line with the literature, i.e. many parties identified as exclusionist right are the same parties that, in the literature, are defined as belonging to the right-wing radicalism. However, some borderline or debatable cases persist and a further investigation, through different data, may be useful: the aim is to shed light on those parties whose collocation, or omission, in the exclusionist right group is critical.

²⁷ The party quickly dissolved in 1994, suffering the lack of a solid organisation.

In line with the type of data employed early, this section will make use of expert surveys, in particular those collected by Benoit and Laver (2006) during the period 2002-2004. Resorting to a different data source than Chapel Hill's expert judgments boosts the comparison of results and helps verify whether they are sufficiently robust. Yet, Benoit and Laver's survey structure does not provide an encompassing GAL/TAN dimension. Therefore, the focus has been concentrated on the only two issues dealing directly with values: social policies and immigration. The former is a dimension where parties are positioned concerning their support/opposition of liberal policies on abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. The latter is a dimension where parties are positioned whether they favour policies helping immigrants to integrate into society or, on the contrary, support repatriation of immigrants in their country of origin. This issue is treated from a very specific point of view, since respondents have to assess a particular aspect of party ideology and program, i.e. repatriation or integration²⁸. Moreover, it can be argued that a party striving for repatriation will probably support also tough policies on immigration and hold strict view on that domain. As previously seen, the GAL/TAN scores were strongly correlated with traditionalism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia, whilst to a lesser extent with nationalism. Given the couple of issues here are at stakes — i.e., social policies and immigration — they do represent a good proxy of traditionalism and xenophobia, but not of authoritarianism and, even less, of nationalism. Despite this limitation, a counter-analysis is actually worthwhile, since social conservatism and xenophobia are exactly two main features of ERPs.

The investigation is conducted within each party system, taking into account party scores along the two topics mentioned earlier. In order to be as accurate as possible, the salience of each dimension is used as weight to obtain a weighted average score for each party: in this manner, the final mean is affected by the salience that the party attributes to the two single issues. Once all means are calculated, in analogy with what have been done before, standard values are computed within each party system. The goal is to sort out those parties that are

²⁸ The same dimension will be employed also in Chapter III to estimate the spatial positions of parties.

right-deviant along the “new dimension” composed of social policies and immigration, keeping the threshold of at least one standard deviation above the mean. Results are compared with those of the precedent section.

With Benoit and Laver data, the configuration of the Austrian party system reinforces the FPÖ as the most right-deviant party. Yet, its deviancy is just slightly above one standard deviation since the FPÖ has an extreme position on immigration, while on social policies its stance is a bit more moderate. However, salience is the key difference, since immigration is a much relevant topic than social policies. That said, the standardized weighted mean is over the threshold and this support the inclusion of FPÖ into the exclusionist right group. Since the BZÖ was founded in 2005 and the majority of Benoit and Laver surveys were collected in 2003, this party is not included. By the way, since the BZÖ issued from the FPÖ and, on the base of what has been specified on the previous section, it appears appropriate to label also the Alliance for the Future of Austria as an ERP.

In Belgium, the two most deviant parties on the right are again the VB and FN. In particular, their standardized weighted means are very far from the third party in the ranking, i.e. the CD&V. Thus, results reveals the extent to which this parties are ideologically divergent from all others. In fact, the deviancy of all Ecology parties on the left is less pronounced. A difference from the analysis of the previous section is that the Flemish N-VA has moderate right score (i.e., 0.48), hence markedly below the threshold. This implies that, in the end, the VB and FN are the only parties that can be considered as ERPs.

In Denmark, the most right-deviant party is the DF, followed by the FP, so that results confirm the conclusions drawn before. Both are strongly concerned with immigration and to a very less extent with social policies. The Conservative People’s Party (KF), that turned out to be right-deviant in the 2006 Chapel Hill’s survey, has a standardized weighted mean of 0.74, thus under the fixed threshold. The saliency attributed by the KF to immigration is less pronounced than those attributed by both DF and FP. This justifies the inclusion of them into the exclusionist right group.

The Finnish party system’s structure is still complex. Firstly, the True Finns (PS) party is the most right-deviant with a standardized weighted mean of 1.44. As

said above, the PS represents a debated case since it is considered a borderline case since when the party started to radicalise its political platform, shifting towards the right by the end of last century. As already mentioned, the PS was founded on the ruins of the old agrarian party that represented the right wing of the KESK, and this left the party in the 1950s. Its scores on expert judgments confirm the argument: both on social policies and especially on immigration, the PS is a rightist party. Although its membership in the right-wing radicalism can always be questioned, on the basis of data available it appears possible to argue that the True Finns are members of the exclusionist right group. Concerning the SKL-KD, i.e. the Christian Democrats, this resulted to be right-deviant in all three Chapel Hill surveys and the same with Benoit and Laver data (2006). The party was established in 1958 when a dissident faction of the National Coalition Party (KOK) decided to split and founded the Finnish Christian League and, in 2001, the party's name was changed. As already said, it is affiliated to the EPP as an observer member, and its ideology is mainly implanted in the defence of traditional values such as demonstrated by party score and salience — i.e., respectively 18.58 and 17.97 — on social matters. On the contrary, the salience of immigration for the SKL-KD is much lower and the position is just slightly on the centre-right. Summing up, given its European connection in the mainstream centre-right group and the minor importance attributed to immigration, the SKL-KD is closer to radical social-conservative parties rather than exclusionist right actors. Therefore, it will not be considered as an ERP. About the Pensioner party (EKA), this resulted right-deviant in the 1999 Chapel Hill's survey, but no more data are available in all other surveys, since it represents a minor extra-Parliament party in Finland, so that it can be discarded from present analysis. Finally, in the 1992 and 2002 Chapel Hill's surveys the former agrarian and now liberal-conservative KESK turned out to be right-deviant. However, with Benoit and Laver data (2006), the KESK resulted rather below the threshold: both topics are not that relevant for the party that, on the one hand, is rather social-conservative but, on the other hand, holds a left to the centre stance on immigration. In particular, the last argument allows for ruling out the KESK from the exclusionist right group.

France is the homeland of the prototype radical right-wing party, i.e. Le Pen's Front National (FN), at present led by his daughter Marine Le Pen who has recently been appointed as President of the party. With both datasets, the FN is right-deviant and attaches a higher salience to immigration, even though in both domains it holds a radical right-wing stance as epitomized by its standardised average mean greater than 19.0. By consequence, the FN has a full membership in the exclusionist right group. The other three parties mentioned in the table below are minor parties that, in spatial terms, tried to insert between the FN and the mainstream Gaullist right. As already specified early, the Charles Millon's Droite represented just a flash party and, indeed, was not included in Benoit and Laver inquiry (2006), hence that party can be ruled out from the set under investigation. On the other hand, the National Republican Movement (MNR) and the Movement for France (MPF) played a more important role. The first one is a splinter party issued from the FN at the end of the 1990s. The former FN cadre — second only to Le Pen's leadership — Bruno Mégrét founded it after contesting Le Pen's project of entrusting the party to her daughter for the upcoming 1999 European elections. Yet, the fight between Le Pen and Mégrét was not only a question of personal party leadership, but concerned also party strategy, since Mégrét was more moderate than his rival and prone to elaborate closer relationships with the Gaullist republican right to bargain a political agreement. At the beginning, Mégrét was able to seize the top of the party through a party congress, which nominated him as leader and added the denomination "National Movement", to that of FN, to highlight the new political line. In the aftermath, Le Pen reacted strongly and went to court where he obtained the reversal of all decisions made by that Congress that was judged to have been illegally convened. Therefore, Mégrét was forced to leave the FN and founded the MNR with certain former FN regional cadres. With regards to MPF, Philippe de Villiers, a Euro-sceptic political leader who fought against the approval of the Maastricht Treaty, established it in 1994. He fought against the approval of the Maastricht Treaty and the MPF has always been characterised by a strong appeal to the defence of national identity and independence from Europe. On the other hand, de Villiers' political line has been oriented towards a non-antagonist relation with the Gaullist right, as demonstrated by numerous alliances with

Gaullist candidates at the local level, whilst keeping distance from Le Pen's party and ideology. Summing up, the MNR can be considered as member of the exclusionist right group, and it is included in the set of extreme right parties by Carter (2005, 4) too, while MPF is considered as a borderline case.

The literature usually identifies three German parties in the area of right-wing radicalism: the German People's Union (DVU), the Republicans (REP), and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP). With regards to the first two political actors in this list, DVU and REP were right-deviant in the 1999 Chapel Hill's survey and this is underpinned also by Benoit and Laver data (2006). On the other hand, the NPD was included only in the latter survey: examining its standardised weighted score, along with that of DVU and REP, reveals that those three parties resulted more rightist than the French FN. Therefore, the inclusion of all of them in the exclusionist right group is rather straightforward. Another very important aspect concerns the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) that in the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill's surveys turned out to be the most right-deviant party along the GAL/TAN dimension in Germany. It has already been previously pointed out the caveat linked to the exclusion of the other three parties from the surveys. In Benoit and Laver inquiry (2006), the CDU and CSU are considered as a unique unit of analysis and its deviancy is right-wing, though clearly under the fixed threshold. Moreover, as the CSU is full member of the EPP, it can be doubtless ruled out from the exclusionist right group. A last observation is about the Law and Order Offensive Party (Schil) that, despite of its considerable standardised weighted score of 17.81, has a right-deviancy under the threshold given the extreme high scores of the other three ERPs. Furthermore, this party has been a flash party without gathering significant electoral results, hence it can be discarded without affecting the present analysis. Indeed, the party founded by Ronald Schill in 2000 was then dissolved in 2007 due to financial problems and loss of many leading figures, among which the founder that had been expelled in 2003 due to judicial problems.

The Greek party system is based on two major parties, one on the centre-left — the Socialist Party (PASOK) — and the other on the centre-right — the New Democracy party (ND). Since the latter is one of two columns supporting the Greek two-party system, the resulted right-deviancy in the 1999 Chapel Hill's survey has

been to be interpreted with caution. Actually, with Benoit and Laver data (2006) too the ND holds a right-deviancy above the threshold. However, the ND is not an ERP on the base of three motivations. Firstly, the ND is a truly executive-oriented government and it has been in power in several occasions. Secondly, the ND is a member of the EPP and, thirdly, its standardised weighted score is only 14.35, so much lower than the usual level reached by ERPs, and the same holds true in relation to salience attributed to both dimensions. On the other hand, the focus has to be shifted over the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), a party whose ideological platforms appears to be located in the exclusionist right area. It was founded by the journalist Georgios Karatzaferis, an ND former member. The LAOS contested its first national elections in 2004, but failed to satisfy the 3 per cent national threshold; the second tentative was much more electorally successful since the party, that in 2005 absorbed the Hellenic Front, entered Parliament in 2007 receiving 3.8 per cent of the vote. The LAOS was included in the 2006 Chapel Hill's survey and resulted significantly right-deviant as expected. Even though it was not included in Benoit and Laver survey, the LAOS in the set of ERPs appears to be appropriate in line with what has been said before about the Austrian BZÖ,

In Ireland as well, one of two mainstream parties — the Fianna Fáil (FF) — turned out to be the most right-deviant on the GAL/TAN dimension in all three Chapel Hill's survey. The same result is obtained with Benoit and Laver data, since the FF has standardised weighted mean of 1.44. Similar remarks that have been put forth before can be repeated here to highlight that, despite of its right-deviancy, this party has never been included by the literature in the right-wing radicalism. Firstly, the FF is part of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), a group whose political ideals are markedly far than those usually supported by right-wing groups. Secondly, by examining its weighted mean score over social policies and immigrations stance in Benoit and Laver data, the score of 14.75 is lower than that of other ERPs. For these reasons, the Republican Party of Ireland is not member of the exclusionist right set.

Given its high degree of fractionalisation, the Italian party system is one of the most complex to inspect. The Italian Social Movement-Tricolour Flame (MSI, MS-FT) and National Alliance (AN) resulted as right-deviant also in Benoit and Laver

data. With special regards to National Alliance, this is an important result given its status of borderline case. In Benoit and Laver data, its weighted average score on the two topics is just above 17 and its standardised weighted mean is right-deviant over the fixed threshold. Therefore, the inclusion of both parties in the exclusionist right group is justified. On the other hand, the United Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Italian Popular Party (PP) turned out to be right-deviant, respectively, in the 1999 and in 2006 Chapel Hill's surveys. In Benoit and Laver inquiry, those parties were not included with the same acronym: the heir of CDU is at present the Union of the Centre (UDC) and that of the PP is the Margherita²⁹ (MARG): in both instances, these parties were not right-deviant and, therefore, can be ruled from the exclusionist right group. The Northern League (LN) represents the trickier case: with Chapel Hill's data, it turned out to be right-deviant only in 2002. Yet, with Benoit and Laver data, it is the most right-deviant party with a significant weighted average over 18 and a standardised weighted mean of 1.51, greatly over the fixed threshold. In the literature, the collocation of LN inside the right-wing radicalism is troublesome and disputed, mainly because of the main ideological tenet of Bossi's party, i.e. federalism and autonomy of the Northern regions of the country. Moreover, the LN itself denies any linkage with the "right" in political terms, especially because of the shadows of fascism that inevitably surrounds every party moving too further on the right of the political spectrum. Another important point is the active participation in the executive in 1994 and then again in 2001 and 2008 with the centre-right coalition leaded by Berlusconi. In several instances, there has been tensions between AN and LN, since the former support national unity, while the second one assumed secession (in the 1990s) and then federalism (in the 21st century) as main goal of its political existence. Cautiously, it appears opportune to consider the LN a borderline case in relation to the exclusionist right group.

The Dutch party system represents another intricate context. First of all, a party usually identified by the literature as extremely located on the right is the Centre Democrats (CD), as also noted by Mudde (1996, 234) when listing the so-called "usual suspect parties", i.e. parties that are considered as component of right-wing

²⁹ Full Italian name: "Democrazia è Libertà – La Margherita".

extremisms. It was established in 1984 by Hans Janmaat and, despite its name³⁰, the party adopted a definite nationalist ideology and supported anti-immigrant claims. The other Dutch parties marked their distance to the Centrumdemocraten and its “alien” ideology, insomuch a *cordon sanitaire* in the period 1989-1998 was set up against Centre Democrats MPs. The party entered a profound crisis at the end of the 1990s, because of an extremely weak consensus (under 1 per cent) and the risk of being banned likewise the Centre Party '86. In the end, the CD was officially dissolved when its founder died in 2002. This explains why Benoit and Laver did not include the CD in their research; however, the incorporation of the CD in the exclusionist right group is, by all means, appropriate. Just few months before the CD dissolution, another political actor with a strong anti-immigrant accent was established: the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The main claim of that party was the fight against the supposed threat put forward by Muslim immigration in the Netherlands, i.e., Fortuyn denounced the incompatibility of Muslim values within the tolerant and libertarian Dutch society and the risk of a clash between Dutch secularism and Islam. This helps explain why in Benoit and Laver data the LPF turned out to give a low saliency to social policies, with a centre-left score, whereas immigration had a great salience and LPF stance was definitely on the radical right. In the end, given that results on LPF degree of right-deviancy is controversial — confirmed only with Benoit and Laver data — it appears prudent to rule out the Pim Fortuyn's list from the ERP set. About SGP and CU, both are close in some respects to right-wing radicalism, but a major difference between relates to their European affiliation: the former is member of the group of Europe for Freedom and Democracy (EFD), while the latter is part of European Conservatives and Reformists Group. This means that the CU is farer from the right radicalism than the SGP and therefore is not considered as right-exclusionist, while the latter can be considered as borderline case.

Thus far, the Iberian Peninsula is an area devoid of ERPs, since both for Spain and Portugal the right-deviancy is expressed by conservative Christian democratic

³⁰ The use of a label appealing to a “moderate” profile is somewhat frequent: for instance, the Sweden Democrats. The aim of these labels is probably to avoid any suspect of being extremist and anti-democratic.

parties that are far from right-wing radicalism as such. This conclusion stems from the European affiliation of both PP and CDS/PP.

The 1991 landslide general elections in Sweden was featured by the New Democracy (NyD) breakthrough, which gathered 6.7 per cent of votes and marked the best score ever for a right-wing party³¹. In the aftermath, due to internal disagreements and quarrels, the party weakened and dropped to 1.2 per cent in the 1994 elections; therefore, it lost its parliamentary representations and, finally, in 1998 secured only 0.2 per cent of the vote and dissolved. The party was included only in the 1999 Chapel Hill's survey and its GAL/TAN score was only of 6 out of 10 and its right-deviancy is under 0.50. Hence, the New Democracy is not considered part of the exclusionist right group.

Finally, in the United Kingdom, the case of Tories can be ruled out from right-wing radicalism: although the party is rather deviant also in the Benoit and Laver inquiry, the party can be ruled out on the base of its tradition and values that are totally mainstream and central in British politics. Different is the discourse about the UKIP that unfortunately was included in Benoit and Laver study. This could have been a useful control for a party that resulted two times right-deviant in Chapel Hill's surveys and in Europe too is not affiliated to the mainstream centre-right. On the contrary, the UKIP is member of the EFD like the LN and SGP mentioned early. Cautiously, the UKIP is considered as a borderline case.

Table 2.4. Summary of case selection.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Chapel Hill's</i>	<i>Benoit and Laver</i>	ERPs
Austria	FPÖ (1999, 2002, 2006) BZÖ (2006)	FPÖ (BZO not included)	FPÖ, BZÖ
Belgium	VB (1999, 2002, 2006) FN (1999) N-VA (2006)	VB FN (N-VA not deviant)	VB, FN
Denmark	DF (1999, 2002, 2006) FP (1999) KF (2006)	DF FP (KF not deviant)	DF, FP
Finland	PS (1999, 2006) SKL-KD (1999, 2002, 2006) KESK (1999, 2002) EKA (1999)	PS SKL-KD (KESK not deviant) (EKA not included)	PS
France	FN (1999, 2002, 2006) MPF (2006)	FN MPF	FN, MNR MPF borderline

³¹ Actually, the party was perceived as radical as to be considered distant from other traditional competitors.

	MNR (1999)	(MNR not included)	
	D (1999)	(D not included)	
Germany	DVU (1999)	DVU	DVU, REP, NPD
	REP (1999)	REP	
	CSU (2002, 2006)	(<i>CSU not deviant</i>)	
	(NPD not included)	NPD	
Greece	LAOS (2006)	(LAOS not included)	LAOS
	ND (1999)	ND	
Ireland	FF (1999, 2002, 2006)	FF	-
Italy	AN (1999, 2002)	AN	AN, MSFT
	MS (1999)	MSFT	LN borderline
	LN (2002)	LN	
	CDU (1999)	(<i>CDU not deviant</i>)	
	PP (2006)	(<i>PP not deviant</i>)	
Netherlands	CD (1999)	(CD not included)	CD
	SGP (1999, 2002)	SGP	SGP borderline
	CU (2002, 2006)	(CU not included)	
	(<i>LPF not deviant</i>)	LPF	
Portugal	CDS/PP (1999, 2002, 2006)	CDS/PP	-
Spain	PP (1999, 2002, 2006)	PP	-
	PNV (1999)	(<i>PNV not deviant</i>)	
Sweden	KD (1999, 2002, 2006)	KD	-
UK	UKIP (1999, 2006)	(UKIP not included)	-
	Conservatives (1999, 2002)	Conservatives	UKIP borderline

European affiliation has been a further criterion widely used in this section to disentangle more complicated cases. Indeed, the four borderline cases — LN, MPF, SGP, and UKIP — are all member of the European EFD. On the other hand, parties that are associated within the Christian democratic network are ruled out from the ERPs set, like the: Danish KF, Finnish SKL-KD, Greek ND, Irish FF, Portuguese CDS/PP, Spanish PP, Swedish KD, and the British Conservative Party.

PART 2: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

III. DEMAND SIDE FACTORS

1. AN OVERALL THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter has extensively explored dimensions of party competition in the tentative of indentifying parties expressing right-deviant stances along the GAL/TAN dimension of Chapel Hill's surveys. Those political actors satisfying a fixed threshold have been labelled Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs). Then, a further counter analysis has been carried out with Benoit and Laver data. In particular, the aim was to strengthen outputs obtained with Chapel Hill's surveys and to shed light on those parties that are debated cases between conservative centre-right and radical right-wing parties. In the end, the final section has supplied sixteen ERPs and four borderline cases.

Once the objects of the present analysis have been singled out, the focus can be turned to theoretical arguments concerning the second scope of the present enquiry, namely, theories accounting for ERPs' electoral success or downfall. A great amount of researches on right-wing radicalism has been elaborated in the last two decades, so that it is useful to spell out some of the major contributions emerged in the extensive literature about the electoral fortunes of radical right-wing parties. Firstly, Ignazi pointed out four concurrent causes (1992, 16, 2000, 215): «a) the rise of a neo-conservative cultural mood; b) a tendency towards radicalization and polarization; c) the presence of an underground but mounting legitimacy crisis of the political and (above all) party system; d) security and immigration issues». To support the first claim, it is argued that in the 1970s some intellectuals, disappointed by left-wing parties, moved towards the right side of the political spectrum (Bell 1973) and neo-conservatism emerged to counter the massive consensus on Keynesian economic recipes which caused the growth of the welfare state. Thus, laissez-faire ideas were revitalized to boost free markets and entrepreneurial initiatives, together with a major change in values where authority, patriotism, family, and tradition were given a renewed importance. Neo-conservatism cultivated the aspiration to represent the alternative to the left-

progressive interpretation of society, thus it advanced right to life, anti-feminism, traditional moral values, law and order, anti-minority rights, and xenophobia (R Flanagan and Inglehart 1987). Ignazi's second hypothesis pinpoints the polarisation of party system: he argues that the neo-conservative mood has induced mainstream centre-right parties to move forward to the right, with the risk of losing their traditional moderate constituencies. Therefore, this hesitation has given an advantage to extreme right parties that could play the role such as the real and genuine representatives of radical instances. On the other hand, about parties' placement along the left-right continuum, it is also plausible to consider another situation, namely, when mainstream parties have converged too much by the median voter in the centre, leaving an empty along their wings. Whether this occurs, the centripetal strategy³² of conventional parties may encourage electors to vote for radical parties, i.e. it induces a centrifugal effect on voters. The third point is related to the specific character of extreme right parties (Ignazi 1992) endangering the legitimacy of the system by blaming long parliamentary debates, the slowness of democratic procedures, and the frailty of state's authority. Last but not least, another issue favouring the extreme right would be immigration from non-European countries and integration of foreigners, especially of Muslim people: the clash between different values and life-styles, the growing fear of incompatibility, and the rise of criminality (directly associated by some parties to immigrations) are factors widely taken into account to explain ERPs electoral inroads. Indeed, electors would seek definite policies and the exclusionist right can establish itself most successfully where conventional mainstream parties have overlapped in their policies, so that they appear such as too mild and toned-down. In a very insightful analysis, Elisabeth Carter (2005) focuses also on party strategies with special regards to: the reciprocal distance between the mainstream centre-right and the extreme right party, and the distance between the two conventional moderate centre-left and centre-right parties. In addition to this, Meguid points out (2005) that when a new party politicises a dormant issue, it had

³² This specific party configuration will be analysed deeply in the next Chapter.

better the take the opposite ideological position on that issue than that assumed by a mainstream party.

A fundamental aspect is about social groups that ERPs are able to attract: a strong aspect is that in many instances these parties exert a pull on blue-collar and low-skilled workers, namely, traditional constituencies of Social Democratic parties (Betz 1993; Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi 2000). Social fragmentation has given rise to different social groupings with divergent political expectations: people with high level of education, working in human-oriented sector of the public service, and high-skilled professionals are generally oriented to cast their votes for the ecology and left-libertarians parties. On the other hand, those better educated and employed in the private sector are generally prone to foster free markets, lower taxes and a less expensive welfare state. Finally, those having low level of education – i.e., the most threatened by globalisation – are reasonably inclined to sustain state intervention in light of its benefices (Betz 1993). The last two groups are both potential ERPs voters: those working in the private sector are attracted by neoliberal economic stances, whereas the largest part of blue-collar workers, involved in object or document processing, is predominantly and may express «above average dispositions toward particularist and culturally parochial conceptions of citizenship and authoritarian decision making» (Kitschelt 1995, 9). Moreover, changes in occupational structures and the transition from «industrial welfare capitalism to post-industrial individualized capitalism» (Betz 1993) has weakened the traditional political cleavages, and strengthen an increasing and worrying alienation of voters from mainstream politics. Kitschelt marked (1995) that whether new radical right parties fail to adopt a neoliberal profile in economics (for instance, because of their legacy with fascism and state-driven economy), they risk losing many potential voters.

Finally, it is straightforward that institutional features too cannot be discarded, in particular electoral systems. Whether or not a new party is able to enter a party system depends inter alia on the entry barriers; from a rational choice perspective, voters are deterred to “waste” their votes towards new parties when there are single-member districts (SMDs) and plurality rule. Hence, the British electoral system is the prototype of a big hindrance to ERPs as their potential supporters are,

in each district, a minority that, in many instances, cannot succeed in electing their preferred candidate. It is often claimed that the more the system is disproportional, the more the extreme right parties will have difficulties in winning seats. However, district magnitude and electoral formula are not the only feature to consider, and Carter (2005) has disproved that PR systems would foster extremism.

This short section has just delineated some of the most cited and debated factors affecting ERPs electoral performances. The aim was to supply an introduction with some hints in the wide set of causal mechanisms that have been investigated in the literature. A very useful tentative to frame all hypothesis into an encompassing scheme was set up by Roger Eatwell³³ who collected a large set of thesis and drafted a systematic framework dividing demand-side and supply-side theories. The former set of explanations refers essentially to macro socio-economic changes, whereas the latter pinpoints those political messages reaching voters and affecting mass public. The demand-side is precisely at stake in this Chapter and will be treated extensively in the next section.

2. DEMAND SIDE FACTORS

Initially, the field of investigation can be conveniently divided into two branches: a socioeconomic, and a cultural strand. Starting with the former one, three majors subsets can be singled out: *a)* unemployment, inflation and economic growth: it has often been argued that high level of unemployment or its sudden rise in a given period, the increasing inflation, and the lowering of economic growth, altogether they bring about a spreading sentiment of discontent and dissatisfaction, with people blaming incumbent political “caste” because of its negative economic performances. Therefore, mainstream parties are meant to be harshly criticised as responsible for the gloomy economic contingency. These factors are linked to the economic protest-vote thesis; *b)* globalisation is a world-wide phenomenon frequently accused to have made competition for scarce resources even more strenuous. Therefore, particular segments of the population – e.g., low-skilled employees, manual workers, young and less educated people – are negatively

³³ Hereafter, I refer to the essay written by Roger Eatwell (2003d).

affected by this upsurge in competition, so that these social categories are generally labelled as “losers of the modernity”, and they would be more vulnerable to political appeals coming from EFRPs. Indeed, these parties advocate the need for a defence against fluxes of immigrants from non-EU countries, perceived as dangerous threats for jobs and houses, and as scroungers of welfare social provisions. Moreover, whether immigrants and asylum-seekers are deeply concentrated in few areas of the country, perception of insecurity of indigenous people precisely in those areas arises, and a radical climate of hostility represents a fertile breeding ground for EFRPs. This account can be epitomised by the chauvinist closure thesis; *c)* traditional loyalties of voters to parties have increasingly declined yielding a de-alignment of usual patterns of voting. This situation is generated by the lessening of religion and major ideologies roles in shaping the political arena since after WWII. Hence, the electoral breakthrough of EFRPs can be conceived as a consequence of the disorientation of voters losing their attachments to traditional mainstream parties. This stance is also known as social disintegration thesis.

Moving the focus towards value-cultural explanations, the internal distinction is two-fold: *a)* one key factor is linked to the so-called new racism (Carter 2005) or, alternatively, culturism: following this interpretation, ERPs cannot be simply viewed as updaters of classical racism, i.e. white race supremacy, since they would promote a newly form of exclusionism built on cultural grounds. On that account, they would blame immigrants not on the basis of the colour of the skin, rather they stress the irreducible incompatibility between traditions and cultures of indigenous people with those of foreigners. In a more general fashion, they are resort to a national interpretation that we can call as cultural clash theory; *b)* a further sensitive point relates to the relation between democracy and extremism: on the one hand, there is a growing sentiment of disenchantment against democratic regimes unable to satisfy expectations of their citizens, while on the other hand extremism would be increasingly perceived as more legitimate and as a tool to reproach political élites their pending promises. Moreover, extremism is reckoned to be more acceptable whether past fascist or nazi regimes are totally absent, or their memory is fading away. This could give an insightful account about the claim that EFRPs

are representing a new right that is much more electorally successful the more is far from the old one. In general, this stance can be labelled as the theory of neo-legitimate extremism.

Re-elaborating from Eatwell (2003d), five thesis can be hypothesized: 1) the single-issue thesis, i.e. extreme right parties are just a form of backlash against immigration in Europe from the 1980s till nowadays. Immigration is not limited to people coming from Northern Africa, but also from Eastern Europe when communism collapsed and civil war broke out in former Yugoslavia; 2) the protest thesis, i.e. extreme right parties are the representatives of 'anti-politics' sentiments, in particular they express discontent against mainstream parties. In practise, this can be verified by falling turnouts at the polls and declining share of votes of dominant parties. Given their 'anti-' stance, extreme right parties are expected not to be able to formulate an articulated political platform; 3) the social breakdown thesis: this is underpinned on concepts such as anomie, insecurity, and inefficacy. In particular, the loss of security is at the roots of opposition to unfamiliar cultures and, conversely, support for traditional values. On the same wave, the revival of ethnic-nationalism is a tool used to foster self-esteem against insecurity, and ethno-regionalism is seen as a natural barrier against immigration. Moreover, the decline of class and religious-based allegiance and voting is producing a de-alignment of society leading to the breakdown of traditional partisanship, and this boosts furthermore social isolation through a vicious circle; 4) the “mirror” post-materialist thesis: from this perspective, extreme right parties oppose a reaction to post-materialist leftist values of green and libertarian parties about quality of life, sexual freedom, and self-expression. Indeed, they put forth an authoritarian conception of society, along with moral and traditional values that they claim as being threatened; 5) the economic interest thesis: this stance argues that workers, in a vulnerable condition when they are exposed to international competition, will be more supportive of extreme right parties as they expect these parties to set up barriers against globalisation. Hence, extreme right parties are supported by the so-called “losers” of the globalisation process, and by those who fear economic change because of their lack of skills to cope with economic competition. The following table provide a theoretical elaboration stemming from what has been said above.

Table 3.1. Demand-side factors.

<i>Side</i>	<i>Thesis</i>	<i>Factors</i>
Society (Demand)	Economic protest-vote	unemployment inflation recession
	Chauvinist closure	generous welfare states world-wide competitiveness
	Social disintegration	resentment disenchantment anomia de-alignment of usual voting patterns
	Cultural clash	extra-European immigration xenophobia 'alien' vs. traditional values
	Neo-extremism	polarisation of voters fascist or nazi historical legacies

Of course, that list of factors does not aim at being exhaustive, since there is a great amount of determinants that could be included into analysis. Nevertheless, the present chapter points at verifying the explicatory power of a restrained subset with peculiar characters. It is useful to remind that the focus is on the relation between demand-side factors and ERPs' electoral performances but, given time and resources constraints, it is necessary to opt for a particular point of investigation in order to select related explanatory conditions. The present dissertation has certainly privileged a value-driven outlook, as showed by the analysis of the GAL/TAN dimension in the previous chapter. In a similar vein, a cultural perspective will guide the selection of conditions³⁴. Therefore, the attention is pointed at some aspects such as traditional values and new life-styles, nativism and hostility towards immigrants, xenophobia from both on cultural and economic ground, resentment against politicians, and satisfaction with democratic functioning.

Hence, the adopted framework is a blend of factors mainly belonging to the social disintegration and cultural clash thesis as described above. As noted early, embracing that perspective narrows the explanation supplied by the present analysis. Indeed, economic wealthy (e.g., GDP per Capita) and public spending data (e.g., flux of Social Security Expenditures) are as well important and have

³⁴ An encompassing description of strategies about the selection of conditions is provided by Amenta and Poulsen (1994). An important example where a given perspective is followed in the selection of conditions is showed by Ragin (1994).

been adopted in other studies (Redding and Viterba 1999). Besides, the socio-economic account, which was rather fashionable in the 1990s, has recently lost attractiveness to a large extent. This stems from the observation that some economic index, e.g. GDP growth, is not markedly different across West European countries, so that this does not account for divergent electoral consensus for the ERPs. On the same wave, the argument is put forth in relation to other indicators like inflation or unemployment. On the other side, historical legacy matters in affecting politics and public opinion: for instance, in Germany the memory of tragic events of WWII is a formidable obstacle to the resurgence of right-wing parties and movement, even when they might deny any connection with national-socialism. That said, considering some authoritarian legacy would imply to provide a sort of ad hoc explanation, whereas the purpose of this comparative study is to sort out one or more common patterns able to explain the outcome (i.e., ERPs' electoral scores). Furthermore, as outlined in the previous chapter, ideological tenets of ERPs are hostility against so-called 'alien' values and libertarian claims, defence of cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the nation, expression of resentment against politicians, and other issues already mentioned. For these reasons, the political ground is 'fertile' for the emergence of the exclusionist right when those feelings are held by a rather consistent percentage of people. For instance, it appears straightforward to think of xenophobia as a key condition fostering the establishment of a party giving political representation to that sentiment. In other terms, the presence in society of certain predispositions and claims from citizens make easier the outcrop and electoral success of those parties adopting a coherent ideological profile. It is obvious that between society and parties there is a circular and nonstop reciprocal influence, though this chapter is interested just in the demand-side, namely, the relation from society towards political parties. By consequence, the following section will make extensive use of datasets gathering information collected at the individual-level in several European countries.

3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

3.1. *Social surveys data*

A preliminary remark is needed: briefly stated, the purpose of this chapter is to assess the potentiality for each country in terms of electorally successful ERPs. Moreover, this potential is supposed to be directly associated to the existence of a cultural ‘fertile’ ground at the societal level. Given the framework of current analysis, individual-level data are inspected in order to evaluate the potential existence of favourable social conditions for ERPs. As the investigation is structured around fourteen West European countries — the same set of the previous chapter — this section will employ data collected into the European Social Surveys (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008)³⁵. These are multi-country surveys, covering more than 30 nation-states, whose first round was fielded in 2002/2003 and the last in 2008/2009. In comparison to other data source, like the widely known World Value Survey³⁶, the ESS appears to be appropriate in terms of both countries covered and type of information gathered. Yet, a limitation is still present since ESS first round dated 2002 and, therefore, the present investigation is restricted to the first decade of the XXIst century. Since ESS data were not available for the 1990s, resorting to other data source would have been a viable solution. However, consistency and coherence, in the type of data here employed, have been privileged over other options. In other words, resorting to the same data source strengthens the comparison of cross-time and cross-country results.

European Social Surveys encompass an extended set of topics and the questionnaire comprehends approximately 120 items in each round. Furthermore, topics are split into core and rotating modules: the first is the set of questions always repeated in the various rounds, while the second are bulk of items embodied at intervals. In particular, the 2002 survey comprises a specific ‘D’ module constituted by 59 issues listed in the Appendix. Those topics are related to the field

³⁵ Henceforth, with reference to: Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2002; Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2004; Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2006; Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway 2008.

³⁶ This is another wide known collection of useful data but, unfortunately, it did not included several countries that are important here, like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Data and documentation are available on the following site: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>.

of inquiry here considered, since they try to measure several aspect of the same topic, i.e. immigration. Unfortunately, that module was fully gathered only in 2002. By consequence, to perform a diachronic comparative analysis, the current investigation will focus only on those items within the ‘D’ module that were covered also by ESS subsequent rounds.

Although immigration lies at the heart of ERPs’ political platforms, the point of view of this chapter cannot be shrunk exclusively to this perspective. Indeed, in accordance to the analytic framework, in the majority of cases ERPs are expected to support a cultural posture in defence of traditional values. In particular, they are supposed to counter left-libertarian claims by advocating a firm conservative stance on social policies like abortion, euthanasia, and gay rights. About the last topic, it is important to measure the extent of intolerance nourish by that part of citizens who do not agree with new life-style promoted by the spread of gay culture and customs. The topic is taken from a cultural point of view, since also a consistent part of the Christian democratic electorate may be against gay marriage or adoption, i.e. overall called “new rights”, even without not espousing exclusionist right-wing values as a whole. Again, the exclusionist-right ground can enlarge easily when the percentage of people holding hostility towards gays attitudes grows.

Furthermore, the emergence of ERPs is from a general crisis of how democracy actually works, fostering so-called populist attacks. Indeed, ERPs leader are often prone to accuse contemporary democracies such as corrupted regimes and closed oligarchies, in defence of privileges and against the “true” will of the people. For these reasons, ERPs may increase their consensus when a consistent percentage of citizens do not trust at all their politicians and mistrust over politics is thick. In this vein, the vote casted for an ERP is potentially driven by resentment, disenchantment, and protest. In fact, when democracy is “under indictment”, traditional mainstream parties are more accountable and are easily targets of protests. This point of view underscores how the crisis of democracy is rebounds on the crisis of mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties.

Having clarified the theoretical background and directions of investigation, seven items within European Social Surveys questionnaires are isolated. The

hypothesis at stake is: the greatest the items' score, the greatest ERPs' electoral success.

Table 3.2. European social surveys' items.

2002	2004	2006	2008
B46: FREEHMS	B31: FREEHMS	B31: FREEHMS	B31: FREEHMS
D5: IMDFETN	B36: IMDFETN	B36: IMDFETN	B36: IMDFETN
D27: IMBGECO	B38: IMBGECO	B38: IMBGECO	B38: IMBGECO
D28: IMUECLT	B39: IMUECLT	B39: IMUECLT	B39: IMUECLT
D29: IMWBCNT	B40: IMWBCNT	B40: IMWBCNT	B40: IMWBCNT
B10: TRSTPLT	B10: TRSTPLT	B10: TRSTPLT	B10: TRSTPLT
B32: STFDEM	B32: STFDEM	B32: STFDEM	B32: STFDEM

Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008.

The first one is coded as “FREEHMS” and the related question asks respondents to express to what extent they agree on the argument that gays and lesbians are free to live as they wish and answers range within five modalities³⁷. Those who opted for “strongly disagree” are the most relevant for the present analysis, since that percentage shows the size of those defending conventional habits and life-styles in society. The second item is codes as “IMDFETN” and the related question ask respondents whether many or few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority should be allowed to settle down in the country. This is clearly linked to the homogenous conception of society within state boundaries. Modalities of answering were four-fold: allow none, a few, some, or many. Since the focus is on the more radical exclusionist postures, the percentage of respondents who said “none” is extracted.

From the third to the seventh item, the set of possible answers range from 0 to 10 and the assumption here is that the cumulative percentage at stake is composed of those who opted for 0 and 1. This is a somewhat restrictive choice, though motivated by the aim of grasping the more radical fraction within respondents. The third item is coded as “IMBGECO” and the related question is whether immigration is bad or good for country's economy. Hence, the item measures a sort of “economic xenophobia” fuelled by those people who feel threaten from immigrants about job markets competition. The fourth item is coded as “IMUECLT” and the related question is whether country's cultural life is

³⁷ These are: strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree or disagree, agree, strongly agree.

undermined or enriched by immigrants. This is the complementary issue to the previous one, since it regards the threat of cultural clash. The fifth item is coded as “IMWBCNT” and the related question is whether immigrants make country worse or better place to live. This is as a sort of summarizing point of view of xenophobia in comparison with the two precedent issues. The sixth item is coded as “TRSTPLT” and respondents are asked to assess their trust on politicians. This issue has to do with faithful in politics and can supply an account about anti-politics sentiments and what has been said early about corrupt elites. The seventh and final item is STFDEM where the question is how satisfied with the way democracy works in country. This topic can grasp those citizens who feel more neglected by politics and without enough means to make them heard. In this vein, democracy today would be not sufficiently democratic because of the distance between people and politicians.

3.2. *The outcome*

The percentage gathered at the polls by ERPs represents the object of investigation, i.e. the aim of the present investigation. Indeed, the purpose is trying to verify whether a link actually exists between those factors listed in the previous section and ERPs electoral scores. In terms of statistical and quantitative analysis, the ERPs vote share would be defined as the dependent variable and the societal factors as independent variables. The extant inquiry resorts extensively to quantitative datasets and descriptive statistical tools, though no regression analysis is performed and its framework is outstandingly qualitative and comparative (Ragin 2008). Thus, a coherent terminology is employed: henceforth, societal factors are called as conditions and the objected to be explained is referred to as outcome. As early specified, conditions relates to four ESS rounds in the first decade of 21st century: in accordance to this, the outcome is measured along the same period of time.

Table 3.3. Classification of countries by electoral of ERPs (2000-2009).

Country	Year	Party	%	%	% Mean
Austria	2002	FPÖ	10.0	10.0	17.8
	2006	FPÖ	11.0	15.1	
		BZÖ	4.1		
	2008	FPÖ	17.5	28.2	
		BZÖ	10.7		

Belgium/Flanders	2003 2007	VB VB	16.8 17.5	16.8 17.5	17.2
Belgium/Wallonia	2003 2007	FN FN	5.3 5.3	5.3 5.4	5.4
Denmark	2001	DF	12.0	12.6	13.3
	2001	FP	0.6		
	2005	DF	13.3	13.3	
	2007	DF	13.9	13.9	
Finland	2003	SMP/PS	1.6	1.6	2.9
	2007	SMP/PS	4.1	4.1	
France	2002	FN	11.3	12.4	8.6
	2002	MNR	1.1		
	2007	FN	4.3	4.7	
	2007	MNR	0.4		
Germany	2002	REP	0.6	0.6	0.5
	2005	REP	0.6	0.6	
	2009	REP	0.4	0.4	
Greece	2004	LAOS	2.2	2.2	3.9
	2007	LAOS	3.8	3.8	
	2009	LAOS	5.6	5.6	
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	2001	AN	12,0	12,4	9.2
	2001	MSFT	0,4		
	2006	AN	12,3	12,9	
	2006	MSFT	0,6		
	2008	MSFT-LD	2,4		
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-
UK	-	-	-	-	-

Some preliminary remarks have to be put forth. The outcome is quantified in terms of electoral scores for the Lower House. This implies that other types of elections (Senate, President of the Republic, or local assemblies) are discarded. This choice is motivated not just by the aim of increasing comparability between data, but also because central governments depend on the confidence stemming from the Lower House. Hence, the House of Deputies has a fundamental role in affecting policies, while the Senate is frequently elected with different electoral systems and its functions are divergent³⁸. However, Presidential elections create some drawbacks to the analysis. When considering countries like Austria and Finland, the President is directly elected by citizens, though its role is not that relevant at the pure political level. The same argument does not hold true for

³⁸ A typical example of asymmetric bicameralism is Germany: the *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat* plays two very different roles in German politics.

France: indeed, the Presidential election has become more and more central and can be considered as the most important electoral event of French politics. This is due to the sharing of powers between the President and the Prime Minister, in addition to usual prerogatives that the Chief of the State holds in foreign politics. After the recent constitutional reform that has equalised Presidential and legislative terms, elections for the *Assemblée Nationale* resembles more and more to a confirmation of the Presidential election results to provide him a coherent majority of MPs in the assembly. Yet, for the sake of coherency in comparing different countries, Presidential elections cannot be included, though this implies an underestimation of the National Front's strength. In fact, its scores were considerable especially in 2002 Presidential elections.

Furthermore, a second point regards Belgium. As already seen before, the Kingdom is divided in two separate cases since two party systems actually coexist. The exception is represented by the bilingual Region of Brussels and, following what outlined by Carter³⁹, it appears opportune to compute party scores considering that Flemish parties contest legislative elections presenting their lists in Flemish constituencies and in Brussels; the same, *mutatis mutandis*, for Walloon parties in Wallonia and Brussels⁴⁰. This brought about higher percentages than those computed at the federal level, though this solution appears to be more appropriate to estimate forces of Belgian parties.

At the outset, countries can be approximately divided into three groups. The first one is composed of five cases where the ERPs have obtained a relevant electoral success, i.e. Austria, Flanders, Denmark, France, and Italy. In particular, among them, in the first three countries ERPs have a vote share considerably over 10 per cent. The second group is composed of countries where ERPs have a middle-to-low vote percentage: i.e. in Wallonia, Greece, and Finland. Finally, the third group is made of countries where ERPs are either markedly weak in terms of consensus or totally absent from the political arena like in Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

³⁹ See (Carter 2005, 12, note 4). Data are also available on the European Election Database (http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/).

⁴⁰ Data source can be found in Carter (2005) and in (Neestar).

4. DATA EXAMINATION

4.1. Descriptive statistics


This sub-section provides analytical statistics concerning the seven ESS items described above⁴¹. The aim is evaluating to what extent the fourteen countries at stake are featured by an exclusionist right potential, i.e. a breeding ground where ERPs can flourish. The analysis is about the seven mentioned items and, finally, some of them are merged to obtain four final conditions, i.e. indexes or independent variables.

The first item is coded as “FREEHMS” by the ESS survey, though henceforth it will be referred to simply as traditionalism. An important remark is that the current investigation takes into account only the percentage of people that totally disagreed with the sentence on gays and lesbians’ freedom to live their life as they wish. Altogether, the mean score of traditionalism is equal to 4.31 per cent: this implies that, on average, slightly more than four respondents strongly disagree on freedom about gays and lesbians’ life-style. The average value appears as rather low and its standard deviation amounts to 2.86, thereby dispersion around the mean is weak. This represents an important hint that, in practise, traditionalism may not be a relevant condition for the purpose of the research⁴². Its values range from 0.9 per cent in the Netherlands (2008) to 12.1 per cent in Greece (2002). The Hellenic country holds the highest average equal to 11.27 per cent, while the lowest place in the ranking is filled up by Sweden with a mean score of 1.5 per cent. The following graphical representation provides each country’s situation.

⁴¹ The complete list is provided by Table 2.2 that is followed by a detailed description about how items are measured in the present inquiry.

⁴² Indeed, as a general principle, when the scope of an inquiry is to account for variation of the outcome, conditions as well are expected to vary, enabling to discriminate among cases. Moreover, a condition with a very limited variance would be closer to a constant and, therefore, it would lose the meaning behind its label. In a nutshell, a comparative inquiry, aiming at explaining different outcomes, needs diversifying conditions.

Figure 3.A. Traditionalism across 14 countries by ESS datasets




The extreme position of Greece is quite unexpected, but its outstanding values will be confirmed also by following data. Greece is strongly deviant on traditionalism since its score is more than two and a half standard deviations above the mean. Surprisingly, Finland as well is almost one and a half standard deviations above the mean and this mainly due to the 2002 high score after which the trend has been decreasing. Another relevant point is that, among those countries with strongly successful ERPs, only two of them —i.e. Austria and France — scored over the mean, while in Greece and Finland ERPs gathered moderate share of votes hitherto. Furthermore, the majority of countries scored under the mean, with the notable bottom position of Denmark in the ranking and this counters the theoretical expectation that traditionalism foster ERPs backing.

The second item is coded as “IMDFETN” though, henceforth, it will be referred to as nativism. As already noted, the investigation takes into account the percentage of people that answered “none” when asked how many immigrants of different race or ethnic group should be allowed to live in the country. On the whole, the mean score of nativism is equal to 12.54 per cent, i.e. more than twelve respondents are totally opposing ethnic or racial heterogeneity in society. There are two important differences from traditionalism: indeed, nativism registers a sharper average and, secondly, its standard deviation is 6.70, greater than that of traditionalism. This implies that scores across countries are more dispersed and nativism can actually serve better off as a useful condition to discriminate among

cases. On average, it is again Greece holding the highest mean equal to 26.37 per cent, while the smallest is Sweden for the second time, with a mean of 2.63 per cent. About single scores, the lowest percentage is 2.2 per cent in Sweden, while the greatest score is in Portugal and equal to 30.1 per cent, both in 2006.

Figure 3.B. Nativism across 14 countries by ESS datasets.




Some remarks need to be highlighted. Firstly, Greece is again the more distant country from the average since its position is more than two standard deviations above the mean. Portugal as well is just slightly below. On the opposite side, Sweden confirms as the most deviant under the mean and Denmark is anew at the end of the ranking. A crucial point is, that, among those countries with successful ERPs, only one of them —i.e. Belgium — scored over the mean, while the majority of cases scored above the mean. Moreover, Portugal, United Kingdom, and Spain are above the average, though ERPs are practically absent from the political arena. Summing up, nativism is more able to discriminate between countries since its standard deviation is rather consistent; on the other hand, falling short of expectations, countries with successful ERPs scored low on this condition.

That said, the focus is then shifted on three items that are connected to the concept of xenophobia. The first one of them is coded as “IMBGECO” and respondents were asked to rank in a range from 0 to 10 (i.e., corresponding to “very bad” and “very good” options) the impact of immigration on country’s economy. As previously stated, the present inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage


of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 8.88 per cent and its standard deviation is 4.88. The highest score is that of Greece equal to 27.6 per cent, whilst the lowest is that of Spain equal to 3.6 per cent, both in 2002. On average, Greece has the greatest mean of 24.6 per cent, whereas Italy has the smallest score equal to 5.1 per cent.

Figure 3.C. IMBGECO item across 14 countries by ESS datasets.




The second is coded as “IMUECLT” and respondents were asked to rank in a range from 0 to 10 (i.e., corresponding to “undermined” and “enriched” options) the impact of immigration on country’s culture. Again, the present inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 6.53 per cent and standard deviation is 5.62. The highest score is that of Greece equal to 27.8 per cent in 2008, whilst the lowest is that of Finland equal to 1.1 per cent in both 2002 and 2008. On average, Greece has the greatest mean of 25 per cent, whereas Finland has the smallest one equal to 1.38 per cent.

Figure 3.D. IMUECLT item across 14 countries by ESS datasets.



The third and last one is coded as “IMWBCNT” and respondents were asked to rank in a range from 0 to 10 (i.e., corresponding to “worse” and “better” options) the impact of immigration on country making a worse or better place to live in. Once again, the current inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 8.41 per cent and standard deviation is 5.58. The highest score is that of Greece equal to 28.4 per cent, whilst the lowest is that of Sweden equal to 2.1 per cent, both in 2008. On average, Greece has the greatest mean of 26.5 per cent, whereas Sweden has the smallest score equal to 2.85 per cent.

Figure 3.E. IMWBCNT item across 14 countries by ESS datasets.



The last three items refers essentially to as many facets of xenophobia, as demonstrated by the high and statistical significant degree of correlation among them.

Table 3.4. Correlation coefficients among three ESS items.


	IMBGECO	IMUECLT	IMWBCNT
IMBGECO	1	-	-
IMUECLT	0.917**	1	-
IMWBCNT	0.920**	0,956**	1

****: Statistical significance at the level of 0.01 (2-tails).

Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008.

For these reasons, they can be merged into one encompassing index measuring the percentage of people supporting xenophobic views⁴³. The new xenophobia index amounts, for each country, to the average of the three previous items' scores. The overall mean score is 8.18 per cent and standard deviation is equal to 5.46. Through a closer examination of single cases, Greece is a strong outlier since its score is more than three standard deviations over the mean. On the whole, five countries have a score above the mean and two of them — i.e., United Kingdom and Portugal — have no relevant ERPs.


Figure 3.F. Xenophobia across 14 countries by ESS datasets.



⁴³ Following Lijphart (1971, 687), the property-space is conveniently reduced when two or more variables are related to a similar underlying concept or feature.


Finally, the sixth and seventh items are connected to resentment. The first one is coded as “TRSTPLT” and respondents were asked to rank their trust in politicians from 0 to 10 (respectively, “not trust at all” and “complete trust”). In accordance to the same logic employed before, the present inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 17.73 per cent and standard deviation is 10.13. The latter is the largest value across the entire analysis and this highlights that trust in politicians is very different across countries. Indeed, the highest score is that of Portugal equal to 45.9 per cent, whilst the lowest is that of Denmark equal to 3.1 per cent, both in 2004. On average, Portugal has the greatest mean of 38.05 per cent, whereas Denmark has the smallest one equal to 3.58 per cent.

Figure 3.G. TRSTPLT item across 14 countries by ESS datasets.




The second one is coded as “STFDEM” and respondents were asked to rank their trust in politicians from zero to ten, correspondent to “extremely dissatisfied” and “extremely satisfied” respectively. In analogy of what has been done so far, the inquiry considers only the cumulative percentage of 0 and 1 scores. On the whole, the mean score is 5.67 per cent and its standard deviation is 4.18. The highest score is registered by Portugal equal to 20.8 per cent, whilst the lowest is that of Denmark equal to 0.8 per cent, both in 2004. On average, Portugal has the greatest mean of 13.63 per cent, whereas Denmark has the smallest score equal to 1.08 per cent.

Figure 3.H. STFDEM item across 14 countries by ESS datasets.



The statistical correlation between the two items is positive and significant at the level of 0.01 (2-tails), and equal to 0.799. Therefore, they can be merged into one encompassing index measuring the percentage of people moved by resentment, dissatisfaction, and mistrust towards politics. The new index is briefly labelled as resentment and is equal, for each country, to the average score of the two components. The overall mean score amounts to 11.70 per cent and standard deviation is 6.85. The highest score is registered by Portugal amounting to 33.4 per cent, whilst the lowest is that of Denmark equal to 2.0 per cent, both in 2004. On average, Portugal has the greatest mean of 25.84 per cent, whereas Denmark has the smallest score equal to 2.33 per cent. Again, Portugal has a score more than two standard deviations above the mean and, in general, this is the first instance where a plurality of countries has a greater score than the average.

Figure 3.I. Resentment across 14 countries by ESS datasets.



Summary statistics about the four main items are summed up in the following table:


Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics about the four main ESS items.

Item	Min	Max	Mean	Std.dev.
Traditionalism	1.50	11.27	4.38	2.74
Nativism	2.63	26.37	12.53	6.56
Xenophobia	3.41	25.37	8.19	5.46
Resentment	2.33	25.84	12.02	6.38

4.2. Comparative analysis

On the basis of descriptive statistics presented above, the relation between ESS items scores and ERPs electoral support does not appear to be strong and, therefore, the hypothesis stated before (*see* §3.3.1) did not receive a solid confirmation. Assuming Greece as an example, the Hellenic extreme deviant position is rather unexpected since the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) was a recently established political actor with a moderate support at the polls hitherto. Instead, drawing from statistics data, Greece should have a massively successful ERP. Given the four main items issued from the previous subsection, they can be merged into a unifying measure to estimate the demand-side potential of each country, accounting for the “fertile ground” fostering exclusionist right prosperity. The new *demand-side potential* can be simply obtained by calculating the average of four indexes — traditionalism, nativism, xenophobia, and resentment — for each country. Results are represented through a bar chart diagram as follows:


Figure 3.J. Demand potential in fourteen countries.



As showed, only five countries are over the mean (i.e., 9.3 per cent) and, in particular, two of them — i.e., Portugal and the United Kingdom — have no electorally successful ERPs. Although the UK has the same average score of France, the strength of the French National Front is greatly higher than any radical right-wing party in the UK, even referring to actors like the British National Party that were not taken into account by precedent expert surveys. Furthermore, among cases with electorally strong ERPs, only France and Austria are above the average, whereas Belgium and Italy are slightly below. However, these four countries show a very similar demand-side potential around the mean. On the other hand, the most unexpected position is that of Denmark where, despite the notable electoral strength of the Danish People's Party (DF) and Progress Party (FP), demand-side factors occur in a very weak manner. This was manifest since Danes interviewed showed a great confidence in politicians and satisfaction about how democracy works.

For better representing the relation between electoral performances and demand-side potential, percentage values of both measures can be standardised and plotted in a diagram as follows:

Figure 3.K. Plot diagram about electoral strength and demand potential.



Whether the two measures were positively correlated then cases would be closer to a diagonal cutting across the first and third quadrant. In other words, whether data confirmed theoretical expectations, cases would fill up the top-right and bottom-left quadrants. Yet, plots' positions in the diagram do not confirm that situation. It should be noted that the outcome is more able to differentiate among cases than demand-side potential does: indeed, standard deviation for electoral strength is equal to 6.07 and for demand-side potential is 4.57. Moreover, concerning those five cases with strongly successful ERPs, only Austria and France are in the expected quadrant (I), while Belgium and Italy are in the second one (II), although very close to the borderline. The more unexpected position is held by Denmark whose coordinates are: more than one standard deviation above the mean about electoral strength, but more than one standard deviation below the mean about demand potential. Thus, Denmark falsifies theoretical expectations. Thirdly, the True Finns (PS) in Finland and the LAOS in Greece have gathered a moderate success, but in the second case Greece has the highest potential for exclusionist right prosperity. Fourthly, the third quadrant (III) is full of countries whose ERPs

are actually electorally irrelevant: Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. However, the position of the United Kingdom and, in particular, that of Portugal is troublesome. Especially in the last instance, Portugal has not displayed any relevant ERP hitherto, though its demand-side potential is the second strongest in the ranking, just below the Greek one. Briefly, the explanatory power of demand-side factors appears to be rather unsatisfying.

To make comparison extensively detailed and rigorous, Boolean algebra and crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) are appropriate tools (Ragin 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). These allow a cross-country comparison through ESS items single scores and also the entire bulk of cases can be grouped on the basis of common configurations of conditions. QCA terminology calls this process as the construction of the truth table. Given that this analysis is based on dichotomous values, the number of different possible combinations of conditions is equal to 2^k , where k is the number of conditions. In the present situation, since k is equal to 4, then the number of different possible combinations of conditions is 16. However, a major limitation of QCA is the so-called limited diversity, i.e. the number of real instances is too small than the number of conditions included in the investigation. Since the present analysis is dealing with 14 cases, then 4 conditions leading to 16 configurations are over-abundant and the risk is to “individualise” each case with a particular combination of conditions. On the contrary, one of the basic goals of QCA is to single out groups of cases featured by the same combination of conditions and limits the amount of *logical remainders*, i.e. logical combinations of conditions lacking any corresponding observed case. This is the reason why it appears opportune to drop one condition, since the relation between 14 cases and 3 conditions becomes more balanced. Descriptive statistics reported early (see Table 2.5) has already displayed that *traditionalism* has the lower standard deviation, so that that item is less able than the others in discriminating between cases. For these reasons, *traditionalism* is put aside and the following analysis will be underpinned on three causal conditions.

Boolean algebra is based on dichotomisation of values into 0-1 binary codes. One of the biggest hindrance of csQCA is fixing thresholds to dichotomise data. The best solution is anchoring this process to qualitative thresholds, so that

justifying binary codes on the ground of substantive knowledge. When this is not possible due to the lack of aprioristic theoretical thresholds, it is possible to revolve dichotomisation on some statistical data like the arithmetic mean or median of the distribution (Ragin 2000, 2008). Since the present analysis lacks of any solid qualitative anchor, it appears appropriate to consider primarily the arithmetic mean of raw scores — and also the median when necessary — for each condition in order to assign binary values to each case.

Starting with the electoral outcome across these 14 West European countries⁴⁴ here at stakes, the mean of ERPs vote percentages is 4.82 and the median is 1.7 (i.e., the mean score of Finland and Germany). Two cases are particularly cumbersome, namely, Greece and Finland for which the ERPs electoral success has been classified as “moderate”. The setting of an electoral threshold beyond which a case is given a positive outcome [1] is a choice that can vary among different studies, e.g. Veugelers and Magnan (2005) opted for 3 per cent mean percentage, Redding and Viterna (1999) chose 4 per cent⁴⁵, and Kitschelt(1995) opted for a double threshold of 2 and 6 per cent. In the present research, the cut-off point has been set at 5 per cent and this is underpinned by two main reasons. Firstly, the main drawback of binary values is that they prevent from grading values of conditions, hence cases that on a middle ground creates criticisms; therefore, it is better to be prudent in attributing a positive outcome [1]. Secondly, the 5 per cent is the highest legal⁴⁶ threshold to gain representatives in Western Europe: this is obviously the case of the German *Bundestag*.

Passing to the first condition, *nativism* has mean of 12.53 and a median of 10.715 (i.e., the mean score of Germany and Austria). Yet, two outliers —i.e., Greece and Portugal — strongly affect the mean value of this condition: indeed, by excluding those two cases, the mean drops to 10.23. Thus, a value of 11.50 as a threshold appears congruous. Secondly, *xenophobia* has a mean of 8.19 and a

⁴⁴ The previous Table 2.3 has already provided a full description. An important difference is that Flanders and Wallonia are not considered individually anymore, so that the outcome of Belgium stems from the arithmetic mean of Flemish and Walloon electoral scores. This change was forced by European Social Survey data that do not distinguish between Flanders and Wallonia.

⁴⁵ As two authors specified, a party that «crosses that threshold at least once during the 1980s or the 1990s is counted as a significant party for that decade» (Redding and Viterna 1999, 495).

⁴⁶ On the other hand, *effective* rather than *legal* thresholds will be considered in the next chapter.

median of 7.09 (i.e., the mean score of Germany and Italy). In this situation as well, Greece is an outlier and without it the mean drops to 6.87. Thus, a value of 7 as a threshold appears correct. Thirdly, *resentment* has a mean of 12.02 and a median of 13.53 (i.e., the mean scores of UK and Spain). In this situation, Portugal is an outlier and the mean, without it, drops to 10.96. Thus, a value of 11 as a threshold appears congruous.

Table 3.6. From ESS scores to binary values.

Country	Out_raw	OUTCOME	Nativ_raw	NATIV	Xeno_raw	XENO	Resent_raw	RESENT
Austria	17.80	1	10.70	0	8.88	1	14.07	1
Belgium	11.30	1	15.05	1	7.86	1	9.15	0
Denmark	13.30	1	7.98	0	5.48	0	2.33	0
Finland	2.90	0	9.65	0	3.41	0	4.55	0
France	8.60	1	11.13	0	10.23	1	14.84	1
Germany	0.50	0	10.73	0	7.12	1	13.81	1
Greece	3.90	0	26.37	1	25.37	1	20.03	1
Ireland	0.00	0	8.17	0	6.23	0	12.23	1
Italy	9.20	1	9.70	0	7.07	1	13.85	1
Netherlands	0	0	10.03	0	4.78	0	4.38	0
Portugal	0	0	26.28	1	8.47	1	25.84	1
Spain	0	0	12.70	1	5.05	0	13.43	1
Sweden	0	0	2.63	0	3.54	0	6.14	0
UK	0	0	14.28	1	11.17	1	13.63	1
threshold	5.00		11.50		7.00		11.00	

A first important step in the analysis is the search for necessary conditions. The general rule is that a given condition *c* is necessary if *c* is always present [1] when the outcome is present [1] (Caramani 2009). With reference to table above, when OUTCOME is present, correspondingly, the value of a given condition as well must be present [1] in all its instances in order to be necessary. It is easy to remark that this does not hold true for any condition, thus on the whole no necessary condition is present. However, XENO is condition that, more than all others, is close to be a necessary condition since this does not hold true only for Denmark. In fact, the Nordic country is the only one that, despite OUTCOME is present [1], the condition XENO is absent [0]. On the other side, for Austria, Belgium, France, and

Italy, it is true that $\text{OUTCOME} \rightarrow^{47} \text{XENO}$. Since the number of possible combinations of conditions is equal to $2^3=8$, the truth table is as follows:


Table 3.7. Three-condition truth table.

NATIV	XENO	RESENT	OUTCOME	Country
0	1	1	C	Austria, France, Germany, Italy
1	1	0	1	Belgium
0	0	0	C	Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden
1	1	1	0	Greece, Portugal, UK
0	0	1	0	Ireland
1	0	1	0	Spain

Limited diversity is restricted since, among 8 possible configurations, actually six of them are at least associated with a real instance and logical remainders are only two. Unfortunately, contradictory configurations are present. In the first line of the truth table, contradiction is due to the presence of Germany with Austria, France, and Italy. As mentioned before, the outcome of Germany is absent [0] contrary to the other three cases where is present [1]. This is hardly surprising when considering that Italy and Germany, along all four ESS items, displayed very proximate values. Checking also the precedent plot diagram (*see* Figure 2.K), the demand-side potential of those four countries was very similar around the mean. The third line of the table above represents another contradictory configuration: in this case, vice versa, contradiction is due to the [1] outcome of Denmark, whereas for all other cases the outcome is absent [0]. The Danish anomaly is already been talked about early, since its demand-side potential was markedly lower than Danish People's Party electoral fortunes. The fourth line of the truth table confirms the weakness of the output here at stake: Greece, Portugal, and UK do not have a contradictory outcome, though, all conditions are present [1] and the outcome is absent [0]. This situation is rather unexpected and counters the framework of analysis, since conditions are measured in a manner that the more are present, the more the outcome should be stronger. In that case, the presence of three conditions is associated with an absence of the outcome and this is contrast with what can be drawn from theoretical explanations (*see* Table 2.1).

⁴⁷ That symbol has to be understood in terms of "implication". Hence, $\text{OUTCOME}=1$ implies $\text{XENO}=1$ in four instances.

In the light of those critical points, it does not appear that useful to go on further to calculate the minimal formula, i.e. a Boolean expression summarising all combinations of INUS⁴⁸ conditions linked to the outcome. Instead, in the tentative of solving contradictions, they will be reconsidered in the final chapter together with supply side factors. Thus, complexity can here be represented through the following Venn diagram:



Note: Venn diagram produced by Tosmana 1.3.2 software (Cronqvist 2011).

Abbreviations: AUS: Austria, BEL: Belgium, DEN: Denmark, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, GER: Germany, GRE: Greece, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, NET: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SPA: Spain, SWE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom.

5. CONCLUSIONS

From a societal point of view, there are facets considered such as potential favourable conditions for the development and electoral success of ERPs. The assessment of the fertile ground for ERPs lies at the heart of this chapter. The

⁴⁸ The acronym stands for: an insufficient though not redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for the outcome (JL Mackie 1974).

analysis carried out above supplied useful information to draw some conclusions about the topic. Firstly, demand side factors are rather weak in explaining differences among ERPs electoral support. Moreover, a common path able to account for the positive or negative outcome did not emerge. These setbacks are due to two main reasons: either the research focused on “wrong” factors, i.e. items that actually are not causally connected to the outcome, or have incorrectly been brought into account. Secondly, a necessary conditions for the outcome to occur is not present; only xenophobia come close to that status since it is a *quasi*-necessary condition — except for Denmark — and this represents one of the most important findings. Concerning single countries, a tricky case is again Denmark because, although the electoral performance of the Danish People’s party is sizeable, related scores on causal conditions are low-lying. The argument is reversed for Greece, Portugal, and the United Kingdom: the first two countries especially hold a thick potential and this has been realized only in the Hellenic case where the LAOS gathered increasing vote percentages in the last three legislative elections.

IV. SUPPLY SIDE FACTORS

1. INTRODUCTION

As outlined early, since the beginning of the 1990s many researches⁴⁹ lavished a lot of efforts in the tentative of providing explanations about electoral change and the rise of parties belonging to the area of right-wing radicalism. However, it is still on the ground the reconstruction of a cross-European pattern encompassing that phenomenon. This chapter will analyse supply-side factors and focus not only on ERPs, but also on party systems as a whole. Indeed, one of the main goals is investigating party system changes in the last twenty years⁵⁰. In particular, the current chapter is interested in examining party competition together with a key institutional setting — the electoral system — in relation to the outcome, i.e. ERPs electoral performances. The investigation has adopted a descriptive perspective and is underpinned on the amount of survey data that have been collected especially in the last three decades. Certainly, dimensions of party competition hold different relevance, varying across countries. Yet, for the sake of parsimony in comparison (Lijphart 1971), two topics have been chosen for their overall importance, i.e. economy and immigration. The former is about the distributional conflict that has been the crucial ground of political struggle, all along the post-WWII party competition, and has forged the voting framework of large portions of West European electorates. The latter one is an emerging issue, though its importance has grown up to being explicitly included by Benoit and Laver expert surveys (2005). Indeed, the two scholars showed that immigration holds the third position in the ranking of more salient issues in European party systems⁵¹.

⁴⁹ See: Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Betz 1993; Harris 1994; Baumgartl 1995; Kitschelt 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998

⁵⁰ Namely, the time period 1990-2009.

⁵¹ In particular, immigration shares the third position with the “EU collective security” dimension. Moreover, it is the most relevant dimension in seven countries: Belgium, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden (Benoit and Laver 2006, 173).

Thus, once all data are systematically organized, the focus will be committed to party competition. This perspective is coherent with a party-oriented investigation where the focus is on parties and their reciprocal interactions. Perhaps because of complexity due to the presence of multiple causal factors, competitiveness among parties and their strategies — in terms of spatial positions and movements — is an aspect that did not receive great attention, with few exceptions like Carter (2005). Therefore, this strengthens the necessity of elaborating on this point of view. The purpose is to verify whether some common configurations of conditions exist in those party systems where ERPs reached significant electoral scores, whereas in others they completely failed or gained only moderate-to-low results.

The next section will take into examination several supply-side factors that the literature singled out as affecting party performances. The third section will deal with methodological issues related to data and pattern of analysis. The fourth section will define the outcome to be explained and the fifth will present an extended country-by-country investigation. Finally, the last section will try to define an encompassing framework to highlight common configuration of conditions across all cases here at stake.

2. SUPPLY SIDE FACTORS

The main argument here is about the political opportunity structure⁵², in which several factors play a central role: *a*) the electoral system is rated as one of the major elements shaping the results of electoral competition through its psychological and mechanical effects (Duverger 1958). In a nutshell, the electoral system affects the way citizens cast ballots and the distribution of seats among parties. Starting from these assumptions, scholars who tried to evaluate electoral system effects, when considering right-wing extremism, obtained highly controversial and unexpected outcomes (Carter 2002, Carter 2005). Whether, on the one hand, it has been often argued that PR formula booster extremism along with the emergence of new challengers, on the other hand, recent analysis deny this

⁵² Major researches in this field are: Abedi 2002; Carter 2002; Golder 2003; Carter 2005; Meguid 2005; Norris 2005; Arzheimer 2009.

connection, even though all results seem strongly affected by the way in which variables are operationalized (Kitschelt 2007). State funding and media access are a couple of elements that are equally central in explaining ERPs success, since financial autonomy and access to modern mass media are crucial. In general, these claims are enclosed in the electoral system thesis; *b*) an uppermost explanation is built on the spatial representation of politics. By considering expert surveys, different scenarios can be analysed by focusing on the spatial location of parties on a given dimension like the overarching left-right axis. That said, the spotlight could be turned to: the position of the ERP, the position of the largest mainstream conservative party, and the distance between them. In addition to this, the programmatic convergence between the two mainstream parties of the centre-left and centre-right is blamed to be responsible for the shifting of voters towards the extreme right to search for a concrete alternative. Furthermore, everything outlined above can be re-analysed by taking into account the left-right positions of parties along the “Taxes vs. Spending” dimension, i.e. checking for the location of parties in the economic domain. These factors are covered by the spatial structure thesis. *c*) the silent counter-revolution (Ignazi 1992) claimed that the emergence of radical right-wing parties represents a backlash to counter the rise of green and left-libertarian alternative parties on the opposite side. Therefore, comparing electoral scores of ecology parties and ERPs can unveil important insights⁵³. Likewise, matching the ERPs electoral support *vis-à-vis* that of the radical and neo-communist left can provide new findings, since one can check whether the prosperity of one of the two sides prevents the other to grow, since both might appeal, at least partially, to the same pool of disgruntled voters through a populist propaganda. Moreover, this represents an indirect test of the supposed abandon of leftist parties by manual and low-skilled workers in favour of the opposite wing of the political spectrum. A third crucial aspect can be the strategy adopted by the mainstream centre-left party: this political force could try to weaken its mainstream

⁵³ That argument will not be treated in the following sections. Yet, by considering only two examples, France and Germany are not in line with that thesis: in the former case, the National Front is a strong ERP, whilst the electoral performances of the Greens were much lower; on the other hand, the German *Grünen* gathered important results in the 1998 and 2002 general elections and entered governments with the social democrats, whereas The Republicans and the German People’s Union performed poorly at the polls.

centre-right counterpart by adopting an adversarial position than that assumed by the ERP, thereby raising its political importance and, indirectly, shifting conservative voters towards more radical rightist stances. This *divide et impera* strategy would allow the mainstream centre-left party to split the right-wing side of the political spectrum, so as to increase its relative power. That said, these claims are referred to as the thesis of mirror sides. *d)* one additional aspect that, hitherto, has not been duly taken into consideration is the territorial organisation of state powers within its boundaries, namely, federalism and local assemblies. The key point is linked to a crucial feature of the ideology fostered by ERPs, that generally strengthen the importance of traditional culture, especially local values and symbols; likewise, given what has been said above about the higher density of immigrants in some portions of the territory, it seems plausible to imagine the rise of these political forces precisely in those areas where citizens feel more threatened. In addition to this, elections to local assemblies can be a starting benchmark for newcomers that can take profit of local electoral systems that are usually more representative, i.e. providing minor barriers to win seats. This interpretation can be labelled as the thesis of local extremism. *e)* one further factor to be considered is the strategy applied by mainstream parties towards ERPs. An *a priori* discernment has to be done in relation to the electoral and political importance eventually reached by extremist parties, since it is quite straightforward that an ERP holding a marginal status is rather different than an ERP party that had eventually overcome the so-called threshold of relevance. That said, the strategy of mainstream parties, either at a local or national level, can play a notable effect whether they opt for including ERPs into the executives or chose to exclude them by a *cordon sanitaire*. These arguments are endorsed by the pariah party thesis.

Furthermore, always with concerns to the supply side, a two-fold set of interpretations lays on party organisation and policy platforms: *a)* as widely underlined, party organisation still holds a pre-eminent role, since well-organised and well-led parties (Carter 2005) seem able to perform better at the polls than, conversely, parties with a loose internal organisation and a weak leadership. The substantial element is that of charisma, even though the argument risks to be a circular one as it can be easily argued that charisma is attributed to parties that are

electorally successful. However, the charismatic factor is salient since it is strictly linked to the typical populist style and ideology of ERPs, in the way that the leader is the defender of the true will of the people, i.e. the personification of the ordinary man's wisdom. Summing up, this is the populist leadership theory. *b)* the political platform elaborated by ERPs, namely, their policy positions, is necessarily another factor able to affect their electoral fortunes. This kind of analysis holds some analogies with that conducted about the spatial location of parties, in that it puts forth a comparison between ERPs and the largest mainstream conservative party on some critical policy, i.e. the salience put on crime, the positive emphasis on the national way of life, the negative stance on multiculturalism, the pursued degree of integration in the European Union. Finally, this represents the policy platform theory.

Returning back to Eatwell (2003d), the scholar analyses a second bunch of theories based on supply-side factors. A re-elaboration of his arguments is presented as follows: 1) the *Political Opportunity Structure* (POS) theory: in this case, several party and institutional aspects are brought into consideration. Starting with the spatial locations of political parties, it is argued that the more mainstream parties are close to the centre of the political spectrum, the more extreme right parties can exploit the uncovered issues on the rightist side. In addition to this, three more elements are investigated: the more mainstream parties adopt issues usually belonging the extreme right side, the more extreme right parties are legitimised; secondly, proportional electoral systems generally promotes the entry of new parties in the political arena; thirdly, federalism and local elections fosters localism and, by this way, the potential outbreak of extreme right parties; 2) the *mediatisation* thesis: the argument is that contemporary mass media stress the role of leadership and focus strongly on charismatic personality, therefore politicians with skills in communication can take advantage and spreading their image and ideas. This could explain why extreme right parties generally rely on charming leaders. Furthermore, mass media are involved in promotion versus delegitimisation of issues and parties; 3) the *national tradition* thesis: the more extreme right parties claim to represent the authentic legacy with national tradition and customs, the more they are legitimised as the “true” defenders of the people. As

already said, social change and “new values” are perceived as threats to national tradition; 4) the *programmatic* thesis: the extreme right parties' electoral campaigning is often issue-driven and those parties show a peculiar ability in picking up issues which, though usually discarded by mainstream parties, are of major concern of people. In this vein, populism is directly linked to their skill in portraying themselves as the authentic democrats and supporters of people's will; 5) the *charismatic leader* thesis: this brings a major concern on the supposed decline of party democracy, in favour of a leadership-driven politics where leaders would be the crucial factor in attracting voters. A particular implication is insightful: the leader can implement of sort of “proxy control”, in fact the more s/he is constantly in touch with the masses, the more people have the impression that s/he could be influenced by their votes. Therefore, this could create an impression of direct democracy through the mediation of the leader.

Given the large amount of factors that can be assumed as drivers in favour of ERPs electoral fortunes, these can be summed up in the following table:

Table 4.1. Supply-side factors.

Side	Thesis	Factors
Institutions and political parties (Supply)	Electoral system	PR-formula generous state funding free media access
	Party spatial location	strategic entry of ERPs convergence of MRP ⁵⁴ and MLP ⁵⁵ extent of distance between MRP and ERP
	Local extremism	powerful local assemblies
	Mirror sides	electoral success of GAL ⁵⁶ parties adversarial position assumed by the MLP
	Pariah parties	<i>cordon sanitaire</i> against ERPs
	Leadership	charismatic leadership close-knit internal organisation
	Policy platform	Euro-scepticism law&order cultural and economic protectionism centrist economic position

⁵⁴ The acronym stands for: Mainstream Rightist Party.

⁵⁵ The acronym stands for: Mainstream Leftist Party.

⁵⁶ This is the acronym for Green, Alternative, Libertarian (parties).

3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

3.1. Data

To represent party positions along a given domain, different alternatives are available like elite studies, textual analysis of party programs or mass judgments, though the preferred option has been expert surveys. The motivation for this choice is due to the rather considerable amount of information collected by different scholars. Surely, the Manifesto Research Project could have been another importance source of data, though expert judgements hold two major strength points: they are legitimated by experts knowledge and confidence with proper features of their party system of reference and, moreover, these surveys generally include a significant amount of small parties that are generally dismissed by the Manifesto Research Group.

That said, the chapter resorts to different expert surveys with the aim of tracing the position of political parties along the longest lifespan possible, starting from the 1990s, hence after the end of the Cold War. The most serious obstacle is the divergent structure of surveys collected by different groups of scholars, thus it is necessary to reorganize data to make them comparable in a consistent way. The first hindrance is represented by the question that respondents are expected to answer with regards to party stance: in other terms, it is fundamental to make sure that party stances that are measured relates to the same dimension or, at least, referred to interrelated concepts. Therefore, assessments referred to each dimensions separately. Starting with the economic domain, Laver and Hunt (1992) and its successor Benoit and Laver (2006) surveys treat the economic dimension exactly in the same way, hence data are perfectly comparable. The division of parties between pro-state and pro-market views are assessed also by Chapel Hill's expert surveys (Steenbergen and Marks 2007) and even though the question asked to expert is not exactly the same, the content is surely comparable since it greatly overlaps. Moreover, data are temporally intertwined since the first Chapel Hill survey was collected between Laver-Hunt and Benoit-Laver surveys. The argument is more complicated with regards to immigration since data were not easily find out as the topic has become politically relevant only recently, therefore it was not

included in the Laver-Hunt study (1992). Thus, data collected by Lubbers (2000) played a central role: in his study a great bulk of European political parties are assessed, concerning their stances on immigration in 1990 and 2000. These data have represented a very useful starting point since they allowed investigating party movements during the last decade of the XXth, whilst data collected by Benoit and Laver (2006) were gathered mainly in 2003. Unfortunately, question asked to respondents is not exactly the same as the two authors conceived immigration as dimension on which parties were located concerning their views on the repatriation in the country of origin versus the integration in the host society of immigrants. Despite the awareness of this difference, one cannot deny that parties that are in favour of repatriation hold as well a restrictive view on immigration and vice versa. Taking into account the two different questions, but the high likely correlation between the two dimensions, Benoit and Laver data represent the third source of data, while the fourth one is given again by Chapel Hill's expert surveys that only in 2006 included a specific dimension regarding the support versus the contrast of tough policies on immigration. Here again, the assumption is that a party holding a restrictive conception on immigration will be in favour of repatriation of immigrants and will uphold tough policies in that domain too (and vice versa).

A second, though notable, point is related to make data comparable, since dimensions in the surveys are constructed along different rankings: i.e., value range can vary from zero to ten or from one to twenty. Therefore, an indispensable step is the normalization of data thereby scores can be compared among them. To reach that aim, the normalization formula⁵⁷ is appropriate and all raw scores will be transformed into values varying from 0 to 1. Afterwards, spatial location of political actors can be easily plotted, for each single dimension separately, through a graphical representation where four horizontal axes constitutes the four surveys and are presented from the oldest (at the top) to most recent (at the bottom) in terms of periods of time. A line passing from all party locations emphasizes the pattern of each party about its stances on economy and immigration and this graphical tool make clearer party swings through time. Since the main object of analysis is given

⁵⁷ As reported by Carter (2005, 143) in the note 11 of the fourth chapter: «(score – minimum possible score) / (maximum possible score – minimum possible score)».

by the electoral performances of exclusionist right parties, it is fundamental to inspect how we can evaluate and measure this event.

3.2. Pattern of investigation

The investigation is based on a rigorous scheme so as to compare the same properties across different party systems. Some hypothesis are put forth to verify whether the electoral success of ERPs is enhanced by the presence or absence of certain conditions.

One of the fundamental institutional settings in party competition is represented by the electoral system, whose mechanisms usually play a key role in favouring or discouraging the entry of new party actors in the political arena. The crucial importance of electoral systems is widely recognized in the literature, since they act as functions transforming votes into seats. By consequence, their algorithms affect party relevance in terms of parliamentary representation and, thus, they attribute to political parties relative power in coalition bargaining and government formation. One of the major features of electoral system are given by legal or effective thresholds that parties have to overcome to obtain seats in national legislatures. Furthermore, the proportional or majoritarian formula and the district magnitude are two pre-eminent characters affecting the degree of proportionality of vote share translation into seats. Briefly, the last three are the most important attributes that influence party competition and elections of MPs. Following Sartori (2004), plurality systems have a “freezing” effect at the district level, i.e., in the single district only two candidates can eventually compete for winning the seat. Whether the party system is structured and no ethnic-linguistic minorities are fully concentrated in some areas of the state, the final outcome is a two-party system. Bearing in mind those two *a priori* conditions, the expectation is that the British plurality system provides a strong effective barrier to the entry of new competitors. On the other hand, the very heterogeneous set of PR systems is more difficult to assess in terms of disproportionality in the allocation of seats. This is due to the several characteristic, as already noticed, that can vary the degree of proportionality during the process of transformation of votes into seats. Therefore, two essential features will be taken into account: the presence/absence of a legal threshold, in terms of minimal percentage of votes that a party need to gather in order to gain

seats. Of course, thresholds can be set directly by electoral laws both at the national and local level, or be implicit. The latter situation is strictly linked to the second feature to assess: the district magnitude, i.e., the dimension of the constituency, namely, the number of seats at stakes in that district. That represent a decisive factor since the more the district magnitude is greater, the more the distribution of seats is proportional. This is clearly proved by first-past-the-post system where the district magnitude is equal to 1 and votes casted for all candidate but the first one do not received any parliamentary representation. The general principle is that the more a PR system has a lower district magnitude, the more that system will yield very similar effect to majoritarian electoral systems. A particular interpretation is reserved to the French double-ballot system whose peculiar traits make it different from other systems, with special regards to the possibility given to electors to vote twice within two weeks. To sum up, the hypothesis is stated as follows: ERPs are expected to perform better at the polls when dealing with PR formula, featured by large district magnitude and low or absent legal thresholds. Therefore: the more the electoral system is permissive, the more ERPs electoral scores increase.

When considering ERPs, in the same vein for all other new parties, it has to be pointed out that they were recently established at that time⁵⁸. Thus, to install themselves in party competition, they predictably needed a political opportunity structure enabling to capture part of the electorate that did not feel represented by any pre-existing party. In spatial terms, a “window of opportunity” creates when parties are located in a way they are not able to cover all along a given issue. Parties of the radical right have often been labelled as anti-immigration party, i.e. single-issue party that focus on the issue of immigrants coming from countries outside Europe. Even though, the analysis presented in the previous chapter has showed that ERPs are more than mere opponents of immigration, sure enough this topic stands in the heart of their ideology. Therefore, the ERPs can actually settle down when the mainstream centre-right party hold a too moderate stance on immigration, thereby opening the way for the entry of a more radical challenger. To assess this hypothesis is necessary to focus the starting point of lifespan analysis,

⁵⁸ Some exceptions are the French Front National and the Danish Progress Party.

i.e. in 1990 when first data have been collected. This is of critical importance since, once a party has successfully acquired the status of political actor truly opposing massive immigration, the electorate will tend to identify that party as the political actor that originally support that stance. In other terms, the exclusionist right party is seen as the owner of that issue, thus making it difficult for other parties to substitute for it in that role. When “issue ownership” has been acquired, it is important to investigate the reaction, if any, of mainstream centre-right parties that have to face a new competitor on their right and decide whether or not radicalise their own stances on the same topic. In 1990, if no ERP was present, the same logic of analysis is applied for the next periods, since for mainstream right-parties is always present the possibility the political threat of a new competitor along their right-wing about immigration policies. The strategic entry of an ERP is assessed just along the dimension of immigration because this is the issue that most probably has triggered the emergence of that kind of parties. Indeed, economy does not lie at the heart of ERPs and the related dimension, as already described above, had been holding the primacy in terms of party competition and ideological struggle.

A third spatial configuration that will be inspected concerns convergence of mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties. In the literature (Carter 2005) the convergence hypothesis has been put forth to argue that the most favourable ground, where parties of the radical right can flourish, is given by the reciprocal approaching of traditional moderate parties. The argument upholds that, when those parties tend to come close to each other, they forcedly tend to overlap and support almost the same policies. Thus, voters would have to choose substantially between two parties without a concrete alternative. Indeed, if the platform of the two most important parties — i.e., Christian Democrats (or the Liberals) and Socialists — appeared such a light alternative to each other, at least part of the voters would be tempted to take into account proposition coming from radical actors⁵⁹. An overlapping among party supplies may carry out the unintentional effect of shedding light to more clear-cut and “pure” proposal from ERPs. As Bartolini (1996) pointed out, four settings are crucial for political competition, i.e.

⁵⁹ For a similar argument, *see* Hainsworth (1992).

contestability of elections by parties and candidates, availability of electors to change their vote from one election to the next, the presence of concrete and visible political alternatives among which electors decide for which casting their votes, and finally the vulnerability of a government to be substituted as consequence of unfavourable election results.⁶⁰ The third element is assumed here as the crucial one, while the first one is approximated by the permissiveness of the electoral system and the second is intended in terms of the “fertile ground” analysed in the previous chapter.

It is useful to remind that an excessive degree of coalescence between mainstream parties could foster anti-elite and anti-politics sentiments in the electorate, and ERPs always mark their willingness of representing the “true people” versus the “corrupt elite”. That said, the twofold hypothesis to be assessed is: when mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties convergence on economy and/or immigration, ERPs’ electoral scores increase.

3.3. *The outcome*

Research is oriented towards finding out, if any, common configuration of party systems properties previously classified in regards to divergent electoral performances of exclusionist right parties. Therefore, the section is a description of the divergent electoral scores of political actors at stake in order to put forth a classification of party systems. The second chapter exposed above helps identify the majority of political actors that belong to the set of the exclusionist right, with some few exceptions that does not alter consistency of conclusions reached before. The procedure is quite straightforward: since analysis time period starts from 1990, electoral scores of exclusionist right parties have to be gathered since that time point till 2009, again for the 14 countries included in the second chapter. Vote shares refer to ballots casted for the Lower Chamber during legislative elections.

Table 4.2. Classification of countries by electoral scores of ERPs.

Country	Year	Party	%	%	Average score
Austria	1990	FPÖ	16.6	16.6	20.2
	1994	FPÖ	22.5	22.5	
	1995	FPÖ	21.9	21.9	
	1999	FPÖ	26.9	26.9	

⁶⁰ For a concrete application of this framework to ethno-regionalist parties, see Tronconi (2005).

	2002	FPÖ	10.0	10.0	
	2006	FPÖ BZÖ	11.0 4.1	15.1	
	2008	FPÖ BZÖ	17.5 10.7	28.2	
Belgium/FI	1991	VB	9.5	9.5	
	1995	VB	11.9	11.9	
	1999	VB	14.2	14.2	14.0
	2003	VB	16.8	16.8	
	2007	VB	17.5	17.5	
Belgium/Wa	1991	FN	2.4	2.4	
	1995	FN	6.9	6.9	
	1999	FN	3.4	3.4	4.7
	2003	FN	5.3	5.3	
	2007	FN	5.3	5.4	
Denmark	1990	FP	6.4	6.4	
	1994	FP	6.4	6.4	
	1998	DF	7.4	9.8	
	1998	FP	2.4		10.4
	2001	DF	12.0	12.6	
	2001	FP	0.6		
	2005	DF	13.3	13.3	
	2007	DF	13.9	13.9	
Finland	1991	SMP/PS	4.8	4.8	
	1995	SMP/PS	1.3	1.3	
	1999	SMP/PS	1.0	1.0	2.6
	2003	SMP/PS	1.6	1.6	
	2007	SMP/PS	4.1	4.1	
France	1993	FN	12.4	12.4	
	1997	FN	14.9	14.9	
	2002	FN	11.3	12.4	11.1
	2002	MNR	1.1		
	2007	FN	4.3	4.7	
	2007	MNR	0.4		
Germany	1990	DVU	0.3	2.4	
	1990	REP	2.1		
	1994	REP	1.9	1.9	
	1998	DVU	1.2	3.0	1.5
	1998	REP	1.8		
	2002	REP	0.6	0.6	
	2005	REP	0.6	0.6	
	2009	REP	0.4	0.4	
Greece	2004	LAOS	2.2	2.2	
	2007	LAOS	3.8	3.8	3.9
	2009	LAOS	5.6	5.6	
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	1992	MSI	5.4	5.4	
	1994	MSI/AN	13.5	13.5	
	1996	AN	15.7	16.6	
	1996	MSFT	0.9		10.5
	2001	AN	12.0	12.4	
	2001	MSFT	0.4		
	2006	AN	12.3	12.9	
	2006	MSFT	0.6		
	2008	MSFT-LD	2.4	2.4	
Netherlands	1994	CD	2.5	2.5	1.6
	1998	CD	0.6	0.6	

Portugal	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-
UK	-	-	-	-	-

4. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

4.1. Austria

The Austrian electoral system is grounded into PR⁶¹ family, even though proportionality degree in seat distribution is corrected by some mechanisms. Each single voter has one vote to cast for a list with the possibility of expressing one preference. Two barriers are set to reduce access to the *Nationalrat*: one full quota at the regional level (*Land*) and 4 per cent at the national level. At the first stage, seats are allocated through the Hare quota — i.e., largest remainders method — whilst d'Hondt method is applied in the second step. The mean district magnitude (MDM⁶²) is equal to 20.3 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137) and, therefore, rather large to maintain a good degree of proportionality. As said before, after having allocated seats at the regional level, the remainders of votes are recovered at the national level: this reduces the amount of wasted ballots and, in the end, the real barrier for small parties is the 4 per cent national threshold. Considering that percentage, the Austrian electoral law cannot be considered as a strict proportional electoral system (Kitschelt 1995; Veugelers and Magnan 2005).


Current lifespan analysis starts from 1990, but the most important ERP in Austria — i.e., the FPÖ - was founded in 1956, as the Federation of Independents' heir. As already stated, it was only in 1986, following the Haider's seize of power, that the Liberal-nationalists underwent a radical right-wing turn. From then onwards, the FPÖ was able to acquire an increasing centrality in the Austrian party system that, for about forty years, had been largely dominated by the Christian Democrats (ÖVP) and Social Democrats (SPÖ). It was exactly in the 1990 national elections that the FPÖ realised an increased of 6.9 percentage points and jumped to

⁶¹ This is the common abbreviation for “proportional representation”.

⁶² Henceforth, the acronym MDM refers to the mean «number of seats to be filled in a *constituency*» (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 632)

16.6 per cent of the vote; conversely, the ÖVP suffered a loss of votes equal to 9.2 percentage points and dropped to 32.1 per cent, namely, their worst electoral result from the end of WWII. Since ERP's favourite issue is the opposition to mass immigration, it is plausible to verify whether along the ÖVP's right-wing side there was a niche representing an opportunity for the Liberal-nationalists.


Figure 4.A. Austria: immigration scale.



Actually, in 1990 the ÖVP occupies a truly centrist position (i.e., 0.56 score), thereby leaving a consistent empty space for the entry of a party supporting more radical views on immigration. Due to the geographical collocation of Austria, that phenomenon must not be interpreted only in terms of people coming from North Africa or Middle East, but also from Central and Eastern Europe after the demise of the Soviet Bloc. Actually, in 1990 the FPÖ expressed a radical stance on immigration of 0.88, thus mirroring that of the Greens on the left-libertarian side. Therefore, the first condition related to an opportunity niche on the right, on the field of immigration, is satisfied. Moreover, exploring the economic axis, in 1992 the FPÖ expressed the more pro-market profile, though not that far from the ÖVP.

The aim was probably to differentiate from the two mainstream parties — ÖVP and SPÖ — that were quite close to each other at that juncture. Few years later in 1994, the FPÖ made a second leap reaching 22.5 per cent of the vote, while the ÖVP dropped to 27.7 per cent, thus losing around 800,000 votes. The 1995 elections left the situation substantially unchanged, while the 1999 elections represented the outbreak of the Austrian right, and his leader became at the same time famous and contested all over Europe. In 1999, the FPÖ realised its best electoral score ever with 26.9 per cent of the vote and climbed to the second position, outranking the Christian Democrats and surpassed only by the Social Democrats that, however, lost slightly less than 5 percentage points.

Figure 4.B. Austria: economic scale.



Three main parties' positions along the two axes deserve an accurate analysis. Starting for immigration, the distance between the FPÖ and ÖVP was just a bit lower in 2000 than in 1990, while the SPÖ has shifted remarkably towards the centre. It is plain to see that the two mainstream parties are very close to each other, expressing a moderate stance around 0.6 score, that is somewhat uncommon for a

Social Democratic actor. Noticeably, convergence of the SPÖ and ÖVP is associated with the FPÖ best electoral performance. Therefore, this particular configuration concerning the dimension of immigration brings confirmation to the convergence theory. About economy, the party placement is more complex: all parties had undergone a pro-state turn, with the FPÖ coming very close to the ÖVP's right in 1999. Whether this centrist swing of the FPÖ is fruitful for its electoral fortunes is no easy to state, since economy is not properly a core issue for ERPs. That said, since the 1999 elections represented the peak for the FPÖ consensus, the 2003 vote completely reverse the respective electoral weights of the FPÖ and ÖVP: the former lost 16.9 percentage points, while the latter gained 15.4 percentage points. This confirms again that the respective performances at the polls of those two parties are interrelated. However, that situation does not appear to be explained by their spatial positions along the two axes of party competition: on immigration, the distance between them is almost identical compared to 1999, whilst in economy the Liberal-nationalists shifted on the left-wing side of the Christian Democrats. It is not possible to argue whether the FPÖ centrist trend in economy affected in some way its consensus. An exogenous factor is its participation in government: after the 1999 breakthrough, it acquired a coalition potential for the first time and entered the executive with the ÖVP. This fact had to be mentioned, though it will not analyse deeply since participation in government by ERPs is at present uncommon, save the Austrian and Italian political contexts.

The 2006 vote presented a different configuration given the exclusionist right split into two parties and the establishment of the BZÖ. In 2006, the FPÖ completed its centripetal trend in the economic domain and assumed a stance that was even below 0.5 score; on the other hand, the BZÖ assumed a strategic position between Liberal-nationalists and Christian Democrats. On immigration, the FPÖ radicalized its stance, compared to that of 1990, and the BZÖ was just slightly on its left. More interestingly, the ÖVP have undergone a rightist swing up to assuming a position near to the FPÖ stance in 1990. Furthermore, the SPÖ assumed in 2006 a posture greater than 0.5, thus more on the right than on the left. Therefore, the three main Austrian parties are, to a different extent, political actors that do support a critical view on immigration. In 2006 vote, the Christian

Democrats suffered a substantial loss equal to 8.1 percentage points, though they were able to defend their second top rank place with 34.2 per cent of the vote, just a little less than the Social Democrats. As previously stressed, it can be argued that there has been a transfer of votes between ÖVP and the exclusionist right. In 2006, the BZÖ contested general elections for the first time and overstepped the 4 per cent threshold. The FPÖ gathered just a feeble increase in votes and the exclusionist right, on the whole, collected 15.1 per cent of votes. Concerning the respective weights of the two ERPs, as expected, the BZÖ triumphed in Carinthia where Haider's party collected the second largest share of votes (second only to the SPÖ) equal to 25.4 per cent, whilst both FPÖ and ÖVP suffered major vote leaks: the former lost 16.3 and the latter 9.7 percentage points. The BZÖ was a truly regional-grounded party, indeed Carinthia was the only *Land* where the party was able to win seats for the *Nationalrat*. That said, since in 2006 the exclusionist right was just above 15 per cent of votes, its performance is much minor than in 1999. This reduced, though consistent, consensus for right-wing radicalism is associated with a more rightist stance of ÖVP along the dimension of immigration; moreover, the two mainstream parties are distant in both dimensions. Therefore, the centrist position on economy of FPÖ do not seem having profited to the Liberal-nationalists, together with a situation of no convergence of SPÖ and ÖVP. Finally, the role played by the Liberals (LIF) is marginal as that party lost its parliamentary representation since 1999. On the other hand, the Greens are represented in the *Nationalrat* since 1986, though they never acquired a coalition potential (Sartori 1976) since they never entered any government.

Summing up what has been said hitherto, the Austrian case confirms two hypothesis: in 1990, the strategic positioning of the FPÖ was made easier by the centrist posture of the ÖVP along the axis of immigration; secondly, in 1999, the convergence of the two mainstream parties on immigration fostered the FPÖ electoral consensus. Concerning economy, the centripetal trend of the Liberal-nationalists does not seem profiting for that party or, at least, does not play a crucial role.

4.2. Belgium

A federal law regulates the electoral system in Belgium. The system for the election of deputies to the Chamber of Representatives is an open list proportional formula. Voters cast their ballots choosing a party list, with the possibility of expressing one or more preference over the same party list. The number of seats is allocated to electoral constituencies⁶³ in proportion to their population and MDM is 7.5 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137). Each party has to overcome a 5 per cent threshold at the constituency level⁶⁴ in order to gain MPs⁶⁵. Seats are allocated using the method of Hare quota at two levels (provincial and federal) and the effective threshold is 9.20 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 142), therefore, even greater than the legal one. Since the effective threshold is over the mean⁶⁶ and the MDM is rather small, the Belgian electoral system is not strictly proportional.

4.2.1. FLANDERS

Looking at the spatial location of political parties in 1990 on immigration, the rather moderate position of the Flemish Liberals (PVV/VLD), just below 0.7, actually left the right-wing side of the political spectrum available for a more restrictive position on immigration like that of the *Vlaams Belang*⁶⁷ (VB). Some features of party competition deserve greater attention.

Firstly, the VB has always occupied a very extreme position, close to the scale limit. Secondly, with the exception of the VU/N-VA, the other parties did not enact any counter-offensive strategy to balance the VB's political posture. Considering the period between 2000 and 2003, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Greens, all moved towards the left-wing side. This situation could be linked to a methodological aspect, i.e. the question asked to experts in the 2003 survey is formulated in a rather different way than in the other cases. Yet, even in 2003, the VB has kept its rightist position, so that its radical and very divergent stance on immigration, compared to all other political actors, is confirmed. Thirdly,

⁶³ The electoral constituencies generally coincide with the provinces, with two exceptions: Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde and Louvain.

⁶⁴ As a consequence of a decision issued by the Court of Arbitration, the 5 per cent threshold is not applied in the following constituencies: Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde, Walloon Brabant, and Louvain.


⁶⁵ This acronym stands for "Member(s) of Parliament".

⁶⁶ Considering all fourteen countries here at stakes, the mean value of effective thresholds is 8.42.

⁶⁷ At that point in time, the name of the party was *Vlaams Block*.

just the VU/N-VA moved significantly towards the right during the first six years of the 21st century: the N-VA is, in the plurality of its components and internal structure, the heir of the VU or, more specifically, its former right-wing faction.

Figure 4.C. Flanders: immigration scale.



However, the VB has always profited of an empty rightist side, without any effective challenger. Its electoral scores have always increased through years: in 1995, it overcame 10 per cent of the vote and in 2007 reached its best electoral performance with 21 per cent of the ballots.

Another important element is the degree of convergence between MRP and MLP⁶⁸. In Belgium as a whole, and in Flanders as well, the evaluation of convergence is problematic since three major and traditional party pillars are present: the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the Liberals. More recently, a four party “family” has added to three previous ones, i.e., the Ecologists. More in details, it is not easy to compute the degree of convergence because of the difficulty

⁶⁸ The same acronyms explicated by note 48 and 49 (see Table 4.2) are here employed.


in choosing which is the MRP. Indeed, the Socialist party (SP) can be considered as the natural MLP, whereas on the right two options are viable: the Christian Democratic and the Liberal party. By adopting an historical point of view, the Christian Democratic party, especially in Flanders, is the most electoral supported party within the centre-right area. Therefore, it appears plausible to choose the CD&V as MRP⁶⁹. Therefore, convergence is assessed as the distance between CD&V and SP. The graphical representation of party positions about immigration depicts an almost identical movement, in terms of direction, of both CD&V and SP. These parties are very close to each other and their reciprocal distance slightly increased only in 2006. Considering only that year, the increased distance between the two mainstream parties has not entailed a reduced consensus for the VB, on the contrary as said early. Considering the average distance of the two Flemish mainstream parties, it comes out that the mean value is second smallest one, just above that of Sweden. To sum up what has been said so far, the VB increasing consensus at the polls has been favoured by an empty space on the rightist side of immigrations scale where the VB did not face any real challenge from the Christian Democrats or the Liberals; furthermore, both MRP and MLP has maintained a high degree of convergence on the left of the centre, so that the VB posture appeared to be the only real alternative for those opposing immigration.

Sure enough, immigration is fundamental in understanding patterns of ERPs electoral inroads, though economy is crucial as well in party competition. Taking into account the VB stance in isolation, the Flemish secessionist party has held a rather pro-market stance around 0.75. In 1999, it radicalized its economic receipt through a pronounced turn towards the right. Thus, it even stepped over the Liberals and became the more pro-market political actor in Flanders. After that leap, the VB returned to its previous economic stance that in 2006 overlapped with that of the VU/N-VA. Since the VB electoral scores increased steady over years, it is not easy to assess whether either a stronger or weaker stance on economy has profited or damaged the party. Two points can be stressed: when the party underwent a right-wing shift, it passed from 9.5 in 1991 to 14.2 in 1999, thus it

⁶⁹ The spatial positions of the Flemish Liberals (VLD) will be taken into account in §5.2.

realized an addition of 4.7 percentage points; on the other hand, when the VB turned back towards a moderate pro-market position, it jumped from 14.2 in 1999 to 21.0 in 2007, with a gain equal to 6.8 percentage points.

Figure 4.D. Flanders: economic scale.



Therefore, the VB was able to increase its vote share both with a stronger and a weaker pro-market stance, though in the second case the rise of votes was larger. Like with immigration, the two mainstream parties are very close to each other, insomuch that Flanders has the minor distance between centre-left and centre-right parties — i.e., the highest degree of convergence — at the same level of Portugal. The minor distance between the two mainstream parties was realized in 2003 along the economic dimension and in 2000 along the dimension of immigration. Focusing on a single configuration at one point in time does not seem to boost comprehension about the VB electoral success. Conclusions can be drawn as follows: the convergence of CD&V and SP is proved on average in both relevant dimensions and this is associated with a mounting vote share for the VB.

To conclude, two important observations regarding the *Vlaams Belang* are to be taken into account. Firstly, the VB did not undergo any centripetal turn along the economic dimension, differentiating from FPÖ and DF (*see* next section). This is probably due to the CD&V truly centrist position that the VB decided not to challenge. Notably, both in Austria and Denmark the mainstream centre-right party – respectively, ÖVP and V — assumed a more pronounced rightist stance in favour of market liberalism, than did the CD&V in Flanders where, on the contrary, its stance was even to the left of the centre. Secondly, an exogenous though crucial factor was not included in analysis, due its peculiar character: the VB is a party whose core ideology is soaked with strong secessionism of Flanders from the Kingdom of Belgium. It is sure enough that its consensus is boosted by those Flemish citizens supporting the split of the country or, at least, with a harsh resentment against the federal state. As the present analysis focuses on economy and immigration, the issue of decentralisation and secessionism could not be included. However, the fight for independence of Flanders has to be mentioned, since this appears again as a factor at the basis of the recent upsurge of the N-VA in the 2010 federal elections where, for the first time, the VB decreased its vote share.


4.2.2. WALLONIA

Compared to the Flemish situation, in 1990 little differences can be noticed in Wallonia with regards to party positions along the immigration scale. The Christian Democratic party expressed a very centrist position, while the Liberals were just slightly below 7.0. Therefore, for the Front National was actually possible to locate at the extreme right of that dimension. The structure of party locations was actually rather profitable to the FN, either by considering the PSC/CDH or the PVV/MR such as MRP.

The evolution of party competition in the subsequent years, always on immigration, is very meaningful. In fact, the Liberals did not turn towards the right to attract potential FN's voters. On the contrary, they underwent a consistent centripetal shift, approaching the Christian Democrats. Concerning the other parties, the only notable change was the shrinking of the distance between the Socialists and Ecologists. The Front National made a noteworthy increase in votes

from 1991 to 1995 when it passed from 2.4 to 6.9 per cent, its best electoral performance so far.

Figure 4.E. Wallonia: immigration scale.




The graphical representation underscores how in the mid-1990s the Liberals were moving firmly towards the centre, favouring the shifting of voters towards the Front National. However, the same argument cannot be held in the aftermath, in fact the FN vote share firstly dropped to 3.4 per in 1999 and then growth again to 5.3 per cent both in 2003 and 2007 federal elections. This means that the 1999 electoral results is not in line with what has been argued in relation to 1995 and then in 2003 and 2007.

Concerning the degree of convergence, as already stated about Flanders, in Wallonia too there are three traditional party families, thus the assessment of convergence depends on the political actor to be considered as the representative of the mainstream right. In line with what has been argued early, the Christian

Democratic party (PSC/CDH) is chosen as MRP⁷⁰. In the period 1990-2006, the PS has assumed a more leftist posture on immigration, while the Christian Democrats have always presided over the centre of the political spectrum. Their reciprocal distance increased over the years and the best electoral score for the FN was in 1995 when the space between PS and PSC was actually very narrow. Four years later, when the FN dropped to 3.4 per cent, PS and PSC were only a little bit more distant. Therefore, the second situation does not confirm the convergence theory. The same can be argued when the PS shifted away from the CDH and, despite of this, the FN increased its consensus.

Figure 4.F. Wallonia: economic scale.



Unfortunately, the analysis lacks data in both dimensions: on immigration, the FN stance in 2006 is not measured, while in the economic domain its stance is assessed only in 2003. Therefore, the only available information is that the FN was

⁷⁰ The spatial positions of the Liberals (MR) will be taken into account in §5.2

on the right of the Liberals and, therefore, appears to be a pro-market rather than pro-state party in economy, like the Flemish VB.

4.3. Denmark


The Danish electoral system is featured by a PR formula where voters cast their ballots choosing a party list and may indicate just one preference within the candidate list. In particular, MDM is 7.9 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137), thus much lower than in Austria; however, a Danish political party has to secure at least 2 per cent of votes at the national level to gain representation into the *Folкетинget*. The electoral system is based on a two-tier set allocation mechanism where the lower level resorts to Hare quota, while the upper stage employs a St. Laguë modified divisor. Summing up those features, with special attention to the 2 per cent national threshold and Hare quota, the Danish electoral law can be evaluated as a strict proportional electoral system (Kitschelt 1995; Veugelers and Magnan 2005).

At party level, the current analysis identified two ERPs: the Progress Party (FP) and the Danish People's Party (DF). When investigating the Danish exclusionist right, it is essential to analyse firstly the Progress Party and then its evolution that gave rise to the Danish People's Party. Indeed, their history and pattern are strictly interrelated.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the FP was undergoing its descendent trajectory in terms of electoral consensus. Almost twenty years before (in 1972), Mogens Glistrup founded the Progress Party as a force mainly devoted to economic liberalism and supporting strong tax reductions, a net simplification of bureaucratic apparatus, and a sensible reduction in public spending. Naturally, the party was placed on the right of the state-market dimension and, during the 1970s, the FP secured its best electoral results ever, with the peak of 15.9 per cent in the first election that the party contested. Suddenly, the FP became the second largest force in Parliament gaining 28 out of 179 seats. Secondly, the ban of immigration from Muslim countries became a core element in its ideology. Essentially, the aim was to protect the generous amount of resources supplied by the Danish welfare state. For these reasons, immigrants from poor and underdeveloped countries were seen as

“scroungers” of social benefits, without contributing to the funding of state provisions and, therefore, causes of increased levels of taxation.

Figure 4.G. Denmark: immigration scale.



In 1983, a turning point was marked: the FP leader, Mogens Glistrup, was sentenced to three years in prison for tax fraud and Pia Kjaersgaard seized the reins of the party. In fact, a key element was the dispute involving the two party factions over the strong or soft reduction of welfare state and public spending: on the one hand, the radicals led by Glistrup and, on the other hand, the moderates led by Kjaersgaard. As expected, the fight over party economic policies accentuated since 1987 when Glistrup was released from prison, and internal dispute pushed Kjaersgaard and his followers to exit and form the Danish People’s Party in 1995.

Therefore, the DF spatial position on immigration scale in 1990 has to be intended as related to 1995. The focus is on the political opportunity structure available along the MRP’s right-wing side, i.e. the *Venstre*⁷¹ (V). This Liberal party

⁷¹ Literally, the name means “left”.


is the largest bourgeois political actor and its main challenger⁷² is the Social Democratic party (SD). A major finding is that, on immigration, the *Venstre* occupied a moderate position, just above 0.6, while all other parties but the FP were distinctly on the left-wing side of the political spectrum. Actually, the only party that advocated restrictive policies against immigration was the Progress Party. By consequence, the necessary niche for DF to emerge was occupied by the FP that became its main rival since both was forced to compete in the same portion of the political space. In the 1990s, the DF stance on immigration was even more restrictive than that held by the FP and, when the Progress Party declined inexorably, the Kjærsgaard's party slightly moderate its position. The *Venstre* actually tried to challenge the DF by moving towards the right from 1990 to 2000, and afterwards it kept its rather restrictive position. Of great relevance is the increasing electoral success of the DF that has contested so far four elections (in 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2007) and has always increased its vote share. The big leap was made between 1998 and 2001 when it passed from 7.4 to 12.0 per cent, while the FP dramatically dropped to 0.6 per cent and virtually disappeared. Since 2001 has represented an important election for the exclusionist right, it is useful to focus on party movements during that period. As already stressed above, the *Venstre* radicalized on the immigration scale, though the largest spatial swing was undergone by the Social Democrats that, as showed by the graphic, from 1990 until 2006 have incessantly moved towards the right. This trend implied that the distance between V and SD has been reducing through years. In other terms, on immigration the respective positions of V and SD converged and the DF support increased at the expense of the FP. Therefore, increasing convergence within mainstream parties of centre-right and centre-left parties is associated with increasing support for the ERP.

About economy, after 1999 the DF underwent a strong centripetal turn, placing itself at the centre of political spectrum and abandoning the radical pro-market ideology typical of the Progress Party. Furthermore, V and SD kept a considerable divergence between their respective economic recipes. It should be noted that the

⁷² The spatial position of the Conservative Party (KP) will be taken into account in §5.2.

DF profile, along the two scales, corroborates the welfare-chauvinist label applied by Kitschelt (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 137). The combination of exclusionism in cultural domain and defence of the welfare state in economic dimension revealed as profitable in 2007 when the DF increased its support to 13.9 per cent of the vote, thus making robust its presence in the Danish party system, underpinned by an increasing percentage at the polls. Moreover, since 2001 the DF has always backed the Liberal-Conservative government without entering the executive. Its support for Rasmussen's policies was selectively given when the government took decisions touching core ideological tenets of the DF, like more restrictive policies on immigration. Yet, DF exponents did not perform charges directly in the executive, unlike other countries such as Austria and Italy.

Figure 4.H. Denmark: economic scale.



4.4. Finland


The Finnish electoral system is one «of the world's most durable electoral systems, certainly one of the most durable proportional representation (PR) system» (Raunio 2005, 473). Indeed, the basic features of electoral districts have been kept

unchanged, save minor adjustments through time. At present, the national territory is divided into 15 constituencies and district magnitude ranges from 6 to 15. About MDM, the «average district magnitude is 13.3» (Raunio 2005, 477). In national elections, voting is highly candidate-centred: actually, the voter casts «one vote for one candidate writing the identification number of the candidate in the empty circle on the ballot sheet supplied» (Raunio 2005, 480). Once polls are closed, seats are distributed to parties according to the d'Hondt method and, furthermore, no legal threshold is set, neither at the national or the local level. As already mentioned before, a candidate can win a seat only on the base of his/her number of preference votes. Given that pre-electoral alliances are viable, the distribution of seats is driven only by the plurality principle within preference votes. This implies that small parties «have tended to enter electoral alliances with larger parties» (Raunio 2005, 481), and small parties can take advantage of this strategy when their share of votes are particularly concentrated on one or few candidates. Firstly, the d'Hondt method assigns seats to the coalition and, secondly, candidates with a plurality of votes in the coalition are elected. As commonly known, that method tend to favour larger than minor parties: in 2003, the three largest parties — the Centre Party (KESK), Social Democrats (SD), and National Coalition (KOK) — received a number of seats greater than their vote shares, whereas the contrary is true for smaller parties (Raunio 2005, 482). On the other hand, the True Finns (PS) won 3 seats with only 1.6 per cent of votes and this is possible since there is no legal clause for entering the *Eduskunta*. In this manner, the national Parliament is highly representative of political forces, including the Swedish People's Party (SFP). The latter represents political demands of Swedish minority in Finland and, for example whether a national threshold of 4 per cent was set then the SFP would risk to be excluded and this could create tension with a consistent minority within the country. Summing up what has been said so far, the PR formula in Finland does not seem to constitute a significant barrier to the entry of new party in the political arena, as explicitly outlined by Raunio who argued that the «proportional electoral system with large constituencies has contributed to the fragmentation of the party system» (2005, 482). By consequence, no party has never been able to win an absolute majority and parties are used to cooperate to form governments: indeed, the «tradition of

having cross-bloc coalitions reflects the pragmatic and consensual nature of Finnish politics» (Raunio 2005, 474). Thus, the Finnish electoral law can be assessed such as a strict proportional system.

Chapter 2 has showed early how the status of most right-deviant party along the GAL/TAN dimension was competed by the Christian Democrats (SKL/KD) and the True Finns. As previously discussed, the True Finns is the only party that the current research considers such as an ERP. When considering party positions on immigration, the SKL/KD has always expressed a centrist position, while PS has held a more right-wing stance. This was even more striking after 2000 when the PS underwent a strong right-wing turn.


Figure 4.I. Finland: immigration scale.



All along the period under examination, the two main Liberal conservative parties — KESK and KOK — have been holding a centrist stance, thereby opening the way for the establishment of an ERP. Yet, to evaluate the degree of convergence, the National Coalition Party (KOK) is assumed as MRP, while the

SD is obviously the MLP. As already mentioned, the PS was founded in 1995 as heir of the agrarian party and took advantage of the wide empty space on the right of the political spectrum. However, despite of the favourable political opportunity structure, PS vote share in 1995, 1999, and 2003 was quite disappointing as just over 1 per cent. Only in 2007, the party was able to more than doubling its score, reaching its best electoral performance of 4.1 per cent. Focusing on 2006 party locations along the immigration scale, KOK and SD strongly converged to the centre, while PS somewhat moderated its stance, though maintaining on the right. It can be argued that the particular configuration, i.e. convergence of mainstream parties, has fostered the PS electoral success.

Figure 4.J. Finland: economic scale.



In the economic domain, the situation is rather different as showed by the graphical representation. On average, both MRP and MLP have kept a notable distance, thus supplying a sound alternative. On the other hand, the KESK has balanced its economic recipes around the centre and the same can be argued for the PS. In this case, the influence of PS stance in economy on its electoral scores

cannot be weighted, since the configuration described above kept its main tenets all along the period here explored while the PS scores were fluctuant.

4.5. France

The French electoral system is featured by particular components that make it totally different from all others in Western Europe. First of all, one major peculiarity is the double-ballot, i.e. voters cast their ballots twice within a period of two weeks. Furthermore, when voters cast their second ballot they know the results of the first round of elections. It is straightforward to argue that this situation is very distinct than “usual” electoral systems where voters vote just once. About its mechanisms, the French electoral system employs a plurality/majority formula: in each single uninominal district, during the first round, the candidate collecting an absolute majority of valid votes wins the seat. If none of the candidates is able to reach that amount of ballots, two or more candidates are admitted to the second round where the candidate winning even a simple plurality of votes is elected. Therefore, the most important mechanism is the filter enabling candidates to contest the second round. In France, a percentage threshold represents this filter and was set at different level through time, starting from 5 per cent until the present 12.5 per cent calculated over the number of citizens having the right to vote in each district. This is a key clause since it implies that the concrete threshold can elevate up to around 20 per cent out of the total of votes. Thus, two components make the system very disproportional in the allocation of seats: the district magnitude — i.e., constituencies are uninominal and obviously MDM equals 1 — and, secondly, the very high threshold to be admitted to the second round. Yet, the assimilation of this system to the majoritarian family does not seem totally straightforward, especially when its peculiarities above mentioned are not carefully assessed. It is plain to see that the French double-ballot system promoted a reduction of the number of parties, since its logic and mechanics discourage party fragmentation. Especially during the second round, in many cases the seat is contended between the left and right’s candidate. In other words, the seat can be credibly won either by the Socialist or the Gaullist candidate.


Indeed, one of the most acknowledged effects is the under-representation of anti-system parties in terms of seats. Within the French party system, the two more

extremist parties are the Communists on the left and the National Front (FN) on the right. It should be noted that in the first case, the *Parti Communiste Français* (PCF) has actively entered coalition with the Socialist Party (PS); moreover, the support of the Communists was decisive for Mitterand's victory in the 1981 presidential election and also for the leftist majority in the 1984 legislative elections. Unlike the PCF, the Jean Marie Le Pen's National Front has been suffering a severe ostracism, i.e. the so-called republican (or Gaullist) right all other parties refuse to conclude any agreement with FN. The *cordon sanitaire* aims at weakening through isolation a party that is considered not viable for any coalition deal, even though this strategy has yield costs for the Gaullist right. In the 1997 legislative elections, the *Rassemblement pour la Republique* (RPR) refused to bargain any withdrawal of its candidates in the second round in favour of National Front's candidates. Therefore, in several *traingulaires* — i.e., where three candidates contest the seat after the first round — right-wing voters split between RPR and FN, and this division represented a great advantage for the PS. In 2002, Le Pen's upsurge to the second rank place, after first round of Presidential elections, entailed the resounding Jospin's resignation from politics; afterwards, the Socialist electorate was faced with Chirac-Le Pen alternative in the second round and it massively opted for Chirac as the "less evil". These two events showed how the National Front is considered such as an anomaly to counter by any means.

Since district magnitude equals 1 and all parties refuse to make an agreement with FN, Le Pen's party has had huge difficulties in winning seats, despite of its large vote share in the first round. For instance, in 1997 FN realized its best electoral score with 14.9 per cent of the vote, but it won only one seat. Again, in 2002 its score moderately dropped to 11.3 per cent with any seat gained. This represents a good example of how the electoral system distorts the transformation of votes into parliamentary seats. The French electoral system belongs by all means to the majoritarian group with Westminster plurality formula, though the real dissimilarity is the presence of a first round. Even though both the British and French electoral systems are very disproportional, the second one has a preliminary voting stage that clearly makes it different from all other cases. Indeed, in the first round all parties do present their own candidate, even those without any real chance

of winning the seat. However, a small vote share may enable parties with a “blackmail” power and, when this is true, they assume a crucial role in the so-called “horse trading”. Furthermore, the first round keeps many parties “alive”, i.e. minor parties can try to collect as much votes as they can to bargain an agreement for the second round. Thus, when assessing the French electoral system, it should be taken into account not only the degree of disproportionality in the allocation of seats, but also a double-round vote. In this vein, it is possible to understand why a majoritarian system, with few parties being represented in parliaments, can coexist with a pluralism of parties at the electoral level. Summing up what has been said so far, the French electoral system represents a barrier to the entry of new party that is higher than usual PR-formula, but lower than first-past-the-post system. Of course, it is very far from a strict proportional representation.

Figure 4.K. France: immigration scale.



About party competition, in 1990 the RPR held a rather restrictive view on immigration equal to 0.78. Compared to other MRP⁷³ in countries where ERPs were successful, the Gaullists held the most anti-immigration stance in 1990. Therefore, the empty space available was narrower than in other contexts, but it did not prevent the FN to become a relevant party in French politics. This can be essentially explained considering the founding date of the party. Unlike all other parties⁷⁴, the FN was already established in 1972 and for the first time it contested legislative elections in 1978 when it gathered only 0.8 per cent. Its meaningful breakthrough was in 1986 when the party collected 9.9 per cent at the polls, profiting that the electoral system was changed in a PR-formula with a 5 per cent threshold. The FN gained 34 MPs, but the double-round ballot was immediately restored since the next election in 1988. Therefore, in 1990 the FN was not a new party on the French scene, but a party with a “blackmail” power (Sartori 1976), at least at the electoral level. The RPR stance has to be interpreted as a tentative to challenge the FN over the issue of immigration. Unfortunately, no data are available before 1990 and, therefore, it is not possible to assess the political opportunity structure before that point in time.

By observing the RPR trajectory on the immigration scale, it is remarkable that the Gaullist party never overstepped the 1990 level and in 2003 underwent a turn towards the centre, leaving free space to the FN’s restrictive platform⁷⁵. Considering also the degree of convergence between the two mainstream rightist and leftist parties — i.e., the RPR/UMP and PS — the gap between them is the second highest, just under the Italian case. In 2003 it is worth noting that the distance between UMP and PS reduced to 0.32 and that point in time coincided also with the major distance between UMP and FN. Furthermore, in 2002 a new President of the Republic was elected and the *Assemblée Nationale* was renewed two months later. In this case, evaluating whether or not the convergence theory is confirmed presents some difficulties. The primary change is the establishment of a new party unifying the French centre-right: the entire RPR, about two third of UDF

⁷³ For example, in 1990: ÖVP (Austria, 0.56), V (Denmark, 0.63), FI (Italy, 0.65).

⁷⁴ Save the FPÖ that represents an exception since it was founded in 1956. About the 1986 Haider’s escalation to the top of the party, see §5.1 before.

⁷⁵ The competition from the MPF is minor and can be discarded.

members, and other minor parties of the Christian Democratic and liberal traditions adhered to the UMP⁷⁶. At the beginning, between the first and second round of the 2002 presidential election, the acronym was just an umbrella to support re-election for Chirac against Le Pen. Afterwards, in November 2002, the party organized and change its name into Union for a Popular Movement. Hence, the shift towards the centre of the RPR within the period 1999-2003 is due to the merging of this party with the UDF and also other minor centrist parties. By the way, the 2003 survey considers again the RPR and its distance from the PS is the shortest ever observed, as already highlighted before. Comparing the distance RPR-PS and the percentage of the FN vote share, it is plain to see that both decreases compared to 1999. Hence, the hypothesis that convergence of mainstream parties is associated with higher electoral scores of ERPs is not confirmed in this case.


A further clarification concerns an exogenous factor not taken into account in the present analysis: the presidential election. Indeed, the dependent variable is consistently defined as the percentage vote share of ERPs in legislative elections for the Lower House. There is no doubt that a crucial election, perhaps the most important one, regards the chief of the *Elisée* and these elections exert a driving force over legislative elections. This is particularly true when the second ones are held around a couple of months after the new president has been elected. As already mentioned, in 2002 Le Pen made its best electoral performances in the run-off for the presidential elections, though it was massively defeated during the second round. The Chirac's landslide victory and the establishment of the UMP affected sure enough the orientation of voters two months later for the National Assembly where the President obtained a favourable strong majority of MPs. That said, as legislative elections are the only ones considered to define the outcome, the hypothesis about convergence is not confirmed. Finally, the FN worst electoral performance was made in 2007 when it dropped to 4.3, hence losing 7 percentage points. As showed in the graph, the UMP returned to assume the rather restrictive RPR stance of 1990, while the FN for the first time quitted the rightist extremity of the scale and moderate its position. The gap between the two mainstream parties

⁷⁶ The acronym stands for: "*Union pour un Mouvement Populaire*".

was almost unchanged and leaned towards the right when, at the same time, the FN moderated. This can be at the origin of the National Front big loss of votes.

On to the economic dimension, the National Front has undergone a centripetal turn, moving from a radical to a more moderate pro-market stance. However, its shifting has been less strong than that enacted by the Austrian FPÖ or the Danish DF. Concerning the convergence between the two mainstream parties, the PS and the RPR was closer in 1999 and, afterwards, they moved away at the beginning of the new century. In particular, in 2006 the UMP was on the right side of the FN and Le Pen's party gathered in 2007 a somewhat disappoint percentage at the polls. Trying to sum up what has been said about the two spatial dimension, it seems more evident that, on the one hand, the radicalization of UMP on immigration and, on the other hand, the moderation of the FN on economy, are two processes that do not have profited to the Front National.

Figure 4.L. France: economic scale.



4.6. Germany

The mixed-member PR system in Germany represents a sort of model within electoral systems that seek to combine PR and plurality formula. Indeed, it has been referred to for electoral reform in New Zealand at the beginning of the 1990s and for the election of MPs in the new assemblies of Wales and Scotland. The particular mechanisms of that system are sometimes misunderstood, because of the plurality formula that creates the impression that the electoral system merges proportional and plurality effects in the distribution of seats. On the contrary, the two formulas have a plain proportional output since PR is dominant over plurality in regards to the distribution of seats among parties. Each voter is given a ballot where she/he has the possibility to cast two votes (Saalfeld 2005, 213): the first *Stimme* is for a candidate and the one winning a plurality is elected; the second is a PR-list vote and the voter has to cross the closed *Landesliste* of the preferred political party. Two fundamental features are then to be brought into account to understand the functioning of the system: seats are distributed at the national level and, secondly, the number of seats that each party is entitled to depends on the total percentage gathered in the second vote, i.e. the list vote. A main clause countering the proliferation of small parties is the 5 per cent hurdle, i.e. all parties not able to reach at least 5 per cent of votes at the national level are excluded from seat distribution, unless they have won at least 3 seats in single-member districts (SMDs). It should be noted that even though a party — e.g., the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in the 2002 elections — was not able either to clear the 5 per cent threshold or to win 3 direct mandates, those who won the race in SMDs (one or two candidates) are nevertheless elected as individuals (Saalfeld 2005, 214). Once the parties admitted to the seat distribution are identified, the «LR-Hare method is used to calculate how many seats the parties are entitled to overall. This calculation is based on the total number of second votes for each party at the national level» (Saalfeld 2005, 214). Since party-lists are established at *Land* level, the total amount of seats for each party is distributed among *Länder* on the basis of party-list vote share in each *Land*, deducted the winners in SMDs of the same *Land*. For instance (Saalfeld 2005, 215): in the 2002 election, the CSU vote share was 9.0 per cent and the Bavarian party was entitled to a total of 58 seats; since CSU candidates

had already won a plurality in 43 SMDs, list-seats awarded was 15. Of course, it may be that some parties, especially larger ones, win a plurality in a number of SMDs greater than the total amount of seats to which are entitled to on the basis of list-votes. In that particular instance, the party keeps its over-mandates (*Überhangmandate*) and, for this reason, the assembly (*Bundestag*) is composed of a variable number of MPs. Therefore, the plurality formula plays the role of personalising the vote allowing voters to select one candidate, while PR-list vote makes distribution of seats among parties depending on their relative weights in terms of vote shares.


It seems that the only effective mechanism provided by the electoral system to counter party proliferation is the 5 per cent national clause (i.e., the *Sperrklausel*). However, another fundamental institution has to be taken into account, i.e. the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The *Bundesverfassungsgericht* was established in Karlsruhe in 1951 and its main function is to assess whether bills passed by the Parliament are not in contrast with the Fundamental Law, i.e. the Constitution of Germany. Furthermore, a great prerogative of that Court is the possibility to sentence a party such as unconstitutional, thereby ruling out that party from political competition. In particular, the Court might esteem a party to be “radical” or “extreme” and, in the latter case, that party is considered to be a threat to the democratic order. This is why Germany is sometimes referred to such as a protected democracy. On the one hand, ERPs do not generally support anti-democratic appeals or, at least, they do not overtly claim to overthrow democracy to favour a regime change. On the other hand, those parties may be blamed harshly whether they uphold similar ideas and goals, especially when maintaining a legacy with nazi or fascist movements of the past. The point here is that the presence of a Constitutional Court, whose powers can actually sentence the legal dissolution of a party, is strongly discouraging for those parties whose ideology is rather farer than other political actors. Moreover, the very peculiar history of Germany, i.e. the nazi regime and the tragedy of WWII with the Holocaust, created a thick barrier against any form of resurgence of nostalgic nazi forces. Political actors trying to build an ERP have to face the big hindrance of National Socialism’s shadows, so that their opportunities to enter the party system are very thin. Therefore, the supervision of

the Constitutional Court, both on the extreme left and right, cannot be discarded to understand correctly why in Germany extremist parties have never played any significant role hitherto. To shed light on this, it suffice to remember that in 1955 and 1956 the neo-nazi and, then, the Communist party of West Germany were dissolved since their ideology was not in line with liberal-democratic values. As highlighted also by Sartori (2004), once extreme parties were out of the game, the 5 per cent hurdle thin out easily small parties and only three competitors (CDU-CSU, SPD, and FDP) became relevant for political bargaining in Parliament. In the aftermath, the rise of the Greens and then, after reunification with Eastern Germany, the new party of the radical left (PDS⁷⁷) altered deeply the usual configuration of party system, currently underpinned by 5 relevant parties. On the one hand, this confirms that the electoral system, on its own, is not able to counter, over the 5 per cent barrier, the entry of new actors. On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that an ERP has to face a severe opposition, given the totalitarian legacy of the right in Germany and, as already described, the role of the Constitutional Court as guardian of the democratic regime. For these reason, the institutional settings are not permissive towards new political competitors and the electoral system is not strict proportional (Veugeliers and Magnan 2005; Kitschelt 1995).

Considering party locations, the focus is primarily on immigration and the two ERPs are The Republicans (REP) and the German People's Union (DVU). Data are available from 1990 to 2003 and, as expected, both parties occupy a very extreme right-wing position. What is really noteworthy is the radical position of the CSU in 1990, more on the right than its usual partner (i.e., the CDU). The 1990 CSU score is 0.76 and lower only than the French Gaullist party, while the CDU held a more moderate stance of 0.65. Chapter 2 has already specified that, despite of right-deviancy of CSU in 2002 and 2006 surveys, the Christian Social Union is not an actor belonging to the right-wing radicalism.

⁷⁷ Current name: "The Left" (DL).

Figure 4.M. Germany: immigration scale.




Therefore, in light also of its traditional merging with the CDU into a unified group in the Bundestag, the CSU can be considered as the mainstream right challenger of any ERP. Thus, giving its radical stance, the spatial opportunity structure is narrower than in other party systems and, eventually, not favourable to ERPs. Summing up, REP and DVU together — just for the sake of investigation since party cartels are not allowed to contest elections — gathered 2.4 in 1990; afterwards, they dropped to 1.9 in 1994 and rose to 3.0 in 1998, and the latter is their best electoral performance hitherto. Considering spatial movements of parties, in 1994 the CSU even radicalised its stance, while the contrary in the following period until it overlapped CDU position in 2000. It implies that when the CSU shifted to the right, REP&DVU lost votes and vice versa when the CSU moved back to the left. On the other hand, convergence between mainstream parties did not turn out: considering the average within CDU and CSU points and, then, comparing that to SPD positions, it is plain to see that no real convergence came

along. Yet, in 2006⁷⁸ the SPD assumed a very centrist position, but the CSU moved again to the right, thus balancing the distance between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats as a whole. After the two-year government driven by Angela Merkel, leader of the *Große Koalition*, the REP electoral score in 2008 was lowest than ever, so disconfirming that political convergence of mainstream parties actually fosters ERPs' success.

Turning the focus to the economic domain, in 1999 CDU and SPD converged, while the REP occupied a more pro-market stance. Since 1998 was the best electoral date in electoral terms for REP&DVU, this could bring some evidence to the convergence hypothesis, along with the pro-market stance of REP that, after that period, shifted consistently towards the centre.

Figure 4.N. Germany: economic scale.




⁷⁸ After national elections, a Great Coalition was set up since neither the centre-right nor the centre-left coalitions were able to assemble a majority of seats. It should be noted that SPD and Greens ruled out the possibility of a majoritarian left-wing coalition with *Die Linke*.

4.7. Greece

The Greek electoral system can be classified such as a reinforced proportional system. First of all, voters cast their ballots choosing between closed lists and seats are distributed to parties by a PR-formula and d'Hondt method. Yet, only parties able to poll at least 3 per cent of national votes are entitled to gain representation in the Parliament. The reinforced part of the system is due to the majority of seats awarded to the party winning a plurality of votes. This provision aims at reinforcing governmental stability and favouring one-party governments that have usually been set up. On the one hand, the national threshold is an intermediate level between, for instance, that of Austria and Denmark. On the other hand, the d'Hondt method and the seat bonus for the plurality party bring out disproportionality in the distribution of seats. Summing up, the Greek electoral law produces one-party government and provides a middle-to-low level hurdle to counter excessive party fragmentation. Therefore, it can be conceived as a quite permissive electoral system.


Figure 4.O. Greece: immigration scale.



A major hindrance is that the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), i.e. ERP in the current research, is not included in expert judgments but in 2006. This is understandable since LAOS contested its first national elections in 2004. Since the 1990s, the Greek party system was based on four main parties: on centre-right, the New Democracy (ND) and on the centre-left the Socialist Party (Pasok); furthermore, two parties competed for catching radical left-wing vote: the “old” Communist Party (KKE) and the more recent Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza). Focusing on immigration, after 2003 the ND started shifting towards the centre and in 2006 its stance was just a bit above 6.0, hence a moderate position. This opened the way for the LAOS that, as Chapter 2 highlighted before, occupied an extremist right-wing position. Therefore, the ND movement favoured the strategic entry of new party on its right wing. The two mainstream parties — ND and Pasok — were extremely close to each other, around the centre of immigration scale, in 1990 but at the time no party was able to take advantage of that configuration. After that period, the two mainstream parties moved away and, when LAOS emerged, they were rather far from each other. About immigration, the convergence hypothesis is not thus confirmed.

Turning to the economic dimension, ND and Pasok in 1990 were, on the contrary, rather far and approached only at the beginning of the new century, because of the centripetal movement underwent by the Pasok. As outlined by the graphical representation, the LAOS positioned between them and, therefore, this may be a first hint about the centrist position on economy of ERPs, likewise other political contexts.

Figure 4.P. Greece: economic scale.




4.8. Ireland

The Irish electoral system differentiates neatly from all other European electoral laws since it implies an ordinal vote, rather than a categorical one. Indeed its electoral system does not rest upon party list, like many other PR systems, but it is based on a set of candidates to be ranked by each single voter. Its stability is proven as it «remained unaltered since it was first employed in 1922» (Gallagher 2005, 514). The voter is provided a ballot indicating the data of candidates and their affiliated political party: she/he must rank all candidates from number one to the last one, thereby expressing a full ordering of preference. This system is widely known as Single Transferable Vote (STV) since it is based on a double vote transfer: from the candidate who has already reached the (Droop) quota to be elected and, secondly, from the last candidate in the ranking that is eliminated from competition. The transfer is made taking into account the second, the third, and all subsequent preferences, and repeating the process until all seats are assigned. As noted by Baldini and Pappalardo (2004), the distortion between votes and seats is

rather moderate, even though MDM is 4, thus very small, and this should reduce strongly proportionality. On the same point, Gallagher asks «how does it come about that disproportionality has not been larger?» (Gallagher 2005, 522). The author argues that the answer has to be sought in interparty relations: voters of small parties, in order to prevent the Republican Party (FF) to win an absolute majority, can give to Fianna Fáil candidates a very low position in their orderings of preference, despite of policy positions. As Gallagher clearly states, this result «can be achieved under PR-STV by ranking candidates of all other parties above the Fianna Fáil candidates on the ballot paper» (Gallagher 2005, 522). That said, it is possible to argue that the PR-STV system provides a medium barrier to new competitors' entry in the party system. Given that MDM is even lower than in Spain, the Irish electoral law cannot be catalogued as a strict proportional system (Veugelers and Magnan 2005; Kitschelt 1995).

Another key feature of Irish party politics regards the two main parties — i.e. the already mentioned Fianna Fáil and the Fine Gael (FG) — with special attention to their origins. In fact, the distinction between the Republican Party (FF) and the United Ireland Party (FG) is mainly due to divergences concerning the Anglo-Irish Treaty that created the Irish Free State: the former opposed the Treaty, whereas the second was in favour. Hence, the distinction based on the usual left-right scale, or pro-market versus pro-state, is not promising to interpret Irish politics. Indeed, the graphical representation of the economic axis is line with this expectation: the two parties intersect frequently and in three points in time the Republican Party is less pro-market than the FG. Yet, both parties belong traditionally to the centre-right side, i.e. they are moderately pro-market. However, since its establishment in 1932, the FF has been in power for long periods and only in few intervals the FG seized power in coalition with the Labour Party (LP), the historical third largest party in Irish politics.

Figure 4.Q. Ireland: immigration scale.




The spatial positions of parties on immigration in 1990 appear to have been favourable for the entry of new party on the right-wing side. Indeed, both FF and FG are very close to the centre and only the Progressive Democrats (PD) are more on the right, though rather below 7.0 on the scale. Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s a window for the strategic entry of an ERP was actually present. In the aftermath, the FF radicalized its stance, moving towards its right wing, thus countering the possible entry of a new party. Irish politics has particular features as mentioned earlier and assessing the degree of convergence between mainstream parties is quite troublesome. Indeed, the main alternative is between FF and FG, but these two parties hold rather similar stances on both scales (i.e., economy and immigration). Furthermore, considering the distance between the LP and either FF or FG is not fully appropriate because the Labour Party has always been gathered percentages at the polls strongly lower than the other two parties⁷⁹. Again,

⁷⁹ With the exception of the last 2011 national elections: the FF dropped dramatically and the Labour Party became the second force in Parliament, behind the FG.

considering the distance between FF and FG would yield a strong degree of convergence along both axes, whereas they are considered as alternative by public opinion and in political discourse. However, always with regards to immigration, all parties are clustered around two groups: the first one is composed by the Labour Party, the Greens, and the Sinn Féin⁸⁰; the second one is composed by the Republican Party, the United Ireland Party, and the Progressive Democrats. The two clusters are quite homogeneous, saved in 2006, setting up a bipolar alternative. Therefore, no real convergence is present and, also, given the right-wing shifting of the FF, the ground is not very fertile for the exclusionist right.

Figure 4.R. Ireland: economic scale.



4.9. Italy

The high complexity in analysing Italy is primarily given by the outstanding change that occurred between 1992 and 1994 when major parties, that had been protagonists of Italian politics over almost fifty years, were dismantled after *Mani*

⁸⁰ Expect in 2006 when that party moved to the centre.

pulite's judicial inquiries. The change of electoral system from an almost pure proportional to a mixed plurality-PR formula represented one of the most important changes at the institutional level⁸¹. During the period 1958-1992, the nine legislative elections were held with an electoral system based on a PR-formula, Imperiali quota and an MDM slightly smaller than 20, namely, equal to 19.57 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004, 27). Two legal thresholds were present: to participate in the distribution of seats, a party had to win at least one seat at the constituency level *and* conquer a minimum of 300,000 votes at the national level. These barriers were rather low and useful to prevent an excessive fragmentation of seat distribution to small parties. Considering that MDM was rather high, so that only minor parties were not able to win any seat, the effective threshold can be estimated such as equal to 2 per cent. In 1994, for the first time, legislative elections were held with a new electoral system, combining two different formulas: three fourth of the total amount of seats were assigned by a first-past-the-post rule, while the remaining candidates were elected through a PR-formula with a 4 per cent legal threshold. The procedure to assign seats to candidates was even more complex because of the presence of the so-called *scorporo*: this mechanism was set to balance the disproportional effects of plurality formula, so that parties that were disadvantaged by the "winner-takes-all" principle, could recover some seats with the PR formula. Therefore, the two formulas were not independent from each other unlike other cases, e.g. the current Japanese electoral system. There are two reasons for which the Italian mixed plurality-PR system cannot be considered as a strong mechanism preventing the entry of new parties. Firstly, the first-past-the-post logic was set into a pre-existing fragmented party system. Furthermore, the first Italian party system, established after the end of WWII, suddenly collapsed. About that, it suffice to bear in mind that the Christian Democrats, after about half a century continuously in government, split in several parties: the Democrazia Cristiana was dissolved and its factions formed new centre-right or centre-left parties. This could give only a partial, nonetheless useful, idea about the extent of change of Italian


⁸¹ The other important reform was enacted in 2001 about the re-allocation of competences between State and local authorities. This represented the only Constitutional change, whilst the form of government stayed unaltered.

party system at the beginning of the 1990s. Given the existence of three different political areas, briefly identifiable such as left-wing, centrist or right-wing, parties tended to set common electoral “umbrella” to be more competitive in the first-past-the-post part of the electoral system. This implied that political parties did not undergo, in the majority of cases, a real process of merging, thereby reducing fragmentation; on the contrary, minor parties took advantage of their “blackmail” potential since, in a vast portion of constituencies, their marginal percentage support could be decisive in terms of winning or losing the seat. Moreover, once in Parliament, original parties tend to set up independent Parliamentary groups, assuring greater visibility, discarding political symbols used during the electoral campaign. In a counter-intuitive way, the proportional side of the electoral law represented a higher barrier to small parties for two reasons: on the one hand, the 4 per cent national level threshold contributed to give representation only to about 5-6 parties, excluding small political actors. On the other hand, competitors contested elections under their own logo and list of candidates, without pre-electoral agreements in most cases. That means that the coalition umbrellas were set just for plurality competition and it was exactly there that minor parties gained seats. The mixed system ruled three legislative elections — i.e., 1994, 1996, and 2001 — and was then substituted by a new system that came into force since 2006.

The new electoral system was approved in 2005 under the Berlusconi’s centre-right government, and its basic tenets are the abolishment of plurality formula and the “extension” of PR formula to the election of all national candidates with a complex set of thresholds and a seat-bonus for the winner. On the one hand, parties entering a coalition have to gather at least 2 percent of the national votes to participate in seat distribution, whereas parties competing alone have to overcome a 4 per cent national-level clause. An important exception to the 2 percent threshold is that, within all lists under that barrier, the party with the best electoral score can participate to seat distribution. In other terms, the best “loser” is recovered and, therefore, even parties with a small vote share can gain some seats. On the other hand, the party or the coalition with just a plurality of votes receives a seat bonus up to 340 members in the Lower Chamber. The constituency design kept unaltered and borrowed the same structure applied settled by the PR-formula of the mixed

system. Finally, seat allocation is calculated at the national level using the very proportional method of Hare quota and highest remainders. By and large, the mixed system and the more recent electoral law provide middle-to-low barriers against new competitors. Therefore, they can be both considered as permissive electoral systems.

Figure 4.S. Italy: immigration scale.




Focusing on immigration, in 1990 the strategic entry was actually feasible given that the position of Berlusconi's Forza Italia (FI) was clearly moderate around 6.5. In this study, both AN and MSFT were included in the set of ERPs, while the LN was prudentially ruled out. Yet, all three parties are grounded on the right-wing extreme of the scale, rather far from FI. Checking the evolution of those three actors, AN enacted a slow but continuous moderate shift until 2006 when it approached the FI posture. The more radical MSFT kept substantially its position, while the NL underwent, after an oscillation between 1990 and 2003, a considerable displacement leaving right-wing extremism. The passage to the so-called "Second Republic" between the turbulent period 1992-1994 created a

profound breakpoint from the “old” to “new” party system, and this forcedly represents an obstacle for the present analysis in terms of continuity of political competitors. That said, the AN best electoral performance was realised in 1996 when the Fini’s party reached its peak of 15.7 per cent. As previously said, AN moderated its stance on immigration approaching FI. By and large, the latter kept its rather moderate stance without overstepping the value of 7.0 along the scale. In the long run, this configuration did not profit that much to AN that dropped to an electoral score just above 12 per cent in the 2006 legislative elections. On the other hand, the two Italian mainstream rightist and leftist parties — i.e., FI and PDS/DS — kept a considerable ideological distance in both dimensions. Considering two legislative elections, 2001 and 2006, Forward Italy and the Left Democrats held a sensible distance both on economic and immigration scales, and AN vote share in 2006 is just slightly lower than in 2001. Since the ideological gap between the centre-right and centre-left parties has always been deep, there is no way to test the convergence hypothesis along both axis. Yet, exactly because of this profound distance between, the AN score is eloquent. A particular difference of National Alliance from all other ERPs was its centrist position in the economy since its formal establishment. Therefore, unlike in other contexts as previously described, AN did not start as pro-market party, while it had always sustained a centrist position.

The trend towards FI was actually confirmed when the two parties merged in 2008 into the new People of Freedom party (PdL). Even though no data are available after 2006, an empty space opened on the right-wing side. Actually, the new Storace’s The Right (LD) party joined the MSFT in a cartel that in 2008 gathered 2.4 per cent of the vote. Though that percentage did not suffice to overcome the 4 percent national-level threshold, since the cartel was not part of any coalition, it is important to note an increase in votes when AN dissolved into the new centre-right party. A confirmation of this association is done also by the consistent increase in votes for the NL that double its percentage compared to 2006.


Figure 4.T. Italy: economic scale.



4.10. Netherlands

The Dutch electoral system represents a sort of archetypal of PR-formula. Indeed, seats are distributed at the national level that represents a unique constituency. A legal threshold has to be reached to win seats, though its level equals 0.67 per cent, and this is the lowest legal threshold all over Western Europe. Even though the d'Hondt method is employed to translate votes into seats, the Dutch electoral system is the best institutional setting representing parties in a very proportional way. By consequence, it is straightforward to argue that a similar PR-formula does not prevent the emergence of new competitors among which an ERP. For these reasons, the Dutch electoral law is a strict proportional system.

Figure 4.U. Netherlands: immigration scale.



Examining the multi-party system, two parties emerged as right-deviant along the GAL/TAN dimension as described in Chapter 2: the Centre Democrats (CD) and the Political Reformed Party (SGP). While the former is certainly an ERP, the latter is a borderline case since its ideology is rooted in Christian radicalism⁸². In the Netherlands, the mainstream rightist party is the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)⁸³. In 1990 on immigration, the Christian Democrats stance was clearly on the centre⁸⁴ and, therefore, the political opportunity structure was actually present for the CD that in 1994 gathered a significant 2.4 per cent at the polls. Subsequently, the CDA kept a somewhat moderate position, whilst the Liberals moved further to the right. However, the declining consensus of the CD appears to be due to exogenous factors like its very weak and conflicting internal organisation. The gap between the PvdA — i.e., here assumed as MLP — and CDA was rather consistent and no factual convergence took place. Yet, a particular feature of the


⁸² Thus, it will not be considered in the current subsection.

⁸³ The spatial positions of the Liberals (VVD) will be taken into account in §5.2.

⁸⁴ Instead, the VVD was more radical at 7.0.

Dutch party system on immigration is the unexpected stance of the Socialist Party (SP) that in 1990, 2000, and 2006 expressed a position more on the right than on the left of the political spectrum.

Figure 4.V. Netherlands: economic scale.




Checking the economic dimension, an important point in time in 1999 where the PvdA and CDA converged to the centre. Yet, in 1998 the CD collected a percentage of votes just a barely above 1 per cent. Therefore, this represents an instance disconfirming the convergence hypothesis.

4.11. Portugal

The Parliament of Portugal is composed of four-year term candidates elected by a proportional representation. An important feature of the electoral law is the absence of any legal threshold to win seats. Yet, multi-member constituencies have an MDM of about 12, a middle way between large (like in Italy with the first electoral system) and small constituencies (like in Spain or Ireland). Seats are assigned employing the d'Hondt method and, as widely known, it tends to over-represent large parties to the detriment of small ones. As showed by Baldini and

Pappalardo (2004, 142), the effective threshold is 5.90. Summing up, the Portuguese electoral law can be conceived as a permissive electoral system.

Figure 4.W. Portugal: immigration scale.




As Chapter 2 highlighted earlier, Portuguese party system does not display any proper ERP. However, in all three surveys (Steenbergen and Marks 2007) the Social and Democratic Centre-People's Party⁸⁵ (CDS-PP) resulted such as the most right-deviant along the GAL/TAN dimension. Since the People's Party is member of the homologue European group cannot be considered as an ERP. Considering immigration, in the last decade of the 20th century, a favourable configuration of party positions was actually present. Indeed, the mainstream rightist party's placement — the Social Democratic Party (PSD) — was just slightly at the right of the centre, while the PP was more radical around 6.5 on the scale. Therefore, in that decade the political opportunity structure was convenient for a new exclusionist right actor. In the aftermath, the PP gradually shifted towards the right, almost

⁸⁵ Henceforth, it is referred to simply as People's Party.

reaching 8.0, whereas the two mainstream party of the left (PS) and the right (PSD) approached to the centre. Hence, when convergence created a favourable context for an ERP, its potential uprising was hampered by the PP radical stance.

Figure 4.X. Portugal: economic scale.



In economy, saved in 1999, the distance between PS and PSD is rather evident, whilst the PP has always kept a neat pro-market stance. That said, an ERP might eventually emerge in the future on two conditions: the adoption of very extremist stance on immigration and a centrist position in economy. In fact, the only chance for collecting votes is trying to differentiate from the People's Party posture.

4.12. Spain

The Spanish electoral system, despite belonging to the PR group, carries out strong majoritarian effects. Thus, it witnesses well how even PR formulas can yield a consistent distortion in the process of transformation of votes into seats. Its main feature is the very small MDM, indeed multi-member constituencies are generally assigned a mean number of candidates lower than 7. Moreover, whether Madrid and Barcelona large districts are excluded, the mean average district magnitude

decreases around 5 (Baldini and Pappalardo 2004). Seats are distributed at the local-district level and a party has to reach at least 3 per cent of votes (at that level) to win seats. Thus, a legal threshold is actually in force, even though its role is eventually minor since the effective threshold to win seats is dependent on the district magnitude. As highlighted by Baldini and Pappalardo (2004, 142), the effective threshold is 10.20 per cent, hence markedly higher than the legal one. This features make the electoral system particularly suitable for larger parties, whose consensus is widely spread all over the country, and for small parties whose vote shares are notably concentrated in thin areas like regions, i.e. in the Autonomy Communities of Spain. On the contrary, those parties that have a consensus from middle to low percentages, without any specific geographical concentration, are meant to be seriously under-represented. Indeed, larger parties — like the Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Worker's Party (PSOE) — are over-represented, i.e. they usually gain a percentage of seats greater than the percentage of votes; on the other hand, regional parties generally win a number of seats that is substantially proportional to their amount of votes. Instead, the United Left (IU) is strongly under-represented: even though its vote share has been around 4-5 per cent, the party is not able to win seats at the local level since those are generally won by the two largest parties. Moreover, the IU does not have any particular area where its vote share is outstanding compared to other constituencies. By consequence, the emergence of an ERP is severely hampered, saved whether its electorate would be particularly condensed in some constituencies. Yet, the electoral system is not permissive and represents a major obstacle to the entry of new competitors, at least without a regional-based political platform.

Spatial positions of parties on immigration shed light on obstacles towards the entry of new parties. As showed, in 1990 the position of the Popular Party was over 7.0 and in 2003 was even further on the right over 8.0 on the scale. The respective distance towards the PSOE has been always consistent and particularly deep in 2003. In a nutshell, the PP radical stance on immigration and the absence of convergence with the Socialists are not favourable configurations for ERPs to emerge. The data about DN and FE-JONS spatial positions are available only for the last decade of the 20th century: as showed by the graphic, they expressed a very

radical stance between 9.0 and 10.0, but their electoral scores were *de facto* negligible.

The Popular Party stance in economy is evidently pro-market and more rightist than other mainstream Christian Democratic parties. The only point in time when the two mainstream parties are relatively close to each other was in 1999 when especially the Socialists converged to the centre. About economic positions, unfortunately no data are available for extreme right parties.

Figure 4.Y. Spain: immigration scale.






Figure 4.Z. Spain: economic scale.



4.13. Sweden

The Swedish electoral system employs a PR-formula and, unlike other Scandinavian countries described earlier, political parties need to gather at least 4 per cent of the national vote to entry Parliament. That legal threshold is rather high, considering that in Denmark is only 2 per cent and in Finland is totally absent. The method used to distribute seat is the modified St. Laguë that, considering the degree of disproportionality, is more proportional than the d'Hondt method and less proportional than the pure St. Laguë one. Computations to assign seats to parties take place at the national level and this increases proportionality. Briefly, the Swedish electoral system provides a middle hurdle for parties to gain seats, on the wave of the Austrian electoral law, but cannot be conceived as permissive.


Figure 4.AA. Sweden: immigration scale.



In the analysis of right-deviancy along the GAL/TAN dimension, the Christian Democrats (KD) resulted as the farer party along that axis. However, KD is member of the European People's Party, thus it was ruled out from the exclusionist right group. On the other hand, the New Democracy party (NyD) was considered in the literature as a party ideologically compatible with right-wing radicalism. Even though it is not conceived as an ERP by the current research, it appears appropriate to mention briefly its electoral performances. Its major breakthrough was in the 1991 elections when NyD gathered an outstanding 6.7 per cent and entered the *Riksdag*. Examining party positions on immigration, this result is not surprising. Indeed, the stance of the Moderate Party (M) — i.e., the mainstream rightist party — was equal to 6.0, thus leaving a profitable empty space on its right wing for the entry of new more radical competitor. The Moderates moved just slightly to the right in 2000 but, in the aftermath, they assumed an even more centrist position than before. Nevertheless, the NyD was not able to profit of this trend and, on the contrary, it dissolved by the end of the last century after declining electoral scores. This is probably due to exogenous factors that are not considered in this study, in

particular a weak organisation that brought about internal quarrels. That said, in 2006 the position of all parties, but the radical left, was clustered around the centre: this implies that the electoral breakthrough of an ERP is always viable. That expectation has found evidence in the 2010 elections when the Sweden Democrats (SD) conquered a crucial 6.2 per cent. They entered Parliament and acquired a relevant role since the centre-right government, leaded by the Moderate Party, is not backed by an absolute majority of seats.

Figure 4.AB. Sweden: economic scale.




Examining the economic dimension, parties are more far away from each other. The economic platforms of Social Democrats and Moderates are very different and the 2006 configuration reflects the setting of two blocks, i.e. centre-right and centre-left. Thus, convergence is absent and the only information about NyD is its pro-market stance in 1999, while no data are available for the Sweden Democrats.

4.14. *United Kingdom*

The Westminster model is underpinned by the plurality electoral system, where in each uninominal district the winner takes all. Namely, the candidate who gathers just a plurality in her/his district is elected, whereas votes given to all other candidates, from the second to the last one, are “wasted”, i.e. they are not represented in Parliament. As Duverger noted (1958), the plurality system tends to produce a two-party system at the district level, since in each constituency only two candidates hold real chances to win the seat. Electors who are aware of this structure of competition will tend to vote strategically for the candidate who had more possibilities to defeat the candidate farer from their ideal point. When this holds true, the plurality brings about a psychological effect on the voter, while the mechanical effect of the electoral system is due, as said above, to the first-past-the-post logic of seat distribution. According to this reasoning, the entry of new competitors in the political arena appears very difficult, since parties already existing for many decades have acquired a comparative advantage than potential new parties that are unknown to the electorate. Furthermore, gaining credit towards the electorate as competitors with chances of winning seat is not an easy job for a hypothetical ERP. As outlined by Sartori (2004), the plurality system is able to yield a two-party system at the national level only when party system is structured and no incoercible ethnic or religious minorities are present. The second *caveat* shed light on countries like Canada and India displaying, despite the plurality formula, a truly multi-party system. Thus, in the United Kingdom, as long as the plurality system will be in force, the possibility for new competitors to gain MPs in the House of Commons is restricted and viable only by holding a majoritarian consensus in some area of the countries. This appears the only real chance that they hold to win some seats in those districts where their consensus is strongly greater than in others. Hence, once the two-party system is deeply rooted, the plurality formula wields a strong freezing effect at the district level (Sartori 2004) and constitutes a formidable obstacle to the rise of an ERP. The plurality system is sure enough the least permissive electoral law.

Figure 4.AC. United Kingdom: immigration scale.




Moreover, examining party positions on immigration, the Conservative Party held a radical position all along the last decade of the 20th century. This forced the BNP to place itself on the very extreme right. In 2006, the Conservatives' stance on the topic was even further on the right and, again, the UKIP was pushed on the right wing limits of the axis. It should be reminded that the UKIP is considered like a borderline case in the exclusionist right group, whilst no more data are available for the BNP both in 2003 and 2006 and is not included in the set under investigation. Its very thin electoral scores appear to have been very affected by electoral barriers and the radical stance of the Conservatives.

Concerning positions on economy, the BNP data are absent, whereas are available for the UKIP in 1999 and 2006. That party have held a very pronounced pro-market stance, more than the Conservative Party. After the Thatcher era, the Tories moderated sensibly their stance, abandoning their radical neo-liberal economic platform. Yet, the distance in regards to the Labour Party appears to be significant, with the partial exception of 1999 when they positioned closer than in other points in time. On the other hand, the Labour Party underwent an evident

right-wing turn on immigration until 2006, when its stance around 6.5 is generally more usual for a rightist than a leftist mainstream party. However, the convergence took place on the right-wing side of the political spectrum, and not on the centre, hence this does not seem a favourable contingency for ERPs.

Figure 4.AD. United Kingdom: economic scale.



5. DATA EXAMINATION

5.1. Strategic entry

The first step is based onto the political opportunity structure framework. Indeed, the aim here is to estimate the extent of a potential empty space for an ERP to enter the immigration scale. Therefore, the spatial positions of political parties along that dimension in 1990 are brought into account. In particular, the focus points to the first time period for which data are available. Besides, while in some countries ERPs were already active, the beginning of the 1990s is by all means a crucial stage. In fact, after 1989 stunning changes — i.e., the fading of the Cold War, the collapse of the Communist block in Eastern Europe, and the breakdown

USSR — politics entered a new era. Furthermore, the economic downfall of communism and the prevalence of the liberal-democratic model triggered a sensible mutation of party struggle. In fact, cultural and value conflicts could receive greater attention since the communist threat has been practically extinguished. Thereby, as already argues in Chapter 1, the antagonism between pro-state and pro-market competitors loosened, while globalisation soared as the new world wide social phenomenon.

Hence, the following table reports the spatial position on the immigration scale of the mainline rightist party in each country. More specifically, the latter one generally is either a current European People's Party member — namely, part of the Christian Democratic family⁸⁶ — or a Liberal party and, therefore, generally associated to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. As commonly known, the three European traditional mainstream party families are: the Socialists and Social Democrats on the left; the Christian Democrats and the Liberals on the right, even though the liberal-democratic parties have a greater variance of postures inside their group.

Table 4.3. Strategic entry: 1990 scores on immigration scale.

Country	Party	Family	Score
Austria	ÖVP	Christian Democrats	0.56
Belgium/FI	VVD	Liberals	0.69
Belgium/Wa	PRL	Liberals	0.72
Denmark	V	Christian Democrats	0.63
Finland	KOK	Christian Democrats	0.52
France	RPR	Gaullist	0.78
Germany	CDU/CSU ⁸⁷	Christian Democrats	0.67
Greece	ND	Christian Democrats	0.53
Ireland	FF	Liberals	0.72
Italy	FI (1995)	Christian Democrats	0.65
Netherlands	VVD	Liberals	0.71


⁸⁶ Actually, some insider *nuances* deserve to be mentioned. The French RPR is on the wake of Gaullist tradition. Although belonging to the centre-right area, its ideological tenets cannot be simply reduced to Christian Democratic values. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party too has a peculiar history and specificity making it different from all other usual confessional parties of continental Europe. Finally, Berlusconi's Forza Italia borrowed a consistent part of its cadres from the defunct Democrazia Cristiana, though its personal imprinting and leadership created a charismatic party able to round up many former liberals and social democrats. Beyond their historical backgrounds, all three parties are antagonists of socialists and left-wing democratic parties.

⁸⁷ The Christian Social Union is further on the right than the Christian Democratic Union, its larger partner in the *Bundestag*, with a score of 0.76 compared to 0.65. Since the former contest general elections just in Bavaria, the final score reported in the table equals the mean scores of two parties, so that avoiding the over-estimation of considering just the CSU's stance.

Portugal	PSD	Christian Democrats	0.55
Spain	PP	Christian Democrats	0.72
Sweden	M	Christian Democrats	0.60
United Kingdom	Cons	Conservatives	0.71

Descriptive statistics of party scores return 0.65 (mean) and 0.67 (median). Since party scores range from 0 to 1, the mean is an appropriate cut-off point to divide cases presenting a favourable spatial opportunity structure for ERPs. Namely, all political parties whose posture is equal or inferior to the median position, actually left a profitable empty space on their right-wing that might stimulate the entry of a new ERP competitor.

Figure 4.AE. Bar chart about 1990 immigration scores.



The figure below helps representing the overall situation, with the Flemish Liberal party (VVD) in the median position and the vertical line representing the fixed threshold. All parties over the median position are positioned so as the entry of new right-wing challenger is discouraged. Among them, the only country where an ERP currently exist and is electorally successful — and already had a prominent role at that point in time, i.e. the National Front — is France where the Gaullist

party expressed a firm rightist posture just a bit lower than 0.8. This may be due to the early relevance of the FN that, in the 1984 European elections and in 1986 general elections, made spectacular inroads, thereby forcing the Gaullist to a reaction. Actually, the so-called French “Republican” right very soon was compelled to enact a strategy to counter the expansion of the Front National: The political struggle between the “two rights” is still nowadays a crucial factor in French politics. The Spanish Popular Party as well is neatly on the right, but this is hardly surprising since, as already mentioned above, the mainline rightist party in Spain is the result of the movement from the right to the centre of *Alianza Popular*, a political actor that absorbed other moderate centrist parties. Within the group of parties over the median, there are three Liberal actors, i.e. in Wallonia, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Summing up, French RPR is the only case that goes markedly counter the theoretical expectation issue from political opportunity structure framework.

On the other hand, considering Flanders as the median position, together with Italy, Denmark, and Austria above theoretical expectations are satisfied. Indeed, those four countries have electorally successful ERP and in 1990 their respective mainline rightist parties had a posture on immigration below the threshold. This is particularly true in the Austrian party system where the ÖVP stand at the right of the centre. The Haider’s escalation to party leadership dated just four years early and the FPÖ was still a member of the Liberal International until 1993 expulsion. The very moderate posture of the Christian Democrats is then comprehensible. Nevertheless, in the same group, there are also countries without successful ERPs, especially Sweden, Portugal, Finland, and Greece, even though in the last two cases ERPs have been recently able to increase their support.

With the exception of France, the moderate position of mainline rightist parties is necessary condition.

5.2. *Party convergence*

The very first stage concerns the identification of the so-called Mainstream Rightist Parties (MRPs) within each party system. That label refers to the party(-ies) that can be considered as leader(s) in the centre-right area because of their spatial positions and electoral vote shares. However, the task is intricate in some


political context. Indeed, while the centre-left segment is usually presided over by a Socialist/Social Democratic party⁸⁸, the setting is trickier in the centre-right interval. In fact, in some of the countries here at stake, Christian democratic and Liberal parties compete for the supremacy. Moreover, a clear-cut bipolar competition is not always present. In other terms, party configuration is not necessarily structured around two opposite blocks leaded, respectively, by an MLP and MRP whose supremacy cannot be credibly challenged by their allies. The baseline of the investigation is drawn upon Kitschelt⁸⁹ whose list is composed of major moderate left and right parties whose average electoral support in the 1980s was at least equal to 15 percent. In regard to the leftist area, the only change is about Portugal where the major moderate actor is the Socialist Party. Indeed, even though the parties of the so-called post-materialist and libertarian “New Left” — e.g., the Left Block or the Unitarian Democratic Coalition — have a notable strength, in the last two decades the Socialists are by all means the dominant party of the centre-left area. On the other hand, more significant changes are made to the centre-right counter-part.

The first troublesome case is Belgium, here analysed separately into its two main regions. As already mentioned, pillars underpin Belgian politics (and society) and the focus is on the Christian Democratic and the Liberal ones. In Flanders, there are two major actors located in centre-right: the Christian Democrats (CD&V) and the Liberals (VLD). On the one hand, the more right-wing party, both along the economic and immigration scales, is the VLD, though the role played by the CD&V cannot be put aside. This is further confirmed by electoral trends, since the Christian Democrats have held the largest vote share in the last two decades. By calculating the mean percentage at the polls, the CD&V reached 15.13 percent, while the VLD 12.52. The following graph highlights that the latter overstepped slightly the former within the interval 1999-2003. In light of this situation, the choice of considering both parties as MRP(s) appears consistent.

⁸⁸ Namely, a party that at present is member of the “Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats” (S&D) in the European Parliament.


⁸⁹ See footnote of Table 2.2 (Kitschelt 1995, 54).

Figure 4.AF. Flanders: CD&V and VLD electoral trends (1991-2010).




In Wallonia, the setting is rather different: although the Christian Democratic and the Liberal parties are important players, the Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH) is a small party whose vote share never overstepped 10 per cent at the federal level and the mean vote percentage is 6.43. On the other hand, the Liberals (MR) has gathered a larger average (10.28 per cent) and has always kept their electoral supremacy over the Christian Democrats. Moreover, the MR is the most right-wing party on both dimensions here at stakes. Given the actual gap of electoral strength between the two parties, the current analysis will consider only the francophone Liberals as MRP. Indeed, the goal is to maintain parsimony and, therefore, the general principle is that the MRP is unique. Party systems featured by two MRPs are to be considered as exceptions and adequately motivated like in Flanders and in the Netherlands (as explained later on by this subsection).

Figure 4.AG. Wallonia: MR and CDH electoral trends (1991-2010).



About Denmark, Kitschelt (1995) considered the Conservative Party (KF) as the mainline rightist party and that choice is upheld by the primacy over the Liberals during the 1980s. However, at the beginning of the 1990s a shift in the balance of power between the two parties occurred. In particular, in the 1994 elections the *Venstre* (V) overstepped the KF for more than 8 percentage points. Since that time onwards, the Liberals has consolidated their unchallengeable supremacy in the centre-right area. It is straightforward to consider the *Venstre* as MRP, also in accordance with right-wing spatial position. More precisely, V and KF hold an average position of 0.76 on economy, while on immigration V is a little more rightist on average than KF (i.e., 0.72 compared to 0.71).

Figure 4.AH. Denmark: V and KF electoral trends (1990-2007).




Some doubts may be arisen in relation to Finland because of the presence of KESK and KOK. However, the former agrarian party has recently evolved in a centrist-liberal party. More in details, the KESK has a mean score on economy equal to 0.51 and on immigration equal to 0.55. On the other hand, the KOK is evidently more right wing on average, i.e., 0.76 on economy and 0.56 on immigration. Thus, it appears opportune to take into account the latter as MRP, since it put forth a political platform alternative to that of the Socialists. In this case, again, the present investigation sticks with Kitschelt's selection (1995).

About Ireland, as already explained early, the main problem is that the overall left-right scale does not really fit Irish politics. In particular, this holds true in relation to the competition between FF and FG, two parties with very similar profiles in terms of economic and immigration tenets. That said and considering that the Labour Party has usually allied with the Fine Gael to form executives (like after the very recent 2011 elections), the Fianna Fáil is selected as MRP.

Finally, in the Netherlands, there is a configuration similar to that previously described about Flanders. Two main parties belong to the centre-right area: the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Liberals (VVD). With regard to economy,

VVD is clearly more pro-market than CDA (respectively, average scores are 0.81 and 0.60) and the same in relation to immigration (respectively, average scores are 0.76 and 0.56). However, electoral trends emphasize that CDA has had a largest average vote share in the 1989-2010 time period, i.e. 22.9 and 18.8 percent. During the second half of the 1990s, the Liberals were able to overstep their competitors and the same happened in the 2010 general elections. Saved these situations, the Christian Democrats have held the primacy in the centre-right area: e.g., in the 2002 general elections the CDA outdistanced the VVD with more than 12 percentage points. In analogy with Flanders, both parties are taken into account as MRP.

Figure 4.AI. Netherlands: CDA and VVD electoral trends (1989-2010).



In conclusion, German CDU and CSU are sometimes considered as a single party and, in other cases, as two distinct parties. Here, the choice has fallen onto the first option and party scores with electoral vote shares are employed to determine the spatial coordinates of the new CDU&CSU political player. More precisely, CDU and CSU spatial positions, on both dimensions, are weighted with their respective percentage of votes, polled in the closest election. The calculation of

weighted means is congruous since the two parties — that usually form one single party group in Parliament — have not the same electoral strength. Indeed, in terms of power relation, the Christian Democratic Union has more relative power than their Bavarian allies.

Table 4.4. Germany: CDU&CSU scores on economic and immigration scales.

	<i>Economy</i>				<i>Immigration</i>			
surveys	1992	1999	2003	2006	1990	2000	2003	2006
CDU	0.66	0.57	0.71	0.68	0.65	0.68	0.72	0.77
CSU	-	0.65	0.66	0.65	0.76	0.79	0.73	0.87
elections	1994	1998	2002	2005	1990	1998	2002	2005
CDU	34.2	28.4	29.5	27.8	36.7	28.4	29.5	27.8
CSU	-	6.7	9.0	7.4	7.1	6.7	9.0	7.4
CDU&CSU	0.66	0.59	0.70	0.67	0.67	0.70	0.72	0.79

Summing up, the following table provide the comprehensive list of MRP and MLP for each European country.

Table 4.5. Mainstream Rightist and Leftist Parties.

Country	MRP	MLP
Austria	ÖVP	SPÖ
Belgium/Flanders	PVV/VLD; CD&V	SP
Belgium/Wallonia	PRL/MR	PS
Denmark	V	S
Finland	KOK	SDP
France	RPR/UMP	PS
Germany	CDU&CSU	SPD
Greece	ND	PASOK
Ireland	FF	LABOUR
Italy	FI	PDS/DS
Netherlands	VVD; CDA	PvdA
Portugal	PSD	PS
Spain	PP	PSOE
Sweden	M	SAP
UK	CONS	LABOUR

To determine the size of the spatial gap between the mainstream right and left parties, it is sufficient to calculate the difference between MRP and MLP scores for each of the four survey values, along both dimensions. Then, the two final average scores are the mean of the four distances. With regards to Flanders and the Netherlands, given the presence of two MRPs, the party interval is calculated twice and, afterwards, a final average score of them is computed. For instance, in Flanders, firstly the spatial gap is calculated between VLD and SP and, secondly, between CD&V and SP. The two resulting values are employed to compute a

comprehensive mean score. The aim of this analysis is assessing the degree of convergence between mainstream parties and, in analogy with Chapter 3, binary values are attributed to countries to signal when convergence is present [1] or absent [0]. Needless to say, the big hindrance is assessing when convergence actually turned out, i.e. the theoretical difficulty lies in the identification of a threshold under which convergence is present. In other terms, since party distances are here at stakes, this investigation needs to fix a cut-off point under which MRP and MLP are sufficiently close to state that they converged.

On the economic scale, the mean and the median are very close to each other. Values are distributed in a way that the assignment of [1] and [0] scores are troublesome. From Finland (0.44) upwards, mainstream parties are on average enough far to state that convergence is absent. On the other hand, from Netherlands (0.35) downwards, mainstream parties are on average rather close to state that convergence is present. On a middle ground, there five cases whose situation is less straightforward to evaluate: Flanders (0.37), France and Spain (0.38), Denmark and UK (0.39). However, the inclusion of VLD has increased the Flemish mean, while considering only CD&V that value is much lower. Moreover, Flanders are above the median and, for these reasons, convergence is evaluated as absent, whereas in all other four cases is coded as present [1].

Table 4.6. Economy: score distance between MRP and MLP.

Country	1992	1999	2003	2006		E_AV	E_CONV
Austria	0.15	0.20	0.38	0.40		0.28	1
Belgium/FI	0.54	0.45	0.48	0.53	0.50	0.37	1
	0.28	0.27	0.11	0.30	0.24		
Belgium/Wa	0.54	0.44	0.49	0.43		0.47	0
Denmark	0.44	0.43	0.39	0.30		0.39	0
Finland	0.44	0.48	0.39	0.44		0.44	0
France	0.38	0.29	0.38	0.49		0.38	0
Germany	0.37	0.18	0.26	0.33		0.29	1
Greece	0.36	0.20	0.21	0.27		0.26	1
Ireland	0.38	0.17	0.38	0.25		0.29	1
Italy	0.42	0.40	0.57	0.47		0.47	0
Netherlands	0.61	0.30	0.46	0.43	0.45	0.35	1
	0.41	0.09	0.27	0.20	0.24		
Portugal	0.28	0.16	0.31	0.22		0.24	1
Spain	0.42	0.21	0.49	0.40		0.38	0
Sweden	0.49	0.42	0.56	0.47		0.48	0
UK	0.62	0.28	0.38	0.26		0.39	0
<i>mean</i>						0.37	
<i>median</i>						0.38	

The investigation of the immigration scale appears more clear-cut, because of the “break” between Flemish and Dutch scores. Taking into account that the mean is 0.25, the median 0.22, and the standard deviation 0.082, the difference between Flanders (0.22) and the Netherlands (0.28) equal 0.6. By sorting countries in a decreasing order, convergence on immigration is stated as absent [0] from the Netherlands upwards, while converged occurred [1] from Flanders downwards.

Table 4.7. Immigration: score distance between MRP and MLP.

Country	1990	2000	2003	2006		I_AV	I_CONV
Austria	0.14	0.04	0.25	0.30		0.18	1
Belgium/FI	0.29	0.23	0.41	0.24	0.29	0.22	1
	0.15	0.10	0.13	0.21	0.15		
Belgium/Wa	0.37	0.27	0.22	0.28		0.29	0
Denmark	0.28	0.22	0.19	0.10		0.20	1
Finland	0.23	0.24	0.26	0.02		0.19	1
France	0.46	0.37	0.32	0.33		0.37	0
Germany	0.30	0.28	0.36	0.25		0.30	0
Greece	0.02	0.20	0.28	0.31		0.20	1
Ireland	0.37	0.32	0.42	0.11		0.30	0
Italy	0.44	0.38	0.53	0.37		0.43	0
Netherlands	0.37	0.33	0.42	0.38	0.38	0.28	0
	0.17	0.15	0.20	0.22	0.18		
Portugal	0.19	0.14	0.24	0.11		0.17	1
Spain	0.26	0.32	0.48	0.25		0.33	0
Sweden	0.14	0.14	0.19	0.09		0.14	1
UK	0.27	0.18	0.25	0.15		0.21	1
mean						0.25	
median						0.22	

5.3. Comparative Analysis

The country-by-country analysis described in section 4 has already tackled the most important features of the electoral systems. At present, the aim is to classify them in accordance with their degree of “permissiveness”, i.e. whether their structure provides a strong or weak barrier in preventing small parties or new challengers to enter the party system. Thus, legal and effective thresholds and the mean district magnitude (MDM) are crucial tools to that purpose. It is worth noting that in Belgium and Spain local the legal threshold is lower than the effective threshold, hence the last one is indicated in the table, while in Germany the number of members in the *Bundestag* is variable. The related binary values are obtained through a comprehensive qualitative assessment.

Table 4.8. Electoral systems: thresholds and MDM values.

Country	Threshold	MDM
Austria	4	20.30
Belgium/FI	9.2	7.50
Belgium/Wa	9.2	7.50
Denmark	2	175
Finland	5.4	13.21
France	12.5	1
Germany	5	620.20
Greece	3	5.30
Ireland	16.96	3.81
Italy	4	155
Netherlands	0.67	150
Portugal	5.9	12.70
Spain	10.2	6.73
Sweden	4	349.18
UK	35	1

Note: Legal threshold in bold characters.

Source: MDM values are drawn from Baldini and Pappalardo 2004.

The following table reports all binary scores employed in the csQCA analysis and the outcome has been dichotomised by resorting again to the 5 per cent hurdle (see Table 3.6).

Table 4.9. Binary values.

Country	OUCTOME	ELSYS	E_CONV	I_CONV
Austria	1	0	1	1
Belgium/FI	1	0	1	1
Belgium/Wa	0	0	0	0
Denmark	1	1	0	1
Finland	0	1	0	1
France	1	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	1	0
Greece	0	1	1	1
Ireland	0	0	1	0
Italy	1	1	0	0
Netherlands	0	1	1	0
Portugal	0	1	1	1
Spain	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	1
UK	0	0	0	1

It is plain to see that there are no necessary conditions, i.e. conditions that are always present [1] when the outcome is present [1]. For the search of sufficient conditions it is very useful to made up the truth table, whose lines represent configuration of causal conditions for which at least one real case exists. The usefulness of the truth table regards identification, if any, of group of countries sharing a common configuration of conditions and, on the other hand, contradictory


configurations where countries sharing the same configuration display divergent outcomes.

Table 4.10. Truth table.

ELSYS	E_CONV	I_CONV	OUTCOME	COUNTRY
0	1	1	1	Austria, Belgium/Fl
0	0	0	C	Belgium/Wa, France, Spain
1	0	1	C	Denmark, Finland
0	1	0	0	Germany, Ireland
1	1	1	0	Greece, Portugal
1	0	0	1	Italy
1	1	0	0	Netherlands
0	0	1	0	Sweden, UK

The overall situation can be better represented through a Venn diagram as follows:

Figure 4.AJ. Three-condition Venn diagram.



Note: Venn diagram produced by Tosmana 1.3.2 software (Cronqvist 2011).

Abbreviations: AUS: Austria, BEL(FL): Belgium/Flanders, BEL(WA): Belgium/Wallonia, DEN: Denmark, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, GER: Germany, GRE: Greece, IRE: Ireland, ITA: Italy, NET: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SPA: Spain, SWE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom.

Firstly, cases with a positive outcome [1] are brought into account. In terms of electoral strength of ERPs, Austria and Flanders hold a major relevance and they share the same combination of causal conditions. Indeed, both countries do not

have a permissive electoral system: although grounded in the PR formula, their respective electoral systems are equipped, as already described, with barriers countering the entry of new political players. In terms of party spatial positions, MRP and MLP have held a reciprocal means below the average with respect to the European mean level. Thus, convergence theory receives confirmation in those two countries. In Austria, along the economic scale, the trend about the MRP and MLP distance has been increasing for the entire period analysed. However, that gap has been very low during the 1990s and the same is true also in relation to immigration where MRP –MLP divide was only 0.4. It is worth noting that in 1999 the FPÖ realized its major electoral breakthrough. In Flanders, complexity is given by the presence of two MRP. Considering the more right-wing between the, i.e. the Flemish Liberals, the distance is strong on economy but just over the mean on immigration. Moreover, the MRP-MRL gap on immigration is below the mean in two occasions, i.e. in 2000 and 2006. On the other hand, taking the Christian Democrats as MRP, the divide with the Socialists is always weak, especially on immigration: e.g., in 2000 that difference equals just 0.10. Summing up, in Flanders party positions on immigration appears to play a more important role with reference to the VB electoral strength.

A more problematic instance is the Italian configuration of conditions. Firstly, three different electoral systems have been employed from 1990 to 2006. Furthermore, several main parties were dissolved during the turbulent period 1992-1994. These are two major reasons why Italy has a very different situation from all other countries in the set that did not undergo profound changes in terms of electoral laws and political actors. Since party proliferation has been increasing from the 1994 elections onwards, the electoral systems have been proved inefficient in providing sufficient barriers to contain party fragmentation. On the other hand, in terms of party spatial locations, no convergence occurred neither on economic nor on immigration scales. For the sake of clarity it is useful to analyse the mixed electoral system employed in three elections (1994, 1996, and 2001). Even though three fourth of total seats were assigned with a plurality formula, elections were contested by two coalitions internally made of several parties. Therefore, fragmentation was embedded *a priori* into coalitions. Moreover, these were based

on a larger party with their minor allies and the former played as a pivot in bargaining with its party partners the distribution of candidates in all 475 districts. These negotiations were necessarily based on the electoral reciprocal support of the pivot party compared to its allies. Thus, although strongly majoritarian, the electoral system has been handled to produce proportional effects, at least within coalitions. The style of communication and political competition was strongly adversarial for several accounts, among which, the harshly contested political role of the media-tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and the lack of consistent party alternation in the national government; indeed, about this second aspect, for about half a century the Christian Democrats have uninterruptedly ruled the country (with the Socialists and other small parties), while the Communists and the MSI as well suffered the *conventio ad excludendum* preventing them to participate in national governments. The DC-PCI gap, after the dissolution of both parties, was renewed between Forza Italia (FI) and the Left Democrats (DS), namely, the main heirs of the two cultural traditions in Italy, i.e. the Catholic and the communist. This depicts a pattern where the two pivot parties of their political camps use to struggle in a deeply conflicting way. The confirmation of this attitude comes from the absence of convergence between FI and DS. Then, the Italian case does not fit theoretical expectations stemming from the convergence hypothesis.

Secondly, the truth table displays two contradictory configurations. The first one involves France that is placed in the group with Wallonia and Spain. It is plain to see that the French position is not in line with causal mechanisms here at stakes. Indeed, its configuration is made up of the absence of all three conditions. Likewise Italy, France presents an adversarial bipolar competition underpinned on the rivalry between the Socialists with other minor parties of the *gauche* and the republican right founded by de Gaulle. The PS and RPR have always been far from each other, especially on immigration. Hence, the settlement of a “third pole” on the right, embodied by the National Front, has been proved strong as much as to survive and develop despite unfavourable conditions from the supply side point of view. Neither the electoral system has advantaged Le Pen’s party, on the contrary the double-round voting system has deprived the FN of many seats that it would had collected with a less disproportional electoral system. This fact has been

documented in the 1986 parliamentary elections ruled by a PR formula with 5 per cent national threshold. Thus, France represent a deviant case in terms of supply side factors since the National Front, considered also such as a sort of archetypal of radical right party, has managed to survive and prosper despite institutional and party factors are neatly adverse.

The second contradictory configuration joins Denmark with Finland. Two conditions are present, i.e. permissive electoral system and convergence between MRP and MLP on immigration, and one in absent, MRP and MLP are not convergent on economy. Since two conditions are positively set, the electoral strength of the Danish People's Party (DF) is explained by a PR system without relevant barriers preventing party fragmentation, combined with a convenient opportunity structure on immigration. Of course, the last one is the favourite issue exploited by ERPs. In accordance to this, the weak electoral support of the True Finns (PS) in Finland goes counter theoretical expectation, even though the electoral trend is increasing.

On the whole, three out of five countries where the outcome is positive [1] have two conditions that are present [1] and in all those three cases (Austria, Denmark, and Flanders) MRP and MLP converged on immigration. On the other hand, Italy and especially France do not satisfy the hypothesis, in particular in both instances MRP and MLP are not convergent in any dimension here analysed.

That said, the focus is shifted towards cases whose outcome is absent [0]. Starting from the analysis of electoral systems, four cases do not have permissive electoral system: Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Yet, in the first two countries a convergence occurred on economy, but not on immigration, whereas the other way around for the last two cases. Then, in the Netherlands the situation is more complicated. As widely knows, the Dutch electoral system is extremely permissive and its degree of proportionality is almost pure. This is associated with a convergence on economy, but not on immigration. Therefore, it is possible to argue that although two conditions are present, the absence of convergence on immigration had a major impact on impeding the rise of a strong ERP. Comparing the Dutch to the Danish case, one important difference is about the role played by the Liberals: in Denmark, the distance between the *Venstre* and

the social democratic party has been decreasing, especially because of the right-wing shifting of the latter player. On the contrary, in the Netherlands the VVD has kept its right-wing posture and a consistent distance from the PvdA, thus thwarting the settlement of an ERP. Last but not least, the position of Greece and Portugal is totally incoherent with theoretical expectations. This is in line with what has been discovered in the previous chapter when they showed a configuration where all three conditions were present. Whether in Greece the LAOS has recently polled better, in Portugal an ERP is totally absent, perhaps because of the CDS/PP, namely, a steady conservative Christian Democratic party. However, since all conditions are present [1] and the outcome is absent [0], theoretical hypotheses are totally rejected. To conclude, two cases are in the same group of France described early: Wallonia and Spain. In these instances, hypotheses are confirmed since for both countries the outcome is absent [0]. More precisely, in Wallonia the FN has had an average consensus below 5 per cent and has been classified as absent in binary terms. This implies that Spain fits better the hypotheses since no ERP has ever polled any consistent percentage.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has extensively examined supply side factors, related to one fundamental institutional setting, i.e. the electoral system, and to party positions along two key dimensions, namely, economy and immigration. Permissive electoral rules, in particular PR formulas are widely appraised such as facilitating channel for new and small parties to gather votes and elect MPs. Whether PR formulas privileges the principle of representation, the prerogative of majoritarian electoral systems is governability, namely, they usually manufacture strong majorities and executives by over-representing the most voted party and under-representing parties from the third position downwards in the ranking. Therefore, the tested hypothesis postulated that the more the electoral system is permissive (i.e., approximating pure proportionality in the allocation of seats), the largest the ERPs' vote shares. Despite theoretical expectations appeared plausible, empirical results weakly corroborate the hypothesis. Indeed, considering for instance the Netherlands and Portugal, the

electoral system is markedly permissive but ERPs' scores are very low, in the former case, and nil in the latter one.

The second and the third hypothesis referred to the convergence of mainstream parties along, respectively, the economic and the immigration axis. The tested argument revolved around the expectation that the more MRP and MLP are spatially close to each other, the largest ERPs' vote shares. The location of Austrian and Flemish mainstream right and left parties is associated with ERPs' scores above the average and, therefore, those two cases corroborate both hypotheses. However, Greece and Portugal are conversely on the opposite side since, despite convergence is present in both cases and dimensions, ERPs are not successful.

In the light of those controversial results, the next chapter is devoted to combine all factors employed in the comparative analysis of both sides. The main purpose is to identify the combination of demand and supply side factors featuring each country.

V. AN ENCOMPASSING ANALYSIS

1. A COMPREHENSIVE BOOLEAN ANALYSIS

The aim of this final chapter is to put together all facets of analysis. Therefore, all information supplied by the last two chapters will be combined to join demand and supply side factors. Given the research question underpinning this research, the purpose is to pinpoint configurations of conditions that are causally associated to the outcome. Thus, as a first step, a comprehensive six-condition Venn diagram is made up to inspect how cases are distributed in the elaborate set of 64 possible combinations of causal conditions. Causal factors are, respectively, the three conditions of demand and supply side of the two previous chapters. With regards to the outcome, i.e. the ERPs vote percentage, an important remark is needed: this final chapter brings into account the average vote share from 1990 to 2009, that is the same amount of Chapter 4. As specified early, Chapter 3 considered a narrower period of time, concerning both conditions and the outcome, since European Social Survey data are not available in the last decade of the XXth century. This means that validity of demand side condition scores is extended to that period of time too. Acknowledging obvious criticisms, this assumption was inevitable since the lack of survey data in the 1990s. Furthermore, since the two decades at stake are contiguous, it does not appear such an overestimation to presume that the same country trends would have been reported whether data were collected in the 1990s. On the other side, the benefit of extending the period of analysis lies in thickening the relevance of results of this comprehensive inspection.

In short: on the one hand, nativism, xenophobia, and resentment are the three causal conditions of the demand side; on the other hand, electoral system, convergence on economy, and convergence on immigration are the three causal conditions of the supply side. Therefore, the 15 cases are distributed across the $2^6=64$ combinations of conditions. Through the same procedure early employed, countries are associated to their own configuration based on their binary values. Nevertheless, due to the unbalanced relation between a small number of cases and

rather larger number conditions⁹⁰, the drawback is the “individualisation” of countries. Briefly stated, it is unlikely to find out common patterns binding causal factors and the outcome. Indeed, the truth table confirms these expectations and, additionally, the only common configuration consists of a contradiction between Denmark and Finland. A somewhat complex six-condition Venn diagram help visualise the overall situation.

Table 5.1. Six-condition truth table.

NATIV	XENO	RESENT	ELSYS	E_CONV	I_CONV	OUTCOME	COUNTRY
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	Austria
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	Belgium/Fl
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	Belgium/Wa
0	0	0	1	0	1	C	Denmark, Finland
0	1	1	0	0	0	1	France
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	Germany
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	Greece, Portugal
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	Ireland
0	1	1	1	0	0	1	Italy
0	0	0	1	1	0	0	Netherlands
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Spain
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Sweden
1	1	1	0	0	1	0	UK


The early investigation on the demand side has already revealed that Austria, France, Germany, and Italy shared the same configuration made of a [1] value on [XENO] and [RESENT]. The contradiction was due to the [0] outcome of Germany since both REP and DVU polled very poorly on average. Those four countries manifest a different configuration on the supply side and Austria only still has two [1] values on [E_CONV] and [I_CONV], though the most critical case is Germany.

On the whole, it has three positive conditions [1], likewise Italy and one more than France: this already suggests that Germany does not fulfil in a good manner the hypothesis on ERPs electoral strength. In fact, its ERPs are too weak in electoral terms and this is not in line with what causal factors would imply. Two factors seem to play a crucial role. Like Austria and France, the German electoral system is not permissive: beyond the 5 per cent national threshold that sure enough counters excessive party fragmentation, the role of the Constitutional Court as

⁹⁰ That carries out a big number of combinations of conditions. It is worthwhile noting that the balance between the number of cases (N) and the number of conditions (k) should always be carefully checked, since the volume of combinations of causal conditions increases exponentially when k increases.

“guardian” of democracy is decisive. Indeed, radical parties are used to avoid the risk of being labelled as extremist and, thereby, bypassing the Constitutional Court’s ban from political competition.

Figure 5.A. Six-condition Venn diagram.



Secondly, the historical legacy of the National Socialist regime is severely cumbersome, hence the establishment of any ERPs — regardless of its claim to be free from any nazi legacy — is blamed as suspicious. Italy as well experienced an authoritarian regime under Mussolini’s command for about twenty years, until its collapse at the end of World War II. Yet, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), *de facto* heir of fascist ideology and values⁹¹, contested elections since 1948 — the

⁹¹ The MSI was established in 1946 by former supporters of the Italian Social Republic (RSI), among which Giorgio Almirante became the founder of the party and its charismatic leader.

first democratic election after the new republican constitution had been approved — and it was capable of stabilising its vote share around a 5 per cent average, so as to preserve its small group of MPs in the national Parliament. When the old party system crumbled and the majority of MSI's lieutenants exited the party to form the new and more moderate National Alliance (AN), the *conventio ad excludendum*⁹² was then removed and AN joined Berlusconi's Forza Italia and the Northern League in a double-side⁹³ alliance that won the 1994 general elections. Therefore, the Italian radical right gained an active position in politics and its key members left their long-term “exile” to fill major institutional charges. In Germany, the radical right is far from being considered as a “standard”, though radical, political player and rightist social demands in terms of xenophobia and resentment are at least partially absorbed by the Bavarian CSU, as demonstrated by its right wing location on immigration.

The demand side presented also a second contradictory configuration involving Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. As said just above, the three supply side factors are not able to solve the contradiction between the two first countries, whereas the last two share a mirroring configuration on the supply side. Indeed, the Netherlands have a [1] value on [ELSYS] and [E_CONV]. Conversely, in Sweden only a convergence on immigration came about. Two additional remarks have to be put forth. In the former case, the outcome was set to [0] given the marginal vote shares of the Centre Democrats (CD), the only Dutch political party here considered as an ERP. Nevertheless, the electoral performances of the List Pim Portuyn (LPF) and, then, the Party for Freedom (PVV) has to be monitored firmly, since it is possible that the second one may come closer to the ERP group in the near future, given its sharp Islamophobic platform. In the second case, the New Democracy party (NyD) was ruled out from the set under investigation and, notwithstanding, it was a flash party that contested only two national elections. Even though the demand side does not constitute a fertile ground for an ERP, the convergence on immigration between mainstream right and left parties may

⁹² The MSI had been put aside from the so-called *constitutional arch* constituted by all political forces in defence of the democratic regime.

⁹³ Actually, two small coalitions were set up in the centre-right camp: FI was allied with AN in the centre-south of Italy (*Polo del buon governo*) and in the north with NL (*Polo della libertà*).

actually open the way for the entry of a more radical right wing competitor. Actually, the Sweden Democrats were not included in the survey data, but in the 2010 national elections gathered an impressive 5.7 percent and elected 20 MPs. Although this may represent again a short-lived phenomenon, the Sweden Democrats might plausibly embody the exclusionist right in Sweden. As Chapter 4 exhibited earlier about the supply side, a second contradictory configuration — in addition to the Danish and Finnish combination — grouped together France, Spain, and Wallonia. Those three countries have all supply side conditions set to [0] and the contradiction was raised by the anomalous stance of France. Such an anomaly consisted of a strong National Front regardless of the absence of favourable supply side factors. Bringing into account demand side determinants solves those contradictions: all three cases have two out of three factors with [1] value.

Before passing to the calculation of a minimal Boolean formula, an important remark is to be pointed out. Indeed, causal conditions and the outcome have been coded in the same logical direction, so that when a given conditions [COND] has a [1] value, this is expected to be associated with a [1] outcome, and vice versa with [0] value. The six-condition truth table presented above showed rather clearly that this assumption is not consistently confirmed. It is sufficient to note that with Greece and Portugal all conditions are present, whereas the outcome is absent. Moreover, in opposite directions, both France and the UK represent troublesome cases: the former has a positive outcome although just two conditions out of six are present and, vice versa, the UK has a totally negative outcome despite four conditions have a [1] value. Furthermore, to obtain a minimal formula is needful to eliminate the contradiction configuration of Denmark and Finland. There are different ways to solve this problem, as listed by Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 48-49), but none of them perfectly fits the present context and, in any case, a choice is always to be justified on either theoretical or empirical grounds. As remarked earlier, in Finland the PS made a leap in the very recent 2011 national elections reaching 19 per cent with an increase of 14.9 percentage points. Whether this score was included in the analysis, the average score of PS would be 5.3 percent. This implies that the score of Finland would be coded as [1]. Moreover, when dropping a case it must be considered the balance between cases with [0] and [1] outcome

and two third of the total have a [0] value for the outcome. These are the main reasons why it appears opportune to drop Finland and keep Denmark in the set of analysis.

When dealing with csQCA and searching for a minimal formula, the minimisation process is to be performed four times like Rihoux and Ragin clearly specified stating the good practises to be followed (2009, 64-65): two times when the outcome is present and then absent, and again each of those processes must be repeated with and then without logical remainders. This way the final output consist of a simpler minimal formula since the software select those logical remainders – and makes some simplifying assumptions about them — and returns a more concise Boolean expression. Results are as follows:

I. Minimisation of the [1] outcome without logical remainders:

nativ * XENO * RESENT * e_conv * i_conv + nativ * XENO * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV + NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV + nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * e_conv * I_CONV

Table 5.2. Coverage of single terms of the minimal formula (1; ~LR).

<i>Term</i>	<i>Case</i>
nativ * XENO * RESENT * e_conv * i_conv	FRANCE + ITALY
nativ * XENO * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV	AUSTRIA
NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV	BELGIUM/FL
nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * e_conv * I_CONV	DENMARK

The first term is the only covering two cases, i.e. France and Italy. These two countries are featured by an adversarial competition between the two mainstream right and left parties, as showed by the absence of convergence both on economy and immigration. Moreover, in both countries there is a combination of [XENO] and [RESENT] and the former, condition as already highlighted, is a *quasi*-necessary condition since is present in four countries out of five. On the contrary, *nativism* is absent in all countries but Flanders.

II. Minimisation of the [0] outcome without logical remainders:

nativ * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * i_conv + NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * e_conv * i_conv + NATIV * XENO * RESENT * ELSYS * E_CONV * I_CONV + nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * E_CONV * i_conv + NATIV * xeno * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * i_conv + nativ * xeno * resent * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV + NATIV * XENO * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV

Table 5.3. Coverage of single terms of the minimal formula (0; ~LR).

Term	Case
nativ * RESENT * elsys * E_CONV * i_conv	GERMANY + IRELAND
NATIV * XENO * resent * elsys * e_conv * i_conv	BELGIUM/WA
NATIV * XENO * RESENT * ELSYS * E_CONV * I_CONV	GREECE, PORTUGAL
nativ * xeno * resent * ELSYS * E_CONV * i_conv	NETHERLANDS
NATIV * xeno * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * i_conv	SPAIN
nativ * xeno * resent * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV	SWEDEN
NATIV * XENO * RESENT * elsys * e_conv * I_CONV	UK

The only Boolean minimisation regards Germany and Ireland, indeed they differed only in relation to [XENO]. Again, the presence of *nativism* is rather unanticipated and counter theoretical expectations: indeed, [NATIV] is positive in five cases out of nine. This warns that the correspondent statistical indicator (*see* Table 3.2) measures a facet of nativism by explicitly mentioning race and ethnicity (*see* Appendix 2). Thus, it is possible that the item is perceived in “racist” terms and traditional racism – e.g., the white supremacy — is not a winning *atout* in contemporary political competition. This could account (at least, partially) for countries where [NATIV] is present and ERPs are unsuccessful at the polls.

It is now opportune to go further into analysis by computing logical remainders in the process of Boolean minimisation. The selection of logical remainders to be included is completely managed by Tosmana software (Cronqvist 2011) and is driven by the aim of getting a minimal formula as concise as possible.

III. Minimisation of the [1] outcome with logical remainders:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{ELSYS} * e_conv + \text{nativ} * \text{XENO} * e_conv + \text{elsys} * \text{E_CONV} * \text{I_CONV} = \\ & = e_conv * (\text{ELSYS} + \text{nativ} * \text{XENO}) + \text{elsys} * \text{E_CONV} * \text{I_CONV} \end{aligned}$$

Table 5.4. Coverage of single terms and simplifying assumptions (1; LR).

Term	Case
ELSYS * e_conv	DENMARK + ITALY
nativ * XENO * e_conv	FRANCE ⁹⁴ + ITALY
elsys * E_CONV * I_CONV	AUSTRIA + BELGIUM/FL

Note: simplifying assumptions listed by Table A2.2 (see Appendix 2).

The conditions *e_conv* has been factorised since it is shared by two terms. Some aspects are remarkable: first, Italy has two paths by which is positive outcome can be explained. This situation highlights an important QCA feature, i.e. equifinality: different causal factors, combined in different ways, can produce the

⁹⁴ Note that “nativ * XENO * e_conv” is the chosen prime implicant for France.

same outcome. That warns also how Italy is a complex case in terms of the relation between conditions and outcome. Secondly and in the opposite direction, convergence on economy is present for the other two countries — i.e., Austria and Belgium — therefore the role played by this condition is ambiguous on the whole. In analogy, also the function played by the electoral system is not completely straightforward since in two positive cases is permissive (Denmark and Italy) and in other two positive cases is not permissive (Austria and Flanders). In the last two cases, even though the electoral law provide barriers to the entry of new parties, a double convergence of mainstream right and left parties along both dimensions, enhances the electoral success of ERPs.

IV. Minimisation of the [0] outcome with logical remainders:

$$\text{NATIV} * \text{RESENT} + \text{E_CONV} * \text{i_conv} + \text{resent} * \text{elsys} * \text{e_conv}$$

Table 5.5. Coverage of single terms of the minimal formula (0; LR).

Term	Case
NATIV * RESENT	GREECE, PORTUGAL + SPAIN + UK
E_CONV * i_conv	GERMANY + IRELAND + NETHERLANDS
resent * elsys * e_conv	BELGIUM/WA + SWEDEN

Note: simplifying assumptions listed by Table A2.3 (see Appendix 2).

The last raw points out a combination of negative conditions that in line with the theory. On the contrary, the first raw counters theoretical expectations since a combination of *nativism* and *resentment* should be associated to a positive, rather than a negative, outcome. Furthermore, three cases out of four — e.g. Greece, Portugal, and the United Kingdom — represents deviant cases as it will be showed in the next section.

2. A WEIGHTED-ADDITIVE INDEX OF POTENTIALITY

In order to assemble all information on tap, an additive six-item index is made up to evaluate the overall demand and supply side potential for ERPs in relation to each country. The key point is that the index is built by pondering each component differently, thereby attributing divergent weights in order to differentiate the supposed theoretical relevance among items. Furthermore, this strategy improves QCA outputs since the latter brings into account demand and supply side conditions that are all “on the same level”. In other words, QCA does not attach a different degree of potentiality to conditions regarding their supposed power to affect the


outcome. By adopting a different point of view, it appears viable to argue that some causal factors have a stronger ascendancy on the outcome than others. In particular, three different weights⁹⁵ are used to rank the importance of components split in the two usual domains (demand and supply side), thereby keeping balanced their importance to the outcome.

Starting from the demand side, as showed also through QCA analysis, *xenophobia* is a crucial item insofar as formidable driver for ERPs electorate, thus it has been attached a weight equal to 3; secondly, *resentment* plays a middle-level role since ERPs have been capable of catching protest votes and present themselves as anti-establishment parties, thus the related item has been attribute a weight of 2; finally, *nativism* has been given a weight equal to 1 since its ambiguous presence in many instances where the outcome was absent [0]. On the whole, the assumption is that the psychological factor, captured by *xenophobia*, appears as more relevant as associated to the irrationality and fears of citizens both in the economic and cultural domain. On the supply side, *convergence on immigration* is considered as the most relevant, since the excessive closeness between MRP and MLP can push voters towards ERPs since they express more radical postures on the issue and, therefore, it is given a weight equal to 3; secondly, the strategic and debated importance of the *electoral system* is recognised by a weight equals to 2. Finally, *convergence on economy* has a weight equal to 1 and this is rather straightforward since, in several occasions, it has been said that economy is not at the core of ERPs' ideology. Moreover its absence is associated to three countries with positive outcome [1], as showed with minimisation with logical remainders.

The following diagram depicts the relationship between the weighted index and the average vote percentage of ERPs in the period 1990-2009 (*see* Table 4.2). The index is simply calculated by summing up each country's score, on each item, multiplied by its weight.

⁹⁵ Respectively equal to 3, 2, or 1, based on their decreasing importance in influencing ERPs' potential.

Figure 5.B. Weighted index and average vote percentage relationship⁹⁶.



On the horizontal axis, index value ranges from 3 to 12. In particular, there are two cases — Greece and Portugal — reaching the top score and four cases — the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden — at the bottom. Putting aside the three outliers lying at the bottom-right corner, the relationship between the two plotted variables is rather strong. Starting from the case with the most electorally supported ERPs (i.e., FPÖ and BZÖ), Austria holds the largest average vote percentage and its index equals 9. Hence, its position is in line with theoretical expectations. In particular, two conditions out of three are present along both sides. Situation is more complicated when index equals 5 since in two countries — France and Denmark — ERPs gathered consistent shares of votes, but the True Finns in Finland holds a middle-to-law strength. Although Germany stands in a borderline position, Greece, Portugal, and the United Kingdom are the real deviant cases.

In particular, in the latter case, no political actor has been able to profit of such a remarkable potential (9 out of 12 points) hitherto. Therefore, the position of UK

⁹⁶ Cases that are considered as outliers are indicated by an asterisk (*).

disconfirms the theoretical hypotheses. Furthermore, all demand side conditions are present in the UK, while convergence on immigration is the only positive condition on the supply side. On the whole, the argument of this section is that the focus has to be turned onto the electoral system. Given the high potential on the demand side, the role played by FPTP — as gatekeeper against party fragmentation — appears to be a crucial factor preventing small and new parties — and among them ERPs too — to enter the House of Commons. Although a larger number of parties are currently able to win some seats than in the past⁹⁷, these are expression of local instances embodied by regionalist parties like the Scottish National Party, the Welsh Plaid Cymru, and others from Northern Ireland. Usually the potential electorate close to ERPs' ideology is not geographically concentrated, i.e. over-represented in some areas, and the same can be argued as well for the Greens. Given the “winner takes all” principle of FPTP system, a candidate needs a plurality in its constituency to win that seat. This implies that demand side conditions should be switch on and concentrated in some districts, in correspondence of ERPs' candidates. In fact, although nativism, xenophobia, and resentment, are present on average across the country, these cannot favour ERPs saved when they are particularly sharp in small portion of the territory. Just as an example, the British National Party could take advantage of immigrant crimes in small cities where resentment and xenophobia become deeply felt by local population. Nevertheless, as long as FPTP is in force, its braking role represents a barrier that ERPs are nowadays not capable to overstep. Moreover, the convergence of the Labour and Conservative parties leans evidently on the right⁹⁸. This clearly means that the Labour moved towards the centre of the political spectrum, while the Tories kept their right-wing stance. Consequently, for an ERP is not straightforward to campaign on immigration, trying to attract part of the electorate of the mainstream centre-right party (CONS).

On the other hand, different observations can be carried out regarding Greece and Portugal. In the first case, the LAOS has returned increasing electoral

⁹⁷ Together with a loss of votes for both the Labour Party and the Tories, an erosion of two-party system appears on the way (Vassallo 2005).

⁹⁸ Indeed, considering all four surveys their average score middle point on immigration is equal to 0.62.

performances, thus Greece may be intended such a “late comer” case, i.e. favourable demand and supply side factors have finally enhanced the emergence of a “delayed” ERP. On the contrary, Portugal does not have any ERP, though the role of the CDS/PP cannot be totally discarded, since the People’s Party holds features that are close to a borderline case.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The description of the West European party system change in the last two decades has represented the background throughout the research. This ongoing transformation traces back to the ascending relevance of non-economic issue in society and, by consequence, in party competition. In particular, the flux of immigrants from non-EU member countries has acquired a growing substance and triggered frictions on cultural grounds. The return on stage of the right-wing radicalism is situated in that context, even though this cannot be conceived just as mere corollary of immigration. Indeed, Kitschelt argued that the radical right is not simply an anti-immigrant backlash and «the themes of racism and cultural intolerance are embedded in broader right-authoritarian political dispositions that are prominent among identifiable social groups» (1995, 257). Actually, ERPs gives political representation to a broader set of feelings, spread in most European countries and bind to the globalisation process. Briefly stated, the latter has brought about the weakening of state barriers and facilitated connections among people and cultures. By consequence, the risk of being exposed to a wider international competition, in economic terms, and to the challenge of unconventional value systems, in cultural terms, is appraised as responsible for the widening of public fears, anxieties and resentments. Nowadays, most of West European party systems consists of four political areas where the mainstream right and left are sided by a libertarian left and an exclusionist right.

The first part of the investigation has been devoted to the portrayal of how party systems evolved and this made possible the recognition of the Exclusionist Right Parties (ERPs), i.e. the chief object of the analysis. The importance of Part 1 lies in setting the research context along with the definition of a proper label for parties at stakes, thereby avoiding any conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). As

stated in the introduction, the main purpose is the identification of configurations of demand and supply side factors accounting for ERPs' electoral performances. Hence, Part 2 is completely committed to that goal. Conveniently, causal factors are divided into demand and supply sides, and they are combined in the final chapter to bond the entire analysis. As showed by the encompassing analysis, minimal formulas for the positive and negative outcomes are rather complex and common patterns grouping together several countries did not emerge easily, saved when including logical remainders. Moreover, some causal conditions are troublesome, like nativism and convergence on economy, in terms of how they actually affect the outcome. About the latter point, this leaves open to debate the supposed new winning formula for radical right parties based on authoritarianism on cultural grounds and a neo-centrist stance on economy (De Lange 2007). Moreover, the role of the electoral system is not clear-cut as demonstrated by two polar cases, i.e. France and the UK: both countries employ majoritarian electoral systems, though in France the National Front has managed not just to survive, but also to acquire a strong political blackmail potential (Sartori 1976), whereas in the UK the exclusionist right is practically irrelevant.

Furthermore, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis proved to be a very powerful too in conducting a rigorous comparison across countries on a given set of conditions. Yet, some limitations are to be reminded, in particular the limited diversity drawback, i.e. given a middle-to-low number of cases it is not appropriate to increase the number of causal factors brought into account. In a nutshell, this setback reproduces the widely known problem of "many variables, small number of cases". QCA is settled on a firm determinism binding conditions to the outcome and all causal factors stand on the same level of importance. Nevertheless, the construction of the weighted additive index has showed that some factors are more influent than others in affecting the outcome. In particular, the two key drivers accounting for different degrees of ERPs' electoral scores are xenophobia, on the demand side, and convergence on immigration, on the supply side. Whenever these two factors reach high values (in this research, above the West European average), then it is more likely that ERPs poll better.

Of course, the overall topic needs further inquiries in several respects. Some of proposals are here put forth: firstly, a deeper analysis of Greece and Portugal, both belonging to the South European area and to third way of democratisation, holding a very high potential for ERPs that has been only partially translated into practise by the former; secondly, a comparison between Denmark and Finland where causal condition' scores are very similar, but results in terms of ERPs' vote shares are divergent; thirdly, a study of France and the UK for the reason explained early, starting from the electoral systems. Moreover, further researches can be conducted taking into account other factors than those treated in the present investigation. Certainly, one of the most important is populism. The main drawback lies on the difficulty in gathering reliable data about that phenomenon, conceived not just as political style but also as an ideology. In particular, measuring that property is subject to many criticisms and, in terms of political propaganda, populism is not an exclusive feature of ERPs since it appears as the *leitmotiv* of contemporary age. Finally, the personalisation of politics and the key role of charismatic leadership is another key factor: here, the pitfall lies in the direction of causality. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that strong leaders are decisive in the electoral performances of their parties or, vice versa, successful parties make their leaders stronger.

APPENDIX 1

Table A.1. Expert survey party positions: Austria.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
BZÖ	-	-	0.60	0.76	-	-	-	0.95
FPÖ	0.76	0.64	0.68	0.48	0.88	0.91	0.92	0.98
GRÜNEN	0.32	0.30	0.26	0.26	0.10	0.11	0.14	0.10
KPO	0.22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LIF	-	0.76	-	0.75	0.20	0.21	-	0.12
ÖVP	0.66	0.62	0.72	0.68	0.56	0.64	0.66	0.83
SPÖ	0.51	0.42	0.34	0.28	0.43	0.60	0.42	0.43

Figure A.1. Austrian bi-dimensional space.




Table A.2. Expert survey party positions: Belgium (Flanders).

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
AGALEV	0.43	0.21	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.05	0.11
CVP/CD&V	0.60	0.58	0.44	0.56	0.55	0.59	0.35	0.59
ID21	-	0.51	-	-	-	-	-	-
VU/N-VA	0.61	0.50	0.57	0.71	0.53	0.51	-	0.74
PVV/VLD	0.85	0.76	0.81	0.79	0.69	0.72	0.63	0.61
SP.A.	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.26	0.40	0.50	0.22	0.38
VB	0.74	0.88	0.70	0.71	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99

Figure A.2. Belgian (Flanders) bi-dimensional space.




Table A.3. Expert survey party positions: Belgium (Wallonia).

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
ECOLO	0.43	0.18	0.19	0.35	0.12	0.12	0.05	0.20
FDF/RW	0.51	0.63	-	-	-	-	-	-
FN	-	-	0.74	-	0.99	0.98	0.96	-
MCC	-	0.58	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRL/MR	0.84	0.70	0.70	0.75	0.72	0.61	0.46	0.53
PS	0.31	0.26	0.21	0.32	0.35	0.34	0.24	0.25
PSC/CDH	0.61	0.53	0.52	0.58	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.48

Figure A.3. Belgian (Wallonia) bi-dimensional space.




Table A.4. Expert survey party positions: Denmark.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
CC	0.33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CD	0.57	0.53	0.43	-	0.36	0.38	0.27	-
DF	-	0.73	0.47	0.48	0.94	0.96	0.97	0.92
DKP	0.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EL	-	0.10	0.15	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.10
FOLKB	-	0.10	-	0.27	-	-	-	-
FP	0.97	0.89	0.88	-	0.89	0.90	0.96	-
G	0.32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
JUNIB	-	0.20	-	0.28	-	-	-	-
KF	0.79	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.63	0.69	0.77	0.76
KRF	0.62	0.57	0.45	-	0.43	0.42	0.40	-
RV	0.61	0.53	0.49	0.58	0.25	0.26	0.18	0.24
SD	0.43	0.34	0.34	0.36	0.35	0.53	0.55	0.66
SF	0.30	0.21	0.20	0.23	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.20
V	0.86	0.77	0.73	0.66	0.63	0.75	0.74	0.76
VS	0.13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Figure A.4. Danish bi-dimensional space.




Table A.5. Expert survey party positions: Finland.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
DA	0.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EKA	-	0.57	-	-	-	-	-	-
FPDL	0.18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IKL	-	-	-	-	0.87	0.92	-	-
KESK	0.54	0.54	0.45	0.50	0.48	0.57	0.59	0.57
KIPU	-	0.45	-	-	-	-	-	-
KOK	0.70	0.82	0.78	0.74	0.52	0.59	0.62	0.50
LPP	0.63	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	0.57	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
REM	-	0.58	-	-	-	-	-	-
SDP	0.26	0.34	0.39	0.30	0.29	0.35	0.36	0.48
SFP	0.72	0.70	0.63	0.71	-	-	-	-
SKL/KD	0.67	0.56	0.39	0.50	0.53	0.62	0.55	0.51
SMP/PS	0.50	0.54	0.44	0.48	0.72	0.73	0.94	0.81
VAS	-	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.29	0.31
VIHR	0.34	0.38	0.32	0.34	0.12	0.15	0.15	0.16
VSL	-	-	-	-	0.71	0.71	-	-

Figure A.5. Finnish bi-dimensional space.




Table A.6. Expert survey party positions: France.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
CPNT	-	0.73	-	-	-	-	-	-
D	-	0.90	-	-	-	-	-	-
DL	-	0.74	-	-	-	-	-	-
FN	0.89	0.87	0.83	0.66	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.86
LO-LCR	-	0.02	-	-	-	-	-	-
MEI	-	0.50	-	-	-	-	-	-
MN	-	0.86	-	-	-	-	-	-
MPF	-	-	0.77	0.75	0.86	0.84	0.85	0.79
PCF	0.06	0.14	0.07	0.06	0.20	0.19	0.25	0.19
PRG	0.41	0.51	-	0.39	-	-	-	-
PS	0.30	0.36	0.32	0.21	0.31	0.37	0.28	0.43
RPF	-	0.74	0.68	-	-	-	-	-
RPR	0.68	0.64	0.70	-	0.78	0.74	0.60	-
UDF	0.66	0.63	0.68	0.58	0.69	0.67	0.50	0.59
UMP	-	-	-	0.70	-	-	-	0.76
VERTS	0.34	0.40	0.19	0.29	0.16	0.11	0.07	0.10

Figure A.6. French bi-dimensional space.




Table A.7. Expert survey party positions: Germany.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
CDU	0.66	0.57	0.71	0.68	0.65	0.68	0.72	0.77
CSU	-	0.65	0.66	0.65	0.76	0.79	0.72	0.87
DKP	-	-	0.04	-	-	-	-	-
DVU	-	0.72	-0.02	-	0.98	0.98	0.97	-
FDP	0.77	0.73	0.93	0.86	0.44	0.46	0.36	0.47
GRÜNEN	0.22	0.35	0.53	0.40	0.17	0.18	0.09	0.19
NDP	0.64	-	0.42	-	-	-	-	-
PDS/DL	-	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.26	0.24	0.22	0.32
REP	-	0.72	0.52	-	0.94	0.94	0.97	-
SCHIL	-	-	0.69	-	-	-	0.91	-
SPD	0.29	0.41	0.44	0.34	0.37	0.42	0.35	0.54

Figure A.7. German bi-dimensional space.




Table A.8. Expert survey party positions: Greece.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
DIKKI	-	0.29	-	0.08	-	0.55	-	-
EM					0.88	0.96	-	-
KKE	0.08	0.09	0.18	0.01	0.29	0.31	0.41	0.36
KKEES	0.36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LAOS	-	-	-	0.53	-	-	-	0.98
ND	0.72	0.74	0.73	0.69	0.53	0.69	0.72	0.61
PASOK	0.36	0.54	0.52	0.42	0.51	0.49	0.44	0.30
POLA	-	0.67	-	-	0.75	0.75	-	-
SYN	-	0.36	0.29	0.11	0.30	0.34	0.13	0.07

Figure A.8. Greek bi-dimensional space.




Table A.9. Expert survey party positions: Ireland.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
DSP	0.20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FF	0.67	0.53	0.67	0.63	0.72	0.71	0.72	0.55
FG	0.72	0.63	0.61	0.69	0.67	0.61	0.63	0.55
GP	-	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.29	0.28	0.25	0.31
LAB	0.29	0.37	0.29	0.38	0.35	0.39	0.30	0.44
NPI	-	-	-	-	0.80	0.85	-	-
PD	0.85	0.82	0.86	0.85	0.68	0.56	0.69	0.63
SF	0.28	0.23	0.21	0.20	0.52	0.42	0.40	0.37
SP	-	0.15	-	-	-	-	-	-
WP	0.18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Figure A.9. Irish bi-dimensional space.




Table A.10. Expert survey party positions: Italy.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
AN	-	0.43	0.48	0.54	0.86	0.79	0.77	0.70
CCD	-	0.50	-	-	0.55	0.59	-	-
CDU	-	0.50	-	-	-	-	-	-
DC	0.53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DEM/DL	-	0.43	0.39	0.44	-	-	0.23	0.32
DP	0.02	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FI	-	0.73	0.87	0.77	0.65	0.69	0.71	0.67
IDV	-	-	0.40	0.46	-	-	0.36	-
LN	-	0.88	0.74	0.81	0.94	0.90	0.96	0.82
MRE	-	-	-	0.48	-	-	-	0.63
MSFT	-	0.52	0.30	-	-	0.91	0.89	-
MSI	0.71	-	-	-	0.90	-	-	-
NPSI	-	-	-	0.57	-	-	-	0.63
PCI	0.11	-	-	-	0.21	-	-	-
PDCI	-	-	0.15	0.03	-	-	0.13	0.20
PDS/DS	-	0.33	0.30	0.30	-	0.30	0.18	0.30
PdUP	-	0.10	-	-	-	-	-	-
PLI	0.80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PP	-	-	-	0.45	-	-	-	0.57
PPI	-	0.40	-	-	0.32	0.36	-	-
PR	0.37	0.82	0.75	0.67	-	-	0.22	0.52
PRI	0.68	0.58	-	-	-	-	-	-
PsDA	-	0.37	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSDI	0.44	0.40	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSI	0.43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RC	-	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.20
RI	-	0.62	-	-	-	-	-	-
SDI	-	-	0.44	0.38	-	-	0.33	0.35
SEGNI	-	0.64	-	-	-	-	-	-
SVP	-	0.55	-	0.47	-	-	-	-
UD	-	0.50	-	-	-	-	-	-
UDC	-	-	0.51	0.51	-	-	0.42	0.58
UDEUR	-	-	-	0.43	-	-	-	0.54
VERDI	0.28	0.38	0.21	0.30	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.18

Figure A.10. Italian bi-dimensional space.




Table A.11. Expert survey party positions: Netherlands.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
CD	-	0.86	-	-	0.97	0.97	-	-
CDA	0.66	0.53	0.65	0.56	0.51	0.57	0.55	0.63
CPN	0.04	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
D66	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.52	0.35	0.41	0.33	0.40
GL	-	0.24	0.22	0.20	0.14	0.20	0.12	0.22
GPV/CU	0.73	0.58	0.46	0.41	0.68	0.72	0.45	0.57
LPF	-	-	0.81	-	-	-	0.91	0.94
PPR	0.11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSP	0.06	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PvdA	0.25	0.44	0.37	0.36	0.34	0.42	0.35	0.42
PVV	-	-	-	0.83	-	-	-	-
RPF	0.80	0.60	-	-	0.68	0.72	-	-
SGP	0.79	0.73	0.64	-	0.74	0.78	0.66	-
SP	-	0.09	0.14	0.11	0.54	0.54	0.42	0.53
VVD	0.86	0.74	0.83	0.79	0.71	0.75	0.77	0.80

Figure A.11. Dutch bi-dimensional space.




Table A.12. Expert survey party positions: Portugal.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
BE	-	0.25	0.22	0.12	-	-	0.08	0.09
CDS/PP	0.84	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.67	0.67	0.75	0.79
CDU	-	0.24	-	0.09	-	-	-	0.28
DI	0.37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
G	0.21	-	0.22	-	0.15	0.14	0.17	-
MDP	0.32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PCP	0.13	-	0.16	-	0.20	0.19	0.15	-
PDC	0.86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PRD	0.46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSD	0.68	0.60	0.71	0.70	0.55	0.51	0.59	0.60
PS	0.41	0.44	0.40	0.48	0.36	0.37	0.35	0.49
PSR	0.16	-	-	-	0.08	0.06	-	-
PXXI	-	-	-	-	0.13	0.10	-	-
UDP	0.16	-	-	-	0.13	0.12	-	-

Figure A.12. Portuguese bi-dimensional space.




Table A.13. Expert survey party positions: Spain.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
BNG	-	0.30	-	0.22	-	-	-	0.44
CC	-	0.56	-	0.61	-	-	-	0.64
CDS	0.44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CHA	-	-	-	0.24	-	-	-	0.47
CIU	0.53	0.61	0.58	0.65	0.59	0.51	0.61	0.59
CP	0.72	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EA	-	0.47	-	0.48	-	-	-	0.48
EAJ-PNV	0.57	0.56	0.54	0.60	0.59	0.57	0.63	0.56
ERC	-	0.35	-	0.24	-	-	-	0.53
FE-JONS	-	-	-	-	0.93	0.93	-	-
HB	0.30	0.18	-	-	-	-	-	-
IC	-	0.33	-	-	-	-	-	-
IU	0.12	0.24	0.15	0.15	0.20	0.16	0.13	0.35
MUC	0.07	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PAR	-	0.63	-	-	-	-	-	-
PP	-	0.66	0.83	0.79	0.72	0.69	0.82	0.68
PRD	0.63	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSC	-	0.42	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSOE	0.29	0.45	0.34	0.39	0.47	0.37	0.34	0.43
UV	-	0.57	-	-	-	-	-	-
VERDE	-	0.24	-	-	-	-	-	-

Figure A.13. Spanish bi-dimensional space.




Table A.14. Expert survey party positions: Sweden.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
CDU/KD	0.59	0.67	0.67	0.69	0.50	0.52	0.45	0.50
COM/V	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.22	0.20	0.17	0.19
C	0.52	0.57	0.55	0.72	0.56	0.59	0.47	0.56
FPL	0.66	0.76	0.66	0.74	0.31	0.34	0.26	0.58
JL	-	-	-	0.59	-	-	-	0.57
M	0.84	0.83	0.88	0.79	0.60	0.65	0.53	0.57
MP	0.34	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.29	0.26	0.22	0.23
NyD	-	0.80	-	-	0.93	0.93	-	-
SAP	0.35	0.41	0.32	0.32	0.46	0.51	0.34	0.48
SD	-	-	-	-	0.97	0.97	-	-

Figure A.14. Swedish bi-dimensional space.





Table A.15. Expert survey party positions: United Kingdom.

Party	Economy				Immigration			
	1992 (I)	1999 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)	1990 (I)	2000 (II)	2003 (III)	2006 (IV)
BNP	-	-	-	-	0.98	0.98	-	-
CONS	0.85	0.77	0.75	0.70	0.71	0.73	0.67	0.80
GREENS	-	0.19	-	0.29	0.24	0.22	-	0.36
LAB	0.23	0.49	0.37	0.44	0.45	0.55	0.42	0.65
LIBDEMS	0.38	0.38	0.25	0.43	0.39	0.38	0.26	0.38
PC	0.23	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.38	0.41	0.38	0.43
SNP	0.26	0.29	0.27	0.39	0.37	0.45	0.38	0.46
UKIP	-	0.78	-	0.84	-	-	-	0.96

Figure A.15. British bi-dimensional space.



APPENDIX 2

Table A2.1. List of items within the ESS 'D' module in 2002.

D1 IMGETN	"MOST IMMIGRANTS TO COUNTRY OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS MAJORITY"
D2 EIMGRPC	"IMMIGRANTS FROM EUROPE: MOST FROM RICH/POOR COUNTRIES"
D3 IMGRPC	"IMMIGRANTS FROM OUTSIDE EUROPE: FROM RICH/POOR COUNTRIES"
D4 IMSMETN	"ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS OF SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP AS MAJORITY"
D5 IMDFETN	"ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS OF DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP FROM MAJORITY"
D6 EIMRCNT	"ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM RICHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE"
D7 EIMPCNT	"ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM POORER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE"
D8 IMRCNTR	"ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM RICHER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE"
D9 IMPCNTR	"ALLOW MANY/FEW IMMIGRANTS FROM POORER COUNTRIES OUTSIDE EUROPE"
D10 QFIMEDU	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: GOOD EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS"
D11 QFIMFML	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: CLOSE FAMILY LIVING HERE"
D12 QFIMLNG	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: SPEAK COUNTRY'S OFFICIAL LANGUAGE"
D13 QFIMCHR	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: CHRISTIAN BACKGROUND"
D14 QFIMWHT	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: BE WHITE"
D15 QFIMWLT	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: BE WEALTHY"
D16 QFIMWSK	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: WORK SKILLS NEEDED IN COUNTRY"
D17 QFIMCMT	"QUALIFICATION FOR IMMIGRATION: COMMITTED TO WAY OF LIFE IN COUNTRY"
D18 IMWGDWN	"AVERAGE WAGES/SALARIES GENERALLY BROUGHT DOWN BY IMMIGRANTS"
D19 IMHECOP	"IMMIGRANTS HARM ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF THE POOR MORE THAN THE RICH"
D20 IMFLJOB	"IMMIGRANTS HELP TO FILL JOBS WHERE THERE ARE SHORTAGE OF WORKERS"
D21 IMUNPLV	"IF IMMIGRANTS ARE LONG TERM UNEMPLOYED THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE"
D22 IMSMRGT	"IMMIGRANTS SHOULD BE GIVEN SAME RIGHTS AS EVERYONE ELSE"
D23 IMSCLV	"IF IMMIGRANTS COMMIT SERIOUS CRIME THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE"
D24 IMACRLV	"IF IMMIGRANTS COMMIT ANY CRIME THEY SHOULD BE MADE TO LEAVE"
D25 IMTCJOB	"IMMIGRANTS TAKE JOBS AWAY IN COUNTRY OR CREATE NEW JOBS"
D26 IMBLECO	"TAXES AND SERVICES: IMMIGRANTS TAKE OUT MORE THAN THEY PUT IN OR LESS"
D27 IMBGECO	"IMMIGRATION BAD OR GOOD FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMY"
D28 IMUECLT	"COUNTRY'S CULTURAL LIFE UNDERMINED OR ENRICHED BY IMMIGRANTS"
D29 IMWBCNT	"IMMIGRANTS MAKE COUNTRY WORSE OR BETTER PLACE TO LIVE"
D30 IMWBCRM	"IMMIGRANTS MAKE COUNTRY'S CRIME PROBLEMS WORSE OR BETTER"
D31 IMBGHCT	"IMMIGRATION TO COUNTRY BAD OR GOOD FOR HOME COUNTRIES IN THE LONG RUN"
D32 CTBFSMV	"ALL COUNTRIES BENEFIT IF PEOPLE CAN MOVE WHERE THEIR SKILLS NEEDED"
D33 IMRSPRC	"RICHER COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE TO ACCEPT PEOPLE FROM POORER COUNTRIES"
D34 IMSETBS	"IMMIGRANT SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: YOURBOSS"
D35 IMSETMR	"IMMIGRANT SAME RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: MARRIED CLOSE RELATIVE"
D36 IMDETBS	"IMMIGRANT DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: YOUR BOSS"
D37 IMDETRM	"IMMIGRANT DIFFERENT RACE/ETHNIC GROUP MAJORITY: MARRIED CLOSE RELATIVE"
D38 IDETALV	"PEOPLE OF MINORITY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP IN IDEAL LIVING AREA"
D39 ACETALV	"PEOPLE OF MINORITY RACE/ETHNIC GROUP IN CURRENT LIVING AREA"
D40 PPLSTRD	"BETTER FOR A COUNTRY IF ALMOST EVERYONE SHARE CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS"
D41 VRTRLG	"BETTER FOR A COUNTRY IF A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT RELIGIONS"
D42 COMNLNG	"BETTER FOR A COUNTRY IF ALMOST EVERYONE SPEAK ONE COMMON LANGUAGE"
D43 ALWSPSC	"IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED SEPARATE SCHOOLS"
D44 STIMRDT	"IF A COUNTRY WANTS TO REDUCE TENSION IT SHOULD STOP IMMIGRATION"
D45 LWDSCWP	"LAW AGAINST ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN WORKPLACE GOOD/BAD FOR A COUNTRY"
D46 LWPETH	"LAW AGAINST PROMOTING RACIAL OR ETHNIC HATRED GOOD/BAD FOR A COUNTRY"
D47 IMGFRND	"ANY IMMIGRANT FRIENDS"
D48 IMGCLG	"ANY IMMIGRANT COLLEAGUES"
D49 SHRRFG	"COUNTRY HAS MORE THAN ITS FAIR SHARE OF PEOPLE APPLYING REFUGEE STATUS"
D50 RFGAWRK	"PEOPLE APPLYING REFUGEE STATUS ALLOWED TO WORK WHILE CASES CONSIDERED"
D51 GVRFGAP	"GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE GENEROUS JUDGING APPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEE STATUS"
D52 RFGFRPC	"MOST REFUGEE APPLICANTS NOT IN REAL FEAR OF PERSECUTION OWN COUNTRIES"
D53 RFGDTCN	"REFUGEE APPLICANTS KEPT IN DETENTION CENTRES WHILE CASES CONSIDERED"
D54 RFGGVFN	"FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO REFUGEE APPLICANTS WHILE CASES CONSIDERED"
D55 RFGBFML	"GRANTED REFUGEES SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO BRING CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS"
D56 NOIMBRO	"OF EVERY 100 PEOPLE IN COUNTRY HOW MANY BORN OUTSIDE COUNTRY"
D57 CPIMPOP	"COUNTRY'S NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS COMPARED TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SAME SIZE"
D58 BLNCMIG	"NUMBER OF PEOPLE LEAVING COUNTRY COMPARED TO COMING IN"

Source: ESS-1 2002 Documentation Report.

Table A2.2. Twenty-three simplifying assumptions.

nativ*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 nativ*xeno*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 nativ*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 nativ*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 nativ*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv +
 nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV +
 nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 nativ*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 nativ*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 nativ*XENO*RESENT*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV +
 nativ*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*resent*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV

Note: conditions in capital characters are present [1], while in small characters are absent [0].

Table A2.3. Twenty-eight simplifying assumptions.

nativ*xeno*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv +
 nativ*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +
 nativ*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv +
 nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv +
 nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV +
 nativ*XENO*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +
 nativ*XENO*resent*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv +
 nativ*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*xeno*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*resent*elsys*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*resent*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*resent*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*elsys*E_CONV*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*i_conv +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*e_conv*I_CONV +
 NATIV*XENO*RESENT*ELSYS*E_CONV*i_conv

Note: conditions in capital characters are present [1], while in small characters are absent [0].

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